State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, No. 18205.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio
Writing for the CourtMARSHALL
Citation143 N.E. 574,110 Ohio St. 271
PartiesSTATE ex rel. CRAWFORD v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO.
Decision Date29 April 1924
Docket NumberNo. 18205.

110 Ohio St. 271
143 N.E. 574

STATE ex rel. CRAWFORD
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO.

No. 18205.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 29, 1924.


Mandamus by the State, on the relation of O. D. Crawford, executor of the will of Flora Estella Morton, deceased, against the State Industrial Commission. Writ denied.-[By Editorial Staff.]



Syllabus by the Court

By virtue of the provisions of section 35 of article II of the Ohio Constitution, limiting the benefits of workmen's compensation insurance to workmen and their dependents, and by virtue of the provisions of section 1465-72, General Code, limiting payments to injured employés and dependents of killed employés, and by virtue of section 1465-88, General Code, providing that compensation before payment shall be exempt from claims of creditors and be payable only to employés or their dependents, and by virtue of section 1465-86, General Code, conferring continuing jurisdiction upon the Industrial Commission and power to make modification or change of its findings and orders, an award of compensation from the state insurance fund, under section 1465-82, General Code, to a wife living with her husband at the time of his death, is revocable, so that in the event of the death of such dependent, before all the installment payments of such award have been made, her personal representative is not entitled to receive the unpaid installments. State ex rel. Munding, Adm'r, v. Industrial Commission, 92 Ohio St. 434, overruled.


[Ohio St. 272]Emmons & Emmons and Hart & Koehler, all of Alliance, for plaintiff.

C. C. Crabbe, Atty. Gen., and R. R. Zurmehly, of Columbus, for defendant.


MARSHALL, C. J.

This is an action in mandamus filed in this court under the original jurisdiction of the court, seeking to compel the Industrial Commission to continue biweekly payments under an award. The controversy grows out of the following facts and circumstances:

One George Morton, an employé, was injured in the course of his employment, resulting in his death. Relator's decedent was the wife of the said George Morton, and she was living with him at the time of his death, and was wholly dependent upon him for support. After the death of George Morton, an award of the full amount due was made to the widow, payable in biweekly installments, to continue for the full statutory period of 416 weeks, in accordance with the provisions relating to wholly dependent persons, such award being made on November 24, 1922. The amount due under the award was subject to deduction by the amount of payments theretofore made on account of said injuries under temporary, total, and permanent[Ohio St. 273]bartial awards, and the award therefore amounted to the sum of $1,069.70. Those biweekly payments were made to the widow up to the date of her death, which occurred on March 24, 1923, at which time the unpaid balance amounted to $796.19. No payments were thereafter made, and relator, as executor of the estate of the widow, seeks to compel the Industrial Commission to continue such biweekly payments until the entire balance has been paid.

The Industrial Commission has answered the petition of plaintiff, and admits that the

[143 N.E. 575]

widow was a wholly dependent person at the time of the award, but alleges that there are no children or other dependent persons. It admits that at the time of the death of the widow it refused to make further payments upon the award, and seeks to justify its action on the ground that upon her death there were no dependent persons to whom further payments could be made. The question for determination in this case, therefore, is whether an order awarding compensation from the state insurance fund, under section 1465-82, General Code, to a wife who was living with her husband at the time of his death, is irrevocable, so that, in the event of the death of such dependent before all of the installment payments have been made, her personal representative is entitled to receive the unpaid installments.

A discussion of this question calls for an examination of the constitutional provisions relative to workmen's compensation and of the statutes enacted pursuant to such provisions, a review of some of the decisions previously rendered by this court, [Ohio St. 274]and a consideration of the nature of workmen's compensation.

