State ex rel. Dunlap v. Cross, 3-579A125
Decision Date | 28 April 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 3-579A125,3-579A125 |
Citation | 403 N.E.2d 885 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana ex rel. LaVerne DUNLAP, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Robert J. CROSS, Raymond H. Rowe and Larry Kramer, Individually and as Members of the Police Civil Service Commission, David LaRocco, Individually and as Chief of the Police Department, and City of Michigan, Indiana, Appellees (Defendants Below). Third District |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Hilbert L. Bradley, Gary, for appellant.
Steven C. Snyder, Michigan City, for appellees.
LaVerne Dunlap, a Michigan City police officer, sought judicial review of a decision of the Police Civil Service Commission 1 which suspended her from the police force, without pay, for a period of 10 working days. The LaPorte Superior Court granted a motion to dismiss as to defendants Robert J. Cross, Raymond H. Rowe, and Larry Kramer, individually and as members of the Police Civil Service Commission and David LaRocco, individually and in his capacity as Police Chief. 2 It granted a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the City of Michigan City.
On appeal, Dunlap raises three issues for our consideration:
(1) Were her procedural due process rights to prior notice and a hearing violated when she was suspended without pay for a period of 10 working days?
(2) Did she have a cause of action for willful and malicious deprivation, independent of IC 1971, 18-1-11-3?
(3) Did the trial court err in failing to order a transcript and enter special findings of fact?
We affirm.
The facts relevant to our disposition of the case indicate that Officer Dunlap was observed by fellow police officers playing pool in a local tavern on March 4, 1978 between 7:30 p. m. and 3 a. m. the following morning. At that time, Officer Dunlap was scheduled to be on duty, but had requested a sick leave absence. On March 8, 1978, she received a letter from the Chief of Police which recited these facts and informed her that she had been charged with neglect of duty and suspended, without pay, for a period of 10 working days. The letter also stated that additional disciplinary action was being sought before the Police Civil Service Commission. The Commission conducted a hearing and heard evidence on the question of whether additional disciplinary action was appropriate. On May 4, 1978, it entered an order denying the Chief of Police's request for additional disciplinary action. Dunlap instituted this action on May 25, 1978.
Due Process Rights
Dunlap bases her claim upon the provisions found in IC 1971, 18-1-11-3, the firefighters' and police officers' Tenure Act. The pertinent section provides:
(Emphasis supplied.).
It is undisputed that, on March 8, 1978, the Police Chief suspended Dunlap for a period of 10 working days, without pay. The statute, upon which she is relying, clearly states that only the action of the board which results in a suspension "in excess of 10 days" is subject to judicial review. Dunlap has failed to meet this requirement. As a matter of statutory construction, she is not entitled to any sort of judicial review.
Despite these statutory obstacles, Dunlap contends that "the Appellate Courts of this state have jurisdiction and a duty to establish a policy that there are certain instances in which a policeman or fireman is entitled to a judicial review in order to prevent the kind of injustice which occurred in the case at bar." She claims that there is a "dearth of Indiana decisions" on this point; our research indicates otherwise.
The Court in City of Muncie v. Campbell (1973), 156 Ind.App. 59, 295 N.E.2d 379, considered a suspension "for a period not exceeding ten (10) days" 3 in conjunction with further disciplinary action. In approving the use of such suspension, it said at 382:
Further, in Dortch v. Lugar (1971), 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25, the Indiana Supreme Court scrutinized the constitutionality of the disciplinary procedures established for the consolidated police force. It explained that Section 1227 4 provided that the Police Chief may suspend from active service for up to 10 days, without pay, any police officer for cause and noted that this decision was not subject to review. Dortch, supra, at 46. At the conclusion of the Court's lengthy discussion of the disciplinary procedures established for the police force, 5 it stated at 46:
Finally, the Court of Appeals in Town of Speedway v. Nilson (1979), Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 1292, recently addressed this issue. It decided that police officer Nilson did not have the right to appeal his suspension since it was not for a period in excess of 30 days. The Court found that the 30-day suspension did not fall within the scope of reviewable board actions as defined by statute. 6
We agree with the foregoing authority and conclude that IC 1971, 18-1-11-3 precludes judicial review of suspensions not "in excess of 10 days."
Dunlap also alleges a constitutional deprivation of due process of law, independent of her statutory claim. She argues that, prior to the Chief's imposition of his 10-day suspension order, she was entitled to some type of Fourteenth Amendment due process. This is not the case.
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights apply only to liberty or property interests. Town of Speedway v. Harris (1976), Ind.App., 346 N.E.2d 646. Due to the nature of this case, we will focus upon the property interest. In order to utilize the due process protections, Dunlap must show us that she had some property interest which was protected by procedural due process. Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Gansert v. Meeks (1979), Ind.App., 384 N.E.2d 1140. This property interest is not created by the Constitution. Board of Regents, supra; Town of Speedway, supra. It may, however, arise from a statute, ordinance or contract. Gansert, supra. The sufficiency of her claim of entitlement to the property...
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Bailey v. Canan, IP97-1483-CM/S.
...interest in suspensions of less than [ten] days." Defs.' Br. In Supp. Of Mot. For Summ.J. at 36 (citing State ex rel. Dunlap v. Cross, 403 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)). Defendants rely upon State ex rel. Dunlap v. Cross, 403 N.E.2d 885 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), and other cases for the propos......
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Estate of Wilson, Matter of, 48A05-9209-CV-329
...property interest is involved. Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; State ex rel. Dunlap v. Cross (1980), Ind.App., 403 N.E.2d 885. The question of whether the state's involvement with nonclaim statutes, such as I.C. 29-1-7-17, is sufficient to impli......
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Smith v. Town of Eaton, Ind., 89-2563
...L.Ed.2d 820 (1985). An Indiana court came to the opposite conclusion when it interpreted the predecessor statute. Dunlap v. Cross, 403 N.E.2d 885, 887-88 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). It appears that the Dunlap court placed great emphasis on the lack of appellate recourse in the statute for a suspensi......
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