State ex rel. Cramer v. Court of Appeals

• Decision Date: 07 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1089-OA.,99-1089-OA.
• Parties: IN MATTER OF APPLICATION OF PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT IN STATE EX REL. Jason J. CRAMER v. David H. SCHWARZ: STATE of Wisconsin EX REL. Jason J. CRAMER, Petitioner, v. WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

236 Wis.2d 473

2000 WI 86

613 N.W.2d 591

IN MATTER OF APPLICATION OF PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT IN STATE EX REL. Jason J. CRAMER v. David H. SCHWARZ:

STATE of Wisconsin EX REL. Jason J. CRAMER, Petitioner,¹ v. WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

No. 99-1089-OA.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument February 9, 2000.

Decided July 7, 2000.

For the petitioner there were briefs by Joseph N. Ehmann, Brian C. Findley and William J. Tyroler, assistant state public defenders, and oral argument by Brian C. Findley.

For the respondent the cause was argued by Corey F. Finkelmeyer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general, and David C. Rice, assistant attorney general.

An amicus curiae brief was filed and there was oral argument by Eric J. Callisto, assistant attorney general, for the State of Wisconsin.

¶ 1. DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

This is an original action to determine whether the Wisconsin Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), created by 1997 Wis. Act 133,² applies to persons seeking certiorari review of probation revocation. Jason J. Cramer (Cramer) pursued certiorari review of a decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals. He filed a complete petition 81 days after the division revoked his probation on a withheld sentence. The Circuit Court for Dane County, Stuart A. Schwartz, Judge, dismissed the petition, finding that Cramer had not complied with the 45-day filing deadline that Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2) (1997-98)³ imposes upon persons subject to the PLRA.

¶ 2. The applicability of the PLRA depends upon whether the prospective litigant is a prisoner. Cramer maintains he is not a prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA, and he asks that his petition be reinstated under the six-month deadline for filing common-law writs of certiorari.

¶ 3. The issue is whether a person challenging the revocation of probation on a withheld sentence is a "prisoner" who must satisfy PLRA filing requirements. We hold that a petitioner who pursues relief from a probation revocation by a writ of certiorari is a prisoner subject to the PLRA. Writs of certiorari that seek to overturn a revocation of probation are civil actions and are not analogous to criminal appeals that challenge a judgment of conviction or sentence. We conclude that Cramer's writ of certiorari therefore should have been filed within the 45-day deadline established by Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2). We therefore deny his petition for declaratory relief.

¶ 4. The State of Wisconsin has filed a nonparty brief in this case asking the court to determine whether the PLRA applies to prisoners confined outside the state. We decline to address that issue here for two reasons. First, Cramer was not housed in an out-of-state facility. We conclude that a decision of this far-reaching impact is better postponed for a different case, in which the factual circumstances are more compelling and all parties have briefed the matter.⁴ Second, the court of appeals recently examined the issue in two cases.⁵ We hesitate to disturb those decisions absent a direct appeal to this court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 5. The record before the court is sparse because this case comes to us as an original action. Consequently, we derive the operative facts from the stipulation entered by the parties and from the decisions and orders issued below.⁶

¶ 6. On April 8, 1998, Cramer was convicted in Dane County Circuit Court of Physical Abuse of a Child, Battery, Bail Jumping, and Disorderly Conduct. The court withheld the sentences on these convictions and placed Cramer on probation for concurrent three-year terms.

¶ 7. On April 20, 12 days after these convictions, Cramer was arrested on new charges. Probation revocation proceedings were initiated, and the final revocation hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on August 31. The ALJ issued a decision on September 9, revoking Cramer's probation on all counts. Cramer qualified for, and was represented by, counsel from the Office of the State Public Defender at the revocation hearing and at subsequent proceedings.

¶ 8. Cramer pursued an administrative appeal before the Division of Hearings and Appeals. On September 28 the division sustained the order of revocation.