In many of the former decisions of this court there has been lengthy discussion of the nature of workmen's compensation, the principles upon which it is founded, the wise, beneficent, and humanitarian character of such laws, and without further comment upon those matters it may be stated at the outset of this opinion that all the members of this court at this time fully concur in all the beautiful, well-worded sentiments heretofore expressed, and we particularly agree that the law is founded upon the principle of insurance, and that it is in no sense a pension, or bounty, or gratuity. On the other hand, we do not think any one would contend that either the Constitution framers or the General Assembly have ever entertained the thought that full compensation would be made in every case. Before the enactment of this legislation, the only means of compensating injured employés was by means of the ordinary negligence action, and unless negligence could be shown no compensation was recoverable. It was not even in all cases of negligence that there could be a recovery, because there were many defenses that prevented recovery even though negligence of the employer might be proven. In the event of recovery, the injured person was entitled to be compensated for pain and suffering, or under circumstances of malice, insult, or ill will there might be punitive damages. In all cases the injured person encountered delays, expenses, and uncertainties. All this has been changed. Delays are negligible, expense has been eliminated, and the uncertainties [Ohio St. 275]have been reduced to a minimum. In negligence cases the courts had established certain rules for measuring damages. These rules gave the jury a wide latitude and a large measure of discretion. The damages assessed were excessive in some cases and too meager in others. The compensation laws correct these inequalities by providing rules for measuring compensation and establishing uniformity in fixing the amount of awards. As an additional guaranty of uniformity, but more particularly for the purpose of careful administration of the insurance fund, a commission is established with powers which are purely administrative. Award is made for all kinds and characters of injuries except those selfinflicted, and has no relation to common-law negligence. It is neither an award of damages nor the imposition of a penalty. It recognizes the fact that the risk of injury or death is an incident of employment in industry, and that this risk has grown constantly greater by reason of the constantly increasing use of machinery. The growing menace to life and limb, and the growing army of maimed and crippled workmen, and of women and children made widows and orphans by deaths in industry, slowly and surely created a sentiment which finally crystallized in workmen's compensation legislation. It was never intended by the most ardent advocates of workmen's compensation to give full and adequate remuneration, because this would remove much of the inducement of working men to exercise care and caution on their own part. At the same time it was plainly seen that industry could not bear an unjust burden, and that any burden so [Ohio St. 276]imposed must eventually be charged back in large measure to the consumers of the product of industry. It was therefore sought to provide a reasonable compensation for all injured employés, rather than to give full compensation to the victims of negligence and deny all compensation whatever to employés injured by accidental causes. Our Constitution framers and legislators have had all these matters in mind in determining a sound policy for the establishment and administration of...

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49 practice notes
  • Arrington v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., No. 2005-0243.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • July 12, 2006
    ...Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 232, 241-243, 116 N.E. 104; see, also, State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 275, 143 N.E. 574. {¶ 26} We have never held that a worker seeking to participate in the fund is entitled to a trial by jury because of ......
  • Morris v. Savoy, No. 89-1807
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • August 27, 1991
    ...laws are " * * * founded upon the principle of insurance * * *." See State, ex rel. Crawford, v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 274, 143 N.E. 574, 575. Indeed, this court has referred to workers' compensation as "workmen's compensation insurance." Id. at syllabus......
  • Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., SAFETY-KLEEN
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • August 27, 1991
    ...omitted.) Id., 69 Ohio St.2d at 614, 23 O.O.3d at 508, 433 N.E.2d at 577. See, also, State, ex rel. Crawford, v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 274-276, 143 N.E. 574, However, it is readily apparent that R.C. 4121.80 does not further the purposes of Section 35, Article II, but inste......
  • Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 96-1411
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 31, 1997
    ...(1915), 92 Ohio St. 434, 450, 111 N.E. 299, 303, overruled in part on other grounds, State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 143 N.E. Moreover, the majority's decision stands for the absurd proposition that compensability turns on whether the criminal perpetrating t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
49 cases
  • Arrington v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., No. 2005-0243.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • July 12, 2006
    ...Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 232, 241-243, 116 N.E. 104; see, also, State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 275, 143 N.E. 574. {¶ 26} We have never held that a worker seeking to participate in the fund is entitled to a trial by jury because of ......
  • Morris v. Savoy, No. 89-1807
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • August 27, 1991
    ...laws are " * * * founded upon the principle of insurance * * *." See State, ex rel. Crawford, v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 274, 143 N.E. 574, 575. Indeed, this court has referred to workers' compensation as "workmen's compensation insurance." Id. at syllabus......
  • Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., SAFETY-KLEEN
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • August 27, 1991
    ...omitted.) Id., 69 Ohio St.2d at 614, 23 O.O.3d at 508, 433 N.E.2d at 577. See, also, State, ex rel. Crawford, v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 274-276, 143 N.E. 574, However, it is readily apparent that R.C. 4121.80 does not further the purposes of Section 35, Article II, but inste......
  • Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 96-1411
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 31, 1997
    ...(1915), 92 Ohio St. 434, 450, 111 N.E. 299, 303, overruled in part on other grounds, State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 143 N.E. Moreover, the majority's decision stands for the absurd proposition that compensability turns on whether the criminal perpetrating t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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