State ex rel. Dike v. Kingsbury
| Decision Date | 01 February 1904 |
| Citation | 78 S.W. 641,105 Mo.App. 22 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. W. G. DIKE, Relator, v. JOHN A. KINGSBURY et al., Respondents |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Writ denied.
O. S Barton for relator.
(1) The levying of a license tax upon merchants of the city is not an "annual assessment" of the city: "An assessment consists in the two processes of listing the persons, property, etc., to be taxed and of estimating the sums which are to be the guide to an apportionment of the tax between them." Cooley on Taxation, 351. There can be no apportioning and assessing of taxes on merchants' valuations. Revised Statutes, secs. 9130, 9280, 5941 and 5945. (2) But even if the merchant's tax list constitutes a part of the annual statement of the city list made from statements filed on the first Monday in June, 1903, is not a part of the last previous annual assessment. (3) Rules for interpretation require that in determining the meaning of a statute the condition of the law and of pertinent facts at the time of its passage should be taken into consideration. When section 2993 of the dramshop act was passed merchants' licenses constituted no part of the annual assessment of the city. State ex rel. Allen v Railroad, 116 Mo. 15. And the Legislature has shown no intention of bringing them within the purview of the section. The city ordinance certainly has not done so and the amendment of the statutes regarding merchants' licenses was not intended to have such effect.
R. M Bagby for defendants.
(1) Merchants' stock of goods, wares and merchandise, are now taxable in the same manner as other property and at same rate as real estate. Merchants are required to furnish statements to the assessor. The assessor is required to make tax book for such statements and to return same to the county board of equalization. Said board of equalization, as constituted in Revised Statutes 1899, sec. 9130, equalize said merchants' statements in the same manner as assessment of other property, real and personal. Revised Statutes 1899, sec. 8546. (2) The city of Fayette, by the terms of its ordinances, has the power to collect an ad valorem tax upon merchants' stocks in trade and at the same time impose a license tax on the pursuit as a condition to the right to carry on the pursuit. (Ordinances printed in agreed statement of facts, relator's brief.) City of Aurora v. McGannon, 138 Mo. 38. (3) The ad valorem tax which merchants pay is not a license or occupation tax, but a personal property tax. City of Aurora v. McGannon, 138 Mo. 46; State ex rel. v. Tracy, 94 Mo. 217; City of Kansas v. Johnson, 78 Mo. 661. It follows then that the taxes of Hancock & Campbell on their stock of goods due and payable on or defore November 1, 1903, was a personal property tax and not a license or occupation tax. (4) The statements filed by merchants with the assessor on the first Monday in June of the year 1903 and the levy of the ad valorem tax upon such statements, constituted the annual assessment of merchants' stocks of goods, wares and merchandise for the year 1903. And being the last assessment just previous to the filing of relator's petition for a dramshop, it necessarily follows that it was the last previous annual assessment so far as these merchants are concerned, and the law (R. S. 1899, sec. 8546), requiring the sums of valuations of merchants' statements to be included in and made a part of the total valuation of property taxable for all purposes, it must follow that this assessment of Hancock & Campbell is a part of the last previous annual assessments of the city of Fayette.
Original Proceeding in Mandamus.
BROADDUS, J.
The relator applied to the county court of Howard county during the November term, 1903, thereof for a license to keep a dramshop in what is known as the Opera House block in Fayette, a city of the fourth class. It is admitted that he is a proper person to receive a dramshop license and that he has complied with the law, provided his petition is subscribed to by the names of two-thirds of the assessed taxpaying citizens and guardians and minors owning real estate in said block as shown by the last previous annual assessment and vote of the city as required by section 2993, Revised Statutes 1899, under which he made his application. The petition is signed by the names of fifteen admitted qualified signers. Seven admittedly qualified signers did not sign the petition. The defendants, composing the county court, not only counted the seven mentioned, but also counted W. A. Hancock and J. B. Campbell as qualified signers, and refused petitioner a license on the ground that he did not have the requisite...
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