State ex rel. Cooper v. Cloyd
Decision Date | 11 January 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 55441,55441 |
Citation | 461 S.W.2d 833 |
Parties | STATE of Missouiri ex rel. Paul COOPER, Individually and as Trustee for Bernadine Quinn and Executor of the Purported Last Will of Margaret Tracy, Deceased, Relator, v. Honorable George W. CLOYD, Judge of Division 9 of the Circuit Court of the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Bart Mantia, St. Louis, and Ben G. Landau, St. Louis, for relator.
David G. Dempsey, Clayton, for respondent.
This is an original action in prohibition filed in the St. Louis Court of Appeals wherein relator seeks to prohibit the respondent judge of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County from proceeding with a will contest.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals issued its preliminary writ and on final determination a majority of that court quashed the preliminary writ. One judge dissented in a separate dissenting opinion and certified that he believed the decision reached by the majority to be contrary to that in Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Banc), 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935; Jensen v. Hinderks, 338 Mo. 459, 92 S.W.2d 108; and Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478, whereupon the court of appeals transferred the cause here for final determination pursuant to the Missouri Constitution 1945, Art. V, § 10, V.A.M.S. We will consider the matter the same as if the proceeding had been brought directly in this court. Mo.Const.1945, Art. V, § 10; State ex rel. Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. v. Brackman, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 289.
The issue is whether or not the will contest petition filed by contestants in the circuit court shows them to have the requisite standing to maintain a will contest under § 473.083, subd. 1, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., which requires that a contestant be a '* * * person interested in the probate of a will. * * *' The resolution of this issue depends on the answers to two questions: Does the increased power of the testamentary trustee to encroach upon the corpus for the support of the principal beneficiary detrimentally affect the residuary beneficiaries financially, and is the interest of the contestants a present one when it is dependent upon their surviving the principal beneficiary?
The majority of the St. Louis Court of Appeals upheld the contestants' right to maintain the will contest. We agree with the result reached by the St. Louis Court of Appeals but not on the basis that contestants have a financial interest in the estate of the deceased, but because contestants have a financial interest in the probate of the will of the deceased. We believe the distinction is important because of the differences between an 'interest in the estate' and an 'interest in the probate of the will.' In large measure we will utilize the majority opinion of the court of appeals in this opinion without the use of quotes.
The contestants, Robert F. and Frances Quinn, make their claim of financial interest in the probate of the will on the differences between provision made for them in a testamentary trust by an earlier rejected will and those made for them in the later admitted will. These differences concern a change in the trustee's powers which the Quinns say may reduce the amount of money they are to receive as the residuary beneficiaries. We mark out the relevant differences between the rejected will executed April 18, 1966, and the admitted will executed August 17, 1966.
The similarities: By each will Mrs. Margaret Taylor bequeathed (a) $5,000 to the contestants, Robert and Frances Quinn, (b) a substantial amount of property in trust to pay Bernadine M. Quinn a $225 monthly income, and (c) the same fractional share of the residue, if any, remaining at Bernadine Quinn's death.
The relevant dissimilarities: The earlier April will restricted the trustee's power to encroach upon the corpus to Bernadine Quinn's need for 'medical or nurising or hospital care.' The later August will broadens this power of encroachment for the benefit of Bernadine Quinn to include 'her proper maintenance and support, or to provide against any emergency which may arise effecting them occasioned by sickness, accident, ill health, misfortune or otherwise, and the said trustee may advance such sum or sums out of the principal of the trust estate for the use and benefit of said beneficiary as he shall consider reasonable and proper under the circumstances and make such advancements from time to time when he believes it proper to do so and for the best interest of said beneficiary.' Thus the trustee's broadened power of encroachment could reduce the value of the corpus.
