State ex rel. A.F. Krainz Co. v. Jackson, 98104
| Citation | 2012 Ohio 5072 |
| Decision Date | 01 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 98104,98104 |
| Parties | STATE, EX REL., A.F. KRAINZ CO., LLC PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT v. MAYOR FRANK G. JACKSON DEFENDANT-APPELLEE |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Jeffrey J. Fanger
Justine S. Winger
Fanger & Associates LLC
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
{¶1} Relator-appellant, A.F. Krainz, Co., LLC ("Krainz"), appeals the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of respondent-appellee, Mayor Frank G. Jackson ("Mayor Jackson"). Krainz assigns 19 errors for our review.1
{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court's decision. The apposite facts follow.
{¶3} The instant case began on June 6, 2008, when Krainz filed a mandamus action to compel Mayor Jackson to restore the portion of East 47th Street, between St. Clair Avenue and Sorg Court, from a two-way street to a one-way street. In the complaint, Krainz's principal place of business is located on that portion of East 47th Street that was changed. In its complaint, Krainz alleged that the City failed to provide proper notice to resident or business owners prior to instituting the traffic pattern change.
{¶4} Specifically, Krainz alleged that on March 14, 2007, and April 16, 2007, respectively, it submitted a public records request to the City requesting documentation regarding the change in the traffic pattern on East 47th Street. Krainz also alleged that on April 5, 2007, the City responded by supplying an interoffice memorandum thatindicated that Day Glo, another company located on East 47th Street, had requested the changes to the traffic pattern.
{¶5} In response to discovery, the City produced several emails between individuals at Day Glo and Robert Mavec, the City's traffic commissioner, and Jomarