State ex rel. Devening v. Bartholomew
Decision Date | 23 June 1911 |
Docket Number | No. 21,866.,21,866. |
Parties | STATE ex rel. DEVENING v. BARTHOLOMEW. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Charles Remster, Judge.
Mandamus by the State, on the relation of Philip Devening, against Pliny W. Bartholomew, as Judge of Room 5 of the Superior Court of Marion County. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, relator appeals. Reversed and remanded.Elmer Bassett, David L. Wilson, Wray & Campbell, Herbert C. Jones, Frank H. Wolfe, and Hord & Adams, for appellant. Gavin, Gavin & Davis, Henry Warrum, and Sullivan & Knight, for appellee.
This action for mandate was brought by the relator under the provisions of an act approved March 6, 1911 (Acts 1911, pp. 541-543), to compel appellee to appear and preside over the Shelby superior court; it being alleged in the complaint that holding said court by appellee is specially enjoined by an act approved March 1, 1911 (Acts 1911, pp. 103-110), and that such duty results from the fact that appellee holds the office of judge of room No. 5 of the superior court of Marion county. Appellee's demurrer for want of facts was sustained to the complaint, and, the relator failing and refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee. The errors assigned call in question the action of the court in sustaining said demurrer.
Said demurrer for want of facts is governed by an act approved March 4, 1911 (Acts 1911, p. 416), which act amended sections 85 and 89 of “An act concerning proceedings in civil cases,” approved April 7, 1881, Acts 1881, p. 255, being sections 344, 348, Burns 1908.
[1] Under the proviso in section 2 of said act of 1911, the defects in a complaint not specifically stated and pointed out in the memorandum, which is a part of the demurrer, are waived by the demurring party, and he cannot thereafter question the same for any defect not so specified. Said memorandum should contain only the reasons why the complaint is insufficient, stated in plain and concise language, without repetition, and no argument to sustain the same should be included therein. Any argument upon such demurrer, if in writing, must be upon a separate paper and is no part of the demurrer. Reasons stated in the memorandum should be numbered or otherwise designated so that in their consideration they can be referred to by number or such other designation.
It is the better practice to set out said reasons immediately following the cause of demurrer on the same paper, and that the party filing the demurrer for want of facts or his counsel sign the same at the close of the reasons set forth, so that the cause of demurrer and the reasons stated why the complaint is insufficient constitute one instrument or writing and may be signed and filed as one pleading.
[2] It is first insisted by appellant that the act approved March 1, 1911 (Acts 1911, pp. 103-110), entitled “An act defining the judicial district of the Shelby and Marion superior court, fixing the time and place of holding courts therein, providing for the jurisdiction of said courts and otherwise regulating the manner of holding and length of terms of the sessions of said courts in each of said counties,” etc., is unconstitutional and void because the subject of the act is not expressed in the title as required by section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: This contention is based upon the claim that the word “defining,” as used in said title, when taken in its plain and ordinary sense, as required by section 240m, Burns 1908, does not mean “create” or “establish,” and that therefore “the part of the act which purports to create the Shelby and Marion superior courts is void because not expressed in the title of the act.”
This is not the first time the Legislature has used the word “define” or “defining” instead of the word “create” or “establish,” in an act creating new judicial districts. Acts 1885, p. 119; Acts 1889, p. 50; Acts 1905, p. 119.
The word “constitute,” instead of the word “create” or “establish,” has also been used in the titles of acts creating new judicial circuits. Acts 1867, p. 84; Acts 1871, p. 63.
The act approved March 6, 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 87), which abolished the common pleas courts and established a number of new judicial circuits, did not have the word “create” or “establish” in its title.
The title of said acts reads as follows: “An act to divide the state into circuits for judicial purposes, fixing the time of holding courts therein, abolishing the courts of common pleas, and transferring the business thereof to the circuit courts, and providing for the election of judges and prosecuting attorneys in certain cases.”
By an act entitled “An act concerning the courts in the counties of Howard, Tipton, Grant and Delaware declaring an emergency,” approved March 1, 1909 (Acts 1909, p. 79), the Legislature abolished the Howard superior court, established the Delaware superior court, and created a new judicial circuit consisting of the county of Howard.
The constitutionality of none of these acts has been assailed on the ground that the word “create” or “establish” was not used in the title.
In Board, etc., v. Albright, 168 Ind. 564, 568, 81 N. E. 578, 579, it was said by the court, in response to a contention that an act was in violation of said section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution, that: Central Union Telephone Co. v. Fehring, 146 Ind. 189, 45 N. E. 64.
As was said in Western Union Telegraph Company v. Braxton, 165 Ind. 165, 168, 74 N. E. 985, 986:
In Hargis v. Board, 165 Ind. 194, 195, 196, 73 N. E. 915, 916, we said: 26 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) 583-590; 1 Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d Ed.) §§ 121, 127, 129, 134; Maule Coal Co. v. Partenheimer (1900) 155 Ind. 100, 106, 107, 55 N. E. 751, 57 N. E. 710, and cases cited; State ex rel. v. Roby (1895) 142 Ind. 168, 184-188, 41 N. E. 145, 33 L. R. A. 213, 51 Am. St. Rep. 174;State v. Arnold (1895) 140 Ind. 628, 38 N. E. 820;Walker v. Dunham (1861) 17 Ind. 483. 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 583; Clare v. State, 68 Ind. 17, 25, and cases cited; Mull v. Indianapolis, etc., Co., 169 Ind. 214, 222, 81 N. E. 657.
To “define” is “to fix, establish, or prescribe authoritatively.” 2 Cent. Dic. p. 1053, “Define,” 2; Robert J. Boyd, etc., Co. v. Ward, 85 Fed. 27, 28 C. C. A. 667, 675.
The word “define” is frequently used in legislation to mean create, establish, enlarge, or extend. In re Fourth Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, 137, 32 Pac. 850, and cases cited; People v. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447; Commissioners v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 607, 609; State v. Commissioners, 41 Kan. 630, 634, 21 Pac. 601;State v. Burr, 16 N. D. 581, 113 N. W. 705;State v. Ely, 16 N. D. 569, 113 N. W. 711, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 638;Walters v. Richardson, 93 Ky. 374, 20 S. W. 279; Gould v. Hutchings, 10 Me. 145, 154.
In State v. Bradley, supra, in construing the word “define” as used in the title of an act, it is said: ...
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