State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2009-0025.,2009-0025.
• Citation: 123 Ohio St.3d 229,915 N.E.2d 633,2009 Ohio 4986
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. CORDRAY, Atty. Gen., Appellee, v. MARSHALL, Judge; Rawlins, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

915 N.E.2d 633

123 Ohio St.3d 229

2009-Ohio-4986

The STATE ex rel. CORDRAY, Atty. Gen., Appellee, v. MARSHALL, Judge; Rawlins, Appellant.

No. 2009-0025.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted August 11, 2009.

Decided September 30, 2009.

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, and Elisabeth A. Long and M. Scott Criss, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting appellee, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray,¹ a writ of prohibition compelling a common pleas judge to vacate certain entries in favor of appellant, Adrian Rawlins, and to immediately return him to prison. The writ compels Scioto County Court of Common Pleas Judge William T. Marshall to vacate the entries granting Rawlins relief from his murder conviction and sentence, convicting him of voluntary manslaughter, and releasing him from prison and also compels the judge to immediately return Rawlins to prison to continue serving the original murder sentence. Because the attorney general has common-law standing to institute this prohibition action and Judge Marshall patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to vacate the murder conviction based on grounds that had previously been rejected by the court of appeals in Rawlins's direct appeal, we affirm the judgment granting the writ.

Facts

Murder Conviction and Appeal

{¶ 2} In April 1997, Rawlins shot and killed James Thomas, who had been having an affair with Rawlins's wife. Rawlins shot Thomas three times, including at least once from close range. Rawlins was charged with aggravated murder and a firearm specification. Following trial, a jury convicted Rawlins of murder with the firearm specification, and the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to a prison term of 15 years to life.

{¶ 3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Scioto County affirmed. State v. Rawlins (Dec. 24, 1998), Scioto App. No. 97CA2539, 1998 WL 961056. The court of appeals rejected Rawlins's claims that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter. Id. at *4-7. The court of appeals concluded that under any reasonable view of the evidence, the victim's death was purposeful and the alleged provocation was not reasonably sufficient to have incited Rawlins to use deadly force. Id. at *4, 7. We did not accept Rawlins's discretionary appeal for review. State v. Rawlins (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1489, 709 N.E.2d 1216.

Motion for Relief from Judgment

{¶ 4} In 2003, Rawlins filed a motion in the common pleas court for relief from the judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to Crim.R. 57(B)² and Civ.R. 60(B). Rawlins raised the same claims in his motion that he had in his previous, unsuccessful direct appeal. The Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney at that time filed a response opposing the motion.

{¶ 5} In March 2005, Judge Marshall, who had not presided over Rawlins's trial, held a hearing on Rawlins's motion for relief from judgment. At the hearing, the judge orally granted the motion, accepted Rawlins's plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter, sentenced Rawlins to ten years' imprisonment, and granted Rawlins a judicial release from prison. A new prosecuting attorney had taken office since the initial trial and the filing of the motion for relief from judgment. At the hearing, the assistant prosecuting attorney representing the state informed Judge Marshall that the state had no objection to Rawlins's motion for relief from judgment. The judge then noted that "the Court will make a finding with no objection from the State of Ohio that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and instead they should have been instructed on Voluntary Manslaughter * * *."

{¶ 6} In journal entries dated March 23, 2005, Judge Marshall granted Rawlins's motion for relief, convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, sentenced him to ten years in prison, and then released him. A couple of weeks later, the judge journalized detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. He found that Rawlins was entitled to the requested relief from his murder conviction because "[f]ailing to instruct the jury on involuntary and voluntary manslaughter violated [Rawlins's] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fifth Amendment due process right to have the law accurately stated." He concluded that the evidence introduced at trial warranted jury instructions on the lesser offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.

Prohibition Case

{¶ 7} In May 2005, then attorney general Jim Petro filed a complaint in the Scioto County Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to compel Judge Marshall to vacate his entries granting Rawlins's motion for relief from judgment, convicting him of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder, and releasing him from prison. After Judge Marshall filed an answer and he and the parties submitted briefs, the court of appeals granted the writ. State ex rel. Petro v. Marshall, Scioto App. No. 05CA3004, 2006-Ohio-5357, 2006 WL 2924762. Rawlins was then arrested and returned to prison to continue serving his murder sentence. Until that time, he had not been notified about the prohibition case.

