State ex rel. Dept. v. Matrix Properties

• Decision Date: 21 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 20080224.,20080224.
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, by NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, for the benefit of Evert Johnson, Plaintiff and Appellant v. MATRIX PROPERTIES CORPORATION, f/k/a E.W. Wylie Corporation, Wild & Associates, Ltd., and Ulteig Engineers, Inc., Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

770 N.W.2d 290

2009 ND 137

STATE of North Dakota, by NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, for the benefit of Evert Johnson, Plaintiff and Appellant v. MATRIX PROPERTIES CORPORATION, f/k/a E.W. Wylie Corporation, Wild & Associates, Ltd., and Ulteig Engineers, Inc., Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20080224.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

July 21, 2009.

Michael Trent Pitcher, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.

Krista L. Andrews (argued), and Gregory L. Thompson (on brief), Anderson, Bottrell, Sanden & Thompson, Fargo, N.D., for defendants and appellees Matrix Properties Corp. and Ulteig Engineers, Inc.

Brian P. Toay (argued) and John V. Boulger (on brief), Wold Johnson, P.C., Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellee Wild & Associates, Ltd.

Margaret Moore Jackson (on brief) and Daniel Michael Schaffzin (on brief); Lori Conroy (on brief), Tobis Funk (on brief), Diane Wehrman (on brief), third-year law students, University of North Dakota School of Law, Law School Room 2, Grand Forks, N.D., for amici curiae Fair Housing of the Dakotas; AARP; National Fair Housing Alliance; The Arc of North Dakota; Dakota Center For Independent Living; Freedom Resource Center for Independent Living; Independence, Inc.; Legal Services of North Dakota; North Dakota Disabilities Advocacy Consortium; North Dakota Human Rights Coalition; North Dakota Statewide Independent Living Council; and Options Interstate Resource Center for Independent Living.

David Boeck (on brief), Bismarck, N.D., for amicus curiae Protection & Advocacy Project.

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] The State, by the Department of Labor for the benefit of Evert Johnson ("State"), appealed from a summary judgment dismissing its discriminatory housing practice action against Matrix Properties Corporation, formerly known as E.W. Wylie Corporation, Wild & Associates, Ltd., and Ulteig Engineers, Inc. (collectively "Matrix"), on the ground that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Because we conclude the district court did not err in ruling the State's action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) and N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-39, we affirm.

I

[¶ 2] In December 2005, the Department received a complaint from Johnson, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair. Johnson alleged that Matrix had committed discriminatory acts by failing to comply with the design and construction requirements under federal and state law for the Stonebridge Apartments in Fargo. Stonebridge Apartments consists of five separate, three-story, walk-up buildings containing 48 units in each building and an underground parking garage. Each building received a certificate of occupancy from Fargo when construction on the building was completed. The building in which Johnson resided received its certificate of occupancy from the city in 1998. Following an investigation, the Department issued a determination of reasonable cause and a charge of discrimination against Matrix in January 2007, and Matrix elected to have the claims decided in district court. See N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-30.

[¶ 3] Matrix moved for summary judgment dismissal of the action, claiming it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq. ("FHA"), and the state Housing Discrimination Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 14-02.5. The district court, relying on Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Thompson v. Turk, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 724, 172 L.Ed.2d 725 (2008), held the statute of limitations required that any action concerning the design and construction of the apartment building must be brought within two years from the issuance of the certificate of occupancy in 1998, and because the civil action was not brought until 2005, the court concluded it was time barred and dismissed the action. The court also dismissed without prejudice the State's alternative claim that Matrix had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination because the State had failed to first make an administrative determination of reasonable cause.

II

[¶ 4] The only issue the State raises on appeal is whether the district court erred in ruling its civil action based on an alleged discriminatory housing practice was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-39(1).

[¶ 5] In Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Thies, 2008 ND 164, ¶ 5, 755 N.W.2d 852 (citations omitted), we outlined our standard for review of summary judgments:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for promptly resolving a controversy on the merits without a trial if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving disputed facts would not alter the result. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence. Whether a district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law that we review de novo on the record.

The determination of when a cause of action accrues is generally a question of fact, but if there is no dispute about the relevant facts, the determination is a question of law for the court. See Tarnavsky v. McKenzie County Grazing Ass'n, 2003 ND 117, ¶ 9, 665 N.W.2d 18.

III

[¶ 6] The Legislature adopted North Dakota's Housing Discrimination Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 14-02.5, in 1999. See 1999 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 134. The legislation was designed to accomplish two goals: "First, it establishes a regulatory authority and administrative process for receiving and investigating charges of housing discrimination under state law ... Second[], it provides for state enforcement of federal fair housing law, provided that its provisions are `substantially equivalent' to ... those in the Federal Fair Housing Act." Hearing on HB 1043 Before House Judiciary Comm., 56th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 12, 1999) (written testimony of Mark Bachmeier, Interim Department of Labor Commissioner). The "substantial equivalency" component was "the key to the federal portion of funding" because "[a]gencies enforcing state or local laws with provisions substantially equivalent to those of the Federal Fair Housing Act are eligible to receive federal funds from HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] to investigate charges of housing discrimination filed under federal law." Hearing on HB 1043 Before Senate Appropriations Comm., 56th N.D. Legis. Sess. (March 25, 1999) (written testimony of Mark Bachmeier, Interim Department of Labor Commissioner). According to the State, North Dakota's Housing Discrimination Act has been certified by the Secretary of HUD as being substantially equivalent to the rights, procedures, and remedies created under the federal FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(3)(A). Under the federal and state acts, "discrimination" is defined to include a failure to "design and construct" covered multifamily dwellings that comport with certain accessibility requirements for handicapped persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C); N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-06(3)(c).

[¶ 7] Under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) and N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-39, an aggrieved person may bring a civil action to enforce these design and construction requirements. However, the civil action must be brought "not later than the second year after the date of the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice." N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-39(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) ("not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice, ... whichever occurs last"). The State argues the two-year limitation period began to run only when Johnson discovered the design and construction flaws in the Stonebridge Apartments, and the lawsuit was therefore brought in a timely manner. Matrix and the other defendants argue, and the district court concluded, the two-year limitation period began to run in 1998 when Fargo issued the certificate of occupancy, and because the lawsuit was not brought until 2005, it is time barred.

[¶ 8] The interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-39(1) presents a question of law. See Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, ¶ 8, 747 N.W.2d 65. The rules of statutory construction are well established:

The primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the legislature by first looking at the language of the statute. Amerada Hess Corp. v. State ex rel. Tax Comm'r, 2005 ND 155, ¶ 12, 704 N.W.2d 8. Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined in the code or unless the drafters clearly intended otherwise. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-09.1. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, "the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of purs[u]ing its spirit." N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings. Amerada, at ¶ 12. If the language is ambiguous or doubtful in meaning, the court may consider extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39.

Sauby, at ¶ 8 (quoting Simon v. Simon, 2006 ND 29, ¶ 12, 709 N.W.2d 4).

[¶ 9] The operative language in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and N.D.C.C. § 14-02.5-39(1) is identical. A civil action must be commenced not later than two years after the "occurrence...