State Ex Rel. Delgado v. Sargent

• Citation: 18 N.M. 131,134 P. 218
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 25 July 1913
• Parties: STATE EX REL. DELGADOv.SARGENT, STATE AUDITOR.

18 N.M. 131

134 P. 218

STATE EX REL. DELGADO

v.SARGENT, STATE AUDITOR.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 25, 1913.

Syllabus by the Court.

Chapter 135, Laws of 1909, interpreted, and held, that the appropriations carried by that act were limited to the insurance moneys mentioned in the title.

Under section 21 of chapter 83, Laws of 1912, only the surplus moneys in the insurance fund, over and above the amounts required to meet the appropriations under chapter 135, Laws 1909, were diverted to the state salary fund.

The last paragraph of section 18, c. 83, Laws 1912, held to be void as violative of section 16 of article 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits general legislation in appropriation bills.

Appeal from District Court, Santa Fé County; E. C. Abbott, Judge.

Action by the State of New Mexico, on the relation of Thomas P. Delgado, against William G. Sargent, State Auditor. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Laws 1912, c. 83, § 18, providing for certain disposition of moneys collected by insurance departments, which disposition is to continue indefinitely, is a violation of Const. art. 4, § 16, prohibiting general legislation in appropriation bills.

F. W. Clancy, Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Wilson, Bowman & Dunlavy, of Santa Fé, for appellee.

PARKER, J.

This is an action brought by the state, on the relation of Thomas P. Delgado, as treasurer of the fire department of the city of Santa Fé, against William G. Sargent, Auditor of the State, to compel the payment of the sum of $1,200 to relator as such treasurer. The respondent answered the alternative writ, and alleged as cause for his refusal to issue his warrant for said sum that there were no funds available for the payment of such warrant, by reason of the fact that the Legislature of 1912 had diverted the fund into the state salary fund. The district court awarded a peremptory writ, and the State Auditor appealed to this court.

It appears that in 1897 the Legislature provided that there should be collected from all foreign fire insurance companies 2 per cent. of the amount of all premiums collected by them within any city, town, or village in the territory, which said sum should be paid to the fire department of the city, town, or village in which said premiums were collected. See chapter 38, Laws of 1897, compiled as section 2132, C. L. 1897.

In 1905 the Legislature created the insurance department of the territory, provided for a superintendent of insurance, and provided that all insurance companies should pay to the superintendent of insurance 2 per cent. upon the gross amount of premiums received during each year. This act provided that these moneys should be paid into the territorial treasury for an insurance fund, and provided that the territorial treasurer should annually, on the 1st day of August of each year, pay to the treasurer of the fire department of every city, town, or village in the territory a sum of money equal to the amount received by such fire department under section 2132, C. L. 1897, during the year 1904. See chapter 5, Laws of 1905.

The law remained in this form until 1909, when the Legislature enacted chapter 135 of the Laws of 1909, which is entitled “An act for the disposition of certain insurance money.” Section 1 of that act provides for the payment of $2,000 per annum “from the amount of money collected from the insurance companies, as defined in the act known as chapter 5, Session Laws of 1905, of New Mexico,” to the “New Mexico Association of Firemen.” Section 2 of the act omitted special reference to the insurance fund created by the act of 1905, but made an annual and continuing appropriation of specific amounts to the various fire departments of the territory, including Santa Fé.

The law remained in this condition until the session of the state Legislature in 1912, when by chapter 83 of the Laws of that session, the same being the general appropriation bill, the Legislature passed two provisions which relate to the subject in hand. The first is the last paragraph of section 18 of that chapter, and is as follows: “All receipts of the State Corporation Commission, including all receipts of the insurance department of the state, shall hereafter be covered into the state salary fund.” Section 21 of that chapter provides: “The State Auditor is hereby directed to transfer to the state salary fund all surplus moneys in the following funds, to wit: * * * ‘Insurance fund’ ”--and ten other funds therein mentioned.

In pursuance of those two provisions, the Auditor transferred all of the funds in the insurance fund to the state salary fund, and hence answered that there were no funds available upon which he could issue his warrant.

[1] 1. The first proposition involved is the construction of chapter 135 of the Laws of 1909. It is argued by appellant that, taking into consideration the title of this act and its provisions, the legislative intent is made to appear to limit the appropriation to the various fire departments in the territory to moneys contained in the insurance fund. Counsel for appellee argued that by reason of the terms of section 2 of that act, which makes no reference to the insurance fund whatever, it necessarily appears that the legislative intent was to make a general appropriation out of any public funds not otherwise appropriated. He cites authority to the effect that the title of an act cannot be resorted to in aid of its construction, where the act is free from doubt or ambiguity.

About the general principle relied upon there can be no controversy. But in this case an ambiguity arises out of the divergence of the literal terms of section 2 of the act from the scope of the title. If the legislative intent to make a general appropriation to the fire departments out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated had been clearly expressed in terms, the appropriation would no doubt control, notwithstanding the limitation in the title. To construe section 2 of the act as a general appropriation would be to ignore the title of the act; but to construe the act as limited to the insurance money is to give due effect to all of its provisions, a result always to be sought when possible. That resort to the title of an act in aid of its interpretation is competent under circumstances like the present, see 2 Lewis' Suth. Stat. Const. § 339; 36 Cyc. 1133; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226.

Another consideration of importance is the history of the legislation in behalf of the volunteer fire departments. No general appropriations for their support have...