¶ 9. On November 10 Cramer filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Dane County Clerk of Circuit Court, seeking review of the order of revocation. The office of the clerk refused to accept the petition because it did not meet statutory and procedural filing requirements.⁷ The clerk returned the filing to Cramer's public defender on November 13, indicating that the petition lacked the paperwork required by the PLRA. The public defender received this notification by mail on November 17. One month later, on December 18, Cramer's public defender resubmitted the petition with the necessary PLRA documentation.

¶ 10. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the action because Cramer had violated the statutory 45-day PLRA filing deadline. Cramer did not argue, and the circuit court did not address, whether he was a prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA. Rather, the court found that under Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2), a statute created by the PLRA, "[a]n action seeking a remedy available by certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is barred unless commenced within 45 days" of the date of the decision of the Division of Hearings and Appeals. The court calculated that because the Division of Hearings and Appeals issued its determination on September 28, the 45-day period tolled on November 12. The court reasoned that allowing Cramer to proceed in effect would grant prospective litigants a de facto extension by permitting them to file insufficient pleadings and to resubmit the required documentation later, as they "saw fit."

¶ 11. On February 18, 1999, Cramer filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing in part that a litigant seeking review of probation revocation is not a prisoner under the PLRA, and therefore the 45-day time filing limit does not apply to him. The statutory definition of "prisoner" as it applies to the PLRA appears in Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2 and excludes "[a] person bringing an action seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court, including an action for an extraordinary writ or a supervisory writ seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or a sentence of a court." Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(a)2.c.

¶ 12. Cramer maintained that he satisfied the exception to the definition of "prisoner" because the revocation of his probation had the effect of returning him to the court for sentencing. The court disagreed, finding that Cramer was not excluded from the definition because he was not seeking relief from a judgment of conviction or a sentence. The court relied on State ex rel. Flowers v. H&SS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978), to conclude that revocation proceedings cannot be analogized to a judgment of conviction or a sentence imposed by a court. The court therefore held that Cramer was subject to PLRA filing requirements and on March 1, 1999, denied his motion to reconsider.

¶ 13. Cramer filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the dismissals of both his petition and the motion to reconsider. The court of appeals did not receive the filing fee that Wis. Stat. § 809.25(2) requires for filing a notice of appeal and on April 28 issued an order stating that the action would be dismissed if the fee were not received within five days. Cramer asked the court of appeals to stay the order. On May 6 the court granted the stay, in part because Cramer also had filed a petition to this court for an original action for declaratory judgment.

¶ 14. The court of appeals previously had held that a revoked probationer seeking review by writ of habeas corpus must comply with the PLRA and pay filing fees. State ex rel. Marth v. Smith, 224 Wis. 2d 578, 592 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). The court suggested that under that precedent, Cramer might be a prisoner required to satisfy PLRA filing procedures. If Cramer were not a prisoner, however, a request for waiver of the filing fee would be handled like other fee waiver requests by non-prisoners, subject to the procedure established by Wis. Stat. § 814.29(1)(d)2 for indigent litigants.

¶ 15. On May 13, 1999, while Cramer awaited this court's decision about his petition for original action, he was sentenced in Dane County Circuit Court. He received eight months for the Bail Jumping charge and 90 days concurrent for the Disorderly Conduct charge. Because Cramer had 199 days sentence credit and statutory good time, both of these sentences were deemed served. He also was sentenced to 10 months, to run consecutive with the other sentences, for the Child Abuse charge, and another nine months, concurrent, for the Battery charge. These latter two sentences, however, were stayed for acceptance and participation in a Treatment Alternative Program. Cramer was accepted into the program on June 10 with an anticipated completion date of December 10, 1999.

¶ 16. This court granted the petition for the original action on September 28, 1999, and assumed jurisdiction over the matter. On October 5 the court of appeals placed Cramer's case on hold pending a decision by this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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¶ 17. This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews independently. State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 724, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999). This court engages in statutory construction to discern the intent of the legislature. Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992). Our duty to fulfill legislative intent ensures that we uphold the separation of powers by not substituting judicial policy views for the views of the legislature. See State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 495, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998)

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[3, 4]

¶ 18. The process of statutory...