State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool
Decision Date | 16 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 99-1430.,99-1430. |
Parties | THE STATE EX REL. DEBROSSE ET AL. v. COOL, PIQUA CITY CLERK, ET AL. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Donald J. McTigue, for relators.
Stephen E. Klein, Piqua Director of Law, for respondents.
Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), we must now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or a peremptory writ is appropriate. We apply the following standards to render this determination:
"" (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Dist. 1199, Health Care & Social Serv. Union, AFL-CIO v. Lawrence Cty. Gen. Hosp. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 351, 352-353, 699 N.E.2d 1281, 1282, quoting State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 298, 691 N.E.2d 253, 254.
With the foregoing guidelines in mind, we now proceed with our determination under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5).
Relators assert that they are entitled to the requested writ based on the pertinent initiative provisions of the charter:
After Piqua Clerk Cool certified the sufficiency of the petition, she failed to submit it to the commission, and the commission refused to follow the procedures specified in Section 15 of the Piqua Charter. Thereafter, by certification pursuant to Section 16, relators required the submission to a vote of electors of the proposed ordinance. Respondents Cool and the commission failed to act on relators' certification as required by Section 17 of the charter.
Respondents refused to proceed in accordance with Sections 15, 16, and 17 of the charter based on their claims that the initiative petition was excepted from the charter initiative provisions as an appropriation ordinance, or that the proposed ordinance would require an illegal expenditure without an appropriation, and that the proposed ordinance addressed a nonlegislative matter. Respondents' claims lack merit.
Respondents first contend that the proposed ordinance is excepted from the charter initiative provisions because it is an appropriation ordinance. Section 14 of the Piqua Charter specifies that "[t]he electors shall have power to propose any ordinance except an appropriation ordinance, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls, such power being known as the initiative." (Emphasis added.) The charter, however, does not define "appropriation ordinance." Undefined language used in a municipal charter should be construed according to its ordinary and common usage. State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 127, 698 N.E.2d 987, 990; State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138, 656 N.E.2d 940, 944.
We have held that the ordinary and common meaning of the comparable phrase "appropriation bill" is a "measure before a legislative body which authorizes `the expenditure of public moneys and stipulat[es] the amount, manner, and purpose of the various items of expenditure.'" State ex rel. Akron Edn. Assn. v. Essex (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 47, 49, 1 O.O.3d 28, 30, 351 N.E.2d 118, 119-120, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary (2 Ed.); see, also, Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 102; Risser v. Klauser (1997), 207 Wis.2d 176, 192, 558 N.W.2d 108, 115. An appropriation bill must "contain, somewhere within its four corners, a specific appropriation in money." State ex rel. Akron Edn. Assn., 47 Ohio St.2d at 50, 1 O.O.3d at 30, 351 N.E.2d at 120.
The ordinance proposed by relators in their initiative petition is not an appropriation ordinance because it contains no specific appropriation of money and fails to stipulate any amount associated with the employment of independent legal counsel authorized therein. There is consequently nothing to support respondents' claims that the proposed ordinance is an appropriation ordinance excepted from the charter initiative provisions under Section 14 of the charter. See State ex rel. King v. Portsmouth (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 27 OBR 73, 75, 497 N.E.2d 1126, 1128. Respondents' reliance on the R.C. 131.01(F) definition of "appropriation" is misplaced because that definition does not apply to municipal ordinances. R.C. 131.01(F) limits the applicability of the definition to statutes enacted by the General Assembly. Respondents next contend that the proposed ordinance is not subject to initiative because it is substantively illegal under Section 53 of the Piqua Charter, which provides that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury of the city, nor shall any obligation for the expenditure of money be incurred excepting pursuance of the annual appropriation ordinance, any preliminary appropriation ordinance passed in accordance with Section 50 of this Charter, or of the annual appropriation ordinance when changed as authorized by Section 51 hereof."
We need not address this contention because it does not bar an election on the proposed initiative ordinance. Any claims alleging the unconstitutionality or illegality of the substance of the proposed ordinance, or actions to be...
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