State Ex Rel. Elmo Williams v. Riffe
| Decision Date | 08 May 1945 |
| Docket Number | (No. 9718) |
| Citation | 127 W.Va. 573 |
| Parties | State ex rel. Elmo Williams v. Hon. W. A. Riffe,Judge, etc. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Prohibition
In criminal cases a trial court may set aside an order imposing a sentence during the same term at which it was entered, and where it does not clearly appear that the accused has partly satisfied the judgment imposed and also that it is the intention of the trial court to require him to submit to trial for an offense the minimum sentence for which is more severe than the sentence set aside, this Court will not prohibit the trial court from proceeding further in the case.
Original proceeding for writ of prohibition by the State, on the relation of Elmo Williams, against Hon. W. A. Riffe, Judge of the Criminal Court of Raleigh County, to prohibit such judge from ordering the trial of petitioner on a charge of murder in the first degree, after petitioner had pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and dismissal of the charge of first-degree murder, and after sentence on such plea.
Writ refused.
John Q. Hutchinson, for petitioner. Ira J. Partlow, Attorney General, and Ralph M. Hiner, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
A rule in prohibition was granted by this Court upon the petition of Elmo Williams against the Honorable W. A. Riffe, Judge of the Criminal Court of Raleigh County, upon a petition alleging that at the January, 1945, term of that court petitioner had been indicted for the first degree murder of his wife, arrested and placed in jail awaiting trial, which shortly thereafter was set for January twenty-fifth; that on January eighteenth, during the same term at which the indictment against him was returned, he was brought before the Criminal Court of Raleigh County and advised by his attorney that it had been agreed between him and the Prosecuting Attorney that in the event the accused would plead guilty to murder in the second degree the charge of first degree murder would be dismissed; and that upon the petitioner agreeing, with the approval of the trial judge, petitioner did enter his plea of guilty to murder in the second degree, upon which he was sentenced to not less than five nor more than eighteen years in the state penitentiary, the maximum sentence, and, in addition, to an additional five years because of a previous conviction.
The petition alleges that immediately after sentence was imposed petitioner was returned to the county jail of Raleigh County, where he has since remained pursuant to the judgment so entered.
The petition alleges further that the father-in-law of petitioner, the father of his deceased wife, about the first of February, 1945, filed with the Criminal Court of Raleigh County a petition in writing, signed by himself and many other persons, asking that the case against petitioner be tried and protesting the fact that petitioner was allowed to plead guilty to an offense less than murder in the first degree; that petitioner's attorney opposed the consideration of the petition by the Criminal Court of Raleigh County and filed with said court his own affidavit and that of several other persons in opposition to the affidavits that had been tendered and filed in support of the petition praying to set aside the judgment.
The petition seeking a peremptory writ of prohibition alleges that on February twentieth the Criminal Court of Raleigh County, in the absence of the accused, and after he had begun serving his sentence, entered an order the terms of which vacate, set aside and annul the judgment of that court rendered on the sixteenth day of January, 1945, and set the case against petitioner for trial at the March, 1945, term of court. The prayer of the petition is that the judge of the Criminal Court of Raleigh County be prohibited from ordering the trial of petitioner on said charge of murder in the first degree and from taking any action to force Williams to trial on that charge. Upon that prayer this Court granted the rule returnable April third, 1945.
In response to the rule the Honorable W. A. Riffe filed a verified answer in which it is stated that at the time of permitting Elmo Williams to plead guilty of murder in the second degree he was then of the opinion "that such arrangement was satisfactory to all parties interested in the case"; that thereafter certain petitions in protest of the sentence imposed on the sixteenth day of January, 1945, caused the court to entertain grave doubt as to the correctness of that course of conduct, and that his order of February twentieth, 1945, vacating, setting aside and annulling the judgment entered on the sixteenth day of January, 1945, was based upon the following reasons:
a. Because he was and is of the opinion that the court had control of its orders during the term at which they are entered.
b. That the question of Williams' insanity was and is a question for a jury.
c. No jury having been impaneled or sworn, the accused had not been placed in jeopardy and that no right of his would be violated by his being required to answer the charge in the indictment against him.
d. That if the accused was insane the former sentence of the court was without doubt improper.
The order entered on the twentieth day of February, 1945, after reciting that: "This...
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...situations different from the situation involved in this case, and those cases have no present application. In State ex rel. Williams v. Riffe, 127 W.Va. 573, 34 S.E.2d 21, 23, this Court, discussing the power of a court to set aside its judgment during the term in which it was rendered, us......
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