State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley
| Decision Date | 27 July 1956 |
| Citation | 124 A.2d 898,143 Conn. 679 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. Arba I. COOLEY v. Charles H. KEGLEY. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Stanley Yesukiewicz, Thompsonville, for appellant (defendant).
Phillip E. Tatoian, Thompsonville, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ., and COMLEY, Superior Court Judge.
In this action of quo warranto, the trial court rendered judgment ousting the defendant from the office of selectman of the town of Enfield. The issues of law were presented upon a stipulation of facts which may be summarized as follows: On May 2, 1955, a regular town election was held in Enfield at which two Democrats and one Republican were elected to constitute the board of selectmen, their terms of office to commence on July 1, 1955, and to expire on June 30, 1957. On or about October 5, 1955, a vacancy was created by the resignation of the Republican member. Upon the application of twenty electors in accordance with § 646d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes (as amended, Nov. 1955 Sup. § N111), a special town election to fill this vacancy was held on December 6, 1955. At this election the plaintiff, who is a registered Republican, was the candidate of his party, and the defendant, a registered Democrat, was the candidate of his party. The defendant won the election and has assumed the office of selectman.
The judgment of the trial court that the defendant is not entitled to the office was based upon the portion of § 669d 1 of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement which provides that '[n]o more than a bare majority of [the board of selectmen] shall be members of the same political party.' In his appeal to this court, the defendant raises but one question of law. He contends that the quoted portion of the statute applies only to boards of selectmen as elected at a regular town election and not to the filling of a vacancy at a special election.
This claim is without merit. The principle of minority political representation upon board of selectmen and certain other municipal bodies became a part of our law with the enactment of chapter 81 of the Public Acts of 1877. This was accomplished by the application of the system of so-called restrictive voting whereby, if the number of candidates to be elected to a board was even, no person should vote for more than one-half of that number, and if the number was odd, no person should vote for more than a bare majority of that number. From 1877 to the present time, restrictive voting for the candidates for boards of selectmen has remained in force. Rev.1888, § 46; Rev.1902, § 1810; Rev.1918, § 269; Rev.1930, § 281; Rev.1949, § 515; Cum.Sup.1955, § 669d. In the practical operation of our political party system this method of voting has been effective to secure minority representation where the whole board is to be chosen at a regular town election. This would not be the result at a special election held to fill a vacancy. In fact, where only one office is to be filled, it would be mathematically impossible to follow the statutory system of restrictive voting.
The language now before us for construction had its origin in § 60h of the 1945 Supplement. By that statute, the position of first selectman was first set up as a separate elective office, and even though the principle of restrictive voting for boards of selectmen was retained in the preceding section, 59h, there was added at the end of § 60h the sentence in question: 'No more than a bare majority of [the board of selectmen] shall be members of the same political party.'
It is difficult to observe any purpose in the addition of this sentence other than to ensure that at all times and however constituted, whether by regular or special election, a board of selectmen should have minority political representation upon it. For almost eighty years this wholesome principle, so advantageous to the public and to all political parties, has been recognized by the General Assembly through its retention of restrictive voting as applied to regular town elections. But for the addition of the language in question this desirable result could be defeated at a special election, for it is fair to assume...
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Johnson v. Manson
...clear there is no room for statutory construction. Little v. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 455, 262 A.2d 174 [1969]; State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley, 143 Conn. 679, 683, 124 A.2d 898 [1956]; State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri, 139 Conn. 203, 207, 91 A.2d 773 [1952].' Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 ......
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State v. Hughes
...445, 447, 86 A.2d 70. In such a case, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley, 143 Conn. 679, 683, 124 A.2d 898; Wilson v. Town of West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 654, 116 A.2d 420. The words used in expressing the legislative inten......
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State v. Anonymous (1971-4)
...intent is clear and the language used to express it is unambiguous, there is no room for statutory construction. State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley, 143 Conn. 679, 683, 124 A.2d 898; State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 165, 20 A.2d 737. Thus, § 53-174 has been held not unconstitutional on its face......
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