State ex rel. Dickson v. Williams
Decision Date | 17 October 1894 |
Citation | 60 N.W. 410,6 S.D. 119 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. DICKSON v. WILLIAMS, Mayor, et al. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. By the terms of section 5, art. 3, c. 37, Laws 1890, which provides, that "the mayor shall have power to remove any officer appointed by him, whenever he shall be of the opinion that the interests of the city demand such removal, but he shall report the reasons for such removal to the council at its next regular meeting," power is conferred upon the mayor of a city incorporated under that act to remove any officer of the city appointed by him "whenever he shall be of the opinion that the interests of the city demand such removal;" and the last clause of the section, which requires the mayor to report "the reasons for such removal to the council at its next regular session," does not constitute a qualification or limitation upon such power of removal by the mayor.
2. The city council of a city incorporated under the Laws of 1890 providing for the incorporation of cities, possesses only such powers in appropriating the money of the city as are conferred upon it by the act under which it is incorporated.
3. The mayor of the city of Sioux Falls, on May 14, 1894, caused to be served upon D., the chief of police of said city, an order, signed by him as such mayor, removing said D. from his said office of chief of police, reciting therein that in his opinion the interests of the said city demanded the removal of said D. from the said office; but the city council of said city, notwithstanding the action of the mayor, allowed, and ordered to be issued to said D., city warrants for his salary as such chief of police, for the months of May and June 1894. Held, that on May 14th the said D. was legally removed from his said office as chief of police, and that thereafter he had no legal claim upon the city for such salary. Held further, that the allowance to D. made by the city council for salary after May 14, 1894, was not for the payment of any debt or legal expense of the city, nor for any corporate purpose, and that the allowance to D. of such salary was made without lawful authority, and was not binding upon the city.
Appeal from circuit court, Minnehaha county; Joseph W. Jones, Judge.
Application by the state of South Dakota, on relation of Joseph M Dickson, for a writ of mandamus to compel Roy Williams, as mayor, and Frank L. Blackman, as city auditor, of the city of Sioux Falls, S. D., to issue warrants in payment of relator's salary as chief of police of such city. From a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandamus, defendants appeal. Reversed.
C. P. Bates,
for appellants. Orr & Lawshe (T. B. McMartin, of counsel), for respondent.
On July 18, 1894, Joseph M. Dickson presented to the circuit court of Minnehaha county an affidavit in which he states that on September 3, 1893, he was duly appointed chief of police for the city of Sioux Falls, and that he had continued to perform the duties of said office, and was at the time of making said affidavit the chief of police of said city; that the defendant Roy Williams was the mayor of said city, and that the defendant Frank L. Blackman was the city auditor; that on June 8, 1894, the city council of said city allowed and ordered a city warrant to be issued to him for the sum of $70, for his salary as chief of police for the month of May, 1894, and that on July 2d the said city council allowed and ordered to be issued to him a similar city warrant for his salary for the month of June, 1894; that he had duly demanded of the said mayor and city auditor the said warrants, but that they refused to comply with said demand, and refused to issue to him said warrants. And he concluded with the usual prayer, that the court issue a peremptory writ commanding said defendants to issue to him said city warrants. The circuit court thereupon issued its alternative writ of mandamus, commanding the said defendants to issue and deliver to the plaintiff the said city warrants as demanded, or show cause, etc. To this alternative writ the defendants made return and answer, in which, after admitting certain allegations in the writ, they allege, among other things, the following facts: The notice of removal, served upon the plaintiff on the 14th day of May, 1894, reads as follows:
The affidavit and pleadings are very full and specific, but their great length precludes us from giving more than the foregoing summary of them. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and it found its facts and stated its conclusions of law, from which we only deem it necessary to copy in this opinion the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: ...
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