Intervention, Appeal, and Remand

{¶ 8} Three weeks after the court of appeals granted the writ, Rawlins filed a motion to intervene as a respondent in the prohibition case as well as a motion for relief from judgment. The court of appeals granted the motion to intervene and ordered the parties to file responses to the motion for relief from judgment. Rawlins appealed the judgment granting the writ to this court and also filed a motion for a limited remand so that the court of appeals could rule on his pending motion for relief from judgment. We granted the motion and remanded the cause for the court of appeals to rule on Rawlins's motion for relief from judgment. State ex rel. Petro v. Marshall, 112 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2006-Ohio-6712, 859 N.E.2d 557.

{¶ 9} On remand, the court of appeals granted Rawlins's motion and vacated its previous judgment granting the writ of prohibition. The court ordered that the parties submit evidence and briefs on the attorney general's prohibition claim and further ordered that Rawlins remain in prison during the pendency of the case. We granted Rawlins's application to dismiss his appeal from the vacated judgment. State ex rel. Dann v. Marshall, 114 Ohio St.3d 1496, 2007-Ohio-4160, 871 N.E.2d 1197.

{¶ 10} In November 2008, the court of appeals again granted the writ "[b]ecause Judge Marshall did not have jurisdiction to grant Rawlins' Civ.R. 60(B) motion." State ex rel. Rogers v. Marshall, Scioto App. No. 05CA3004, 2008-Ohio-6341, 2008 WL 5104740, ¶ 39.

{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court upon Rawlins's appeal as of right.

Legal Analysis

Standing

{¶ 12} "Before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue." Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 22. In general, "a prohibition action may only be commenced by a person who is either a party to the proceeding sought to be prohibited * * * or [who] demonstrates an injury in fact to a legally protected interest." State ex rel. Matasy v. Morley (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 22, 23, 25 OBR 18, 494 N.E.2d 1146.

{¶ 13} The court of appeals determined that the attorney general had common-law standing to institute the prohibition action. Rogers, 2008-Ohio-6341, 2008 WL 5104740, at ¶ 14-19. Rawlins asserts that the court of appeals erred in so holding.

{¶ 14} In Ohio, the attorney general is a constitutional officer. Section 1, Article III, Ohio Constitution. In addition, the General Assembly has recognized the attorney general's status as the chief law officer for the state and has set forth the following duties:

{¶ 15} "The attorney general is the chief law officer for the state and all its departments and shall be provided with adequate office space in Columbus. Except as provided in division (E) of section 120.06 and in sections 3517.152 to 3517.157 of the Revised Code, no state officer or board, or head of a department or institution of the state shall employ, or be represented by, other counsel or attorneys at law. The attorney general shall appear for the state in the trial and argument of all civil and criminal causes in the supreme court in which the state is directly or indirectly interested. When required by the governor or the general assembly, the attorney general shall appear for the state in any court or tribunal in a cause in which the state is a party, or in which the state is directly interested. Upon the written request of the governor, the attorney general shall prosecute any person indicted for a crime." R.C. 109.02.

{¶ 16} Rawlins asserts that the attorney general's liberal interpretation of his powers would render R.C. Chapter 109 meaningless. In essence, Rawlins contends that the attorney general's powers should be restricted to those specified by the General Assembly and that the attorney general thus has no standing in the underlying prohibition case because the case was not instituted in this court, and neither the governor nor the General Assembly requested that the attorney general bring the action.

{¶ 17} Rawlins's assertion is incorrect.

{¶ 18} We have held that "when these constitutions were adopted (both state and federal), they were adopted with a recognition of established contemporaneous common-law principles; and * * * they did not repudiate, but cherished, the established common law." State v. Wing (1902), 66 Ohio St. 407, 420, 64 N.E. 514. "`[T]he...