State ex rel. Czaplinski v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary
| Decision Date | 05 October 1950 |
| Docket Number | 9. |
| Citation | 75 A.2d 766,196 Md. 654 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. CZAPLINSKI v. WARDEN, MARYLAND PENITENTIARY. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON HENDERSON, and MARKELL, JJ.
This is an application for leave to appeal from an order of Judge Sayler in the Baltimore City Court denying applicant the writ of habeas corpus.
Applicant was tried by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, found guilty of assault to rob with a deadly weapon, and on March 1, 1945, he was sentenced by Judge Dickerson to ten years in the Maryland House of Correction. There were four other cases against him three for robbery with a deadly weapon, and another for assault to rob with a deadly weapon. In these cases he plead guilty and was sentenced in one of them to one year in the House of Correction, this sentence to run consecutively with the ten year sentence, and in each of the other three, he was sentenced to one year in the House of Correction, to run concurrently with the other sentences. As of March 1, 1945 therefore, applicant faced a total of eleven years in the Maryland House of Correction.
On August 2, 1945 Judge Clark, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sentenced the applicant to seven years in the Maryland House of Correction for riot and assault, this sentence to run consecutively to the other sentences he was serving. At that time, therefore, he faced a total of eighteen years to be served in the House of Correction.
The records of the Criminal Court, which we have had certified to us, show that on August 9, 1947, the ten year sentence imposed March 1, 1945, was reconsidered and stricken out by Judge Dickerson and the applicant was re-sentenced to six years in the Maryland Penitentiary. On the same date the one year sentence which was consecutive to the ten year sentence, was also stricken out, and in that case applicant was re-sentenced to one year in the Maryland Penitentiary, to run consecutively with the new six year sentence. The record shows that the applicant was transferred to the Maryland Penitentiary at some period, but it does not appear exactly when. It may be inferred that he was there on August 9, 1947, which is the reason why the new sentences were to the Penitentiary rather than to the House of Correction. The result of the reconsideration on August 9, 1947, if it was a valid exercise of power, was that the applicant's time, counting from March 1, 1945, was reduced to three sentences, two of six years and one year respectively from Baltimore, and one of seven years from Anne Arundel County, making a total of fourteen years instead of eighteen.
Later, on December 2, 1947, Judge Dickerson reconsidered and struck out the six year sentence imposed on August 9, 1947, and resentenced the applicant to four years in the Penitentiary, this sentence to run concurrently with all four one year sentences. As a result, the period which applicant was to serve under the Criminal Court sentences was reduced from the original eleven years to four years, and the total sentences, if this reduction was valid, which he would then have to serve would be four years from Baltimore City and seven years from Anne Arundel County, or a total of eleven years instead of eighteen. The effect of these reductions (if not the intention) was to exactly nullify the sentence of Judge Clark in the Anne Arundel County Court. There is nothing in the records of the Criminal Court of Baltimore to show why these reductions were made, nor do the docket entries show that any petition, motion, or application was filed in the Court asking for such a reduction.
All of the questions raised by the applicant have to do with the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. His right to raise any contentions on habeas corpus with respect to this sentence depends on whether he is now confined as a result of such sentence. Bennington v. Warden, Md., 59 A.2d 779. State ex rel. Thomas v. Warden, Md., 74 A.2d 830. If the reduction of the original sentences by Judge Dickerson was a valid exercise of his jurisdiction, then of course the Baltimore City sentences have been completed, and applicant is now held under the Anne Arundel County sentence. On the other hand, if Judge Dickerson had no authority to reduce the original sentences, and his subsequent actions were void, then the applicant is still serving the original sentences.
It is well established and has been the law in this state, from the earliest days, that a court retains power over its own judgments and orders in both civil and criminal cases during the term at which they are entered or made. Seth v. Chamberlaine, 41 Md. 186, 194; State v. Butler, 72 Md. 98, 18 A. 1105. This is also the Federal rule, United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 654, although the great majority of the states which have ruled on the question do not follow it in criminal cases, holding that no change can be made after service of sentence begins. States so holding are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
After the expiration of the term, there are many decisions of this court that a judgment in civil cases cannot be changed or modified by the court entering it unless it is shown that there has been fraud, deceit, surprise or mistake. Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130, 138, 79 Am.Dec. 681; Sherwood v. Mohler, 14 Md. 564; Hall v. Holmes, 30 Md. 558, Loney v. Bailey, 43 Md. 10, 16; Sarlouis v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 45 Md. 241, 245; Abell v. Simon, 49 Md. 318, 322; Miller v. State, 135 Md. 379, 382, 109 A. 104. These cases follow the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bank of the United States v. Moss, 6 How. 31, 12 L.Ed. 331, in which the Court, through Justice Woodbury discussed the question, and said that, after the end of the term, the power of the court was exhausted, and unless there was a question of correcting mere form, or the misprision of a clerk, or a clerical error, or some irregularity in notices, mandate, etc., no further action could be taken.
In criminal cases, where a sentence has been increased, either during or after the term in which the sentence was imposed, it is the general rule that the action of the court is void because the prisoner is placed in double jeopardy. Where the sentence has been decreased after the term, the reported cases we have been able to find which discuss the point hold that this is also beyond the power of the court, generally upon the ground that when a sentence has been passed, and has become enrolled, the jurisdiction of the court is concluded and the court has no further authority. Some cases have held that reducing a sentence after the term is a usurpation of the pardoning power which is not vested in the courts, State v. Carlson, 178 Minn. 118, 228 N.W. 173. Compare United States v. Benz, supra, which holds that a reduction during the term is an exercise of the judicial function and not the usurpation of the executive power to pardon.
In the case of United States ex rel. Poch v. Hill, Warden, 3 Cir., 71 F.2d 906, 908, a prisoner serving his sentence, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the court had given him cumulative sentences on several counts in an indictment which charged the same offense. He also prayed the issuance of a mandamus to the trial judge directing him to annul one in each group of sentences. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, assumed that the allegations were true, said that the remedy was not by habeas corpus but by appeal, and then said, 'But where, as here, no appeal has been taken and the term in which the judgment of sentence was imposed has expired, the trial court is without jurisdiction to enlarge, reduce or annul the sentences originally imposed and without jurisdiction to impose new ones.' And having that 'lack of inherent jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to annul the sentences imposed * * * we are constrained to affirm the order of the District Judge denying the petition of the relator for a writ of habeas corpus and to dismiss his petition for writ of mandemus.' Certiorari was denied in this case by the Supreme Court, 293 U.S. 597, 55 S.Ct. 120, 79 L.Ed. 690.
In DeBenque v United States, 66 App. D.C. 36, 85 F.2d 202, 106 A.L.R. 839, a traverser was sentenced in the District of Columbia under an act which was not in force when the crime with which she was charged was committed. After she had served about 25 months of her sentence, she applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in which district she was confined. The court discharged her, but remanded her to the custody of the United States marshal for the District of Columbia, in order that a proper sentence might be pronounced. Thereupon she was brought before the District Court, and a new sentence, less than the earlier one, and in accordance with the proper statute, was imposed. This action was taken in a term of court later than that during which the original sentences were imposed, and it was conceded that the original sentences should not have been imposed. The last sentence was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and that court held that, while it was a general rule that a court loses jurisdiction over a case at the end of the term at which judgment is entered, unless there is an express carrying over of the disposition of the case to a subsequent term, that rule does not apply if the...
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