The probate court admitted the later August will to probate and rejected the earlier April will. Thereupon, Robert and Frances Quinn filed suit contesting the admitted will and seeking to probate the rejected will. The relator, as a contestee, moved to dismiss the Quinns' petition on the ground they did not have an interest in the probate of the will and thus lacked capacity to contest it. The trial court denied the motion, thereby retaining jurisdiction. The relator promptly sought prohibition contending the petition showed the Quinns' lack of capacity to sue and, therefore, did not state facts warranting relief. Since the Quinns concede their petition cannot be amended to show any greater financial interest, prohibition is appropriate to test the trial court's jurisdiction. State ex rel. H. K. Porter Co. v. Nangle, Mo.App., 405 S.W.2d 501.
By § 473.083, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., a will may be contested or a rejected will established only by persons 'interested in the probate of a will.' This requires a contestant to have a 'financial interest in the estate, and one which would be benefited by setting the will aside.' State ex rel. Damon v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 674, 152 S.W. 341; Gruender v. Frank, 267 Mo. 713, 186 S.W. 1004; First Presbyterian Church of Monett v. Feist, Mo.App.,397 S.W.2d 728. For example, a widow cannot maintain a will contest where she is entitled by the laws of intestacy to half of her deceased husband's estate and his will gives her the same thing; since she would not be financially benefitted by setting the will aside, she has no financial interest in its probate. Jensen v. Hinderks, 338 Mo. 459, 92 S.W.2d 108.
While the right to contest a will is statutory and in derogation of the common law, and plaintiffs must bring themselves within it, yet we are required to give acts of the General Assembly a sufficiently liberal construction so as to effectuate the true intent of the legislative act. Section 1.010, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.; Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577.
We measure the Quinns' financial interest as of the time the later will was probated. Davis v. Davis, Mo., 252 S.W.2d 521; Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra, 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935. It seems logical that a residual interest in a trust fund with narrow encroachment powers is more valuable than a residual interest in a trust fund with broader encroachment powers. Thus the Quinns' interest would be benefitted by probating the earlier will since their interest in that trust's residuary would not be subject to the trustee's broader powers to reduce the corpus by using it to pay for maintenance and support, et cetera, of Bernadine Quinn. It is possible, of course, that the trustee may not resort to the corpus to pay that exapense, but the absence of that power of encroachment enhances the value of the residue. The situation is not unlike inheriting a tract of land free from encumbrances and inheriting it subject to a right to easement; that right may never be exercised, but the land would be more valuable without it. The exercise of the broader power of encroachment has the immediate and direct effect of reducing contestants' potential inheritance.
The courts of California and Vermont support this view. In re Plaut's Estate, 27 Cal.2d 424, 164 P.2d 765, ruled: 'The requirement that the contestant be an interested person prevents persons with no interest from delaying the settlement of the estate, but does not compel a person who has established that his interest 'may be impaired' (citation) to prove that it will in fact be impaired.' The cited case, In re Land's Estate, 166 Cal. 538, 137 P. 246, declared: 'If the interest is one that may be impaired or defeated by the will assailed, it is sufficient.' The case of In re Norris' Will, 123 Vt. 116, 183 A.2d 519, adopted the Plaut opinion. We find no authority to the contrary.
In the instant case the trustee's broadened power of encroachment could reduce the amount of the corpus remaining at the termination of the trust and thereby reduce the amount contestants may finally receive. This broadened power of encroachment lessens the present value of the remaindermen's interest in the estate because it makes the corpus subject to larger invasion. Thus there is a direct and present pecuniary interest by the remaindermen-contestants in the probate of the will.
In Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478, cited by relator, the court held that to be a person interested within the meaning of the statute he must be a person whose right or title is concluded by the probate. In our case the amount of money that contestants may receive depends upon the powers of the trustee to invade the corpus while Bernadine Quinn lives. Whether or not Bernadine Quinn will in fact be in need of additional sums for the additional uses authorized by the probated will, but not authorized as such by the rejected will, cannot be determined at this time. What can be determined in this will contest is whether the probated document is the last will of deceased and thereby whether or not the trustee has the right to make such encroachments. This right, if exercised, may cause the amount remaining, if any, for distribution to the contingent remaindermen to be smaller than if that right did not exist. The right to so encroach on the corpus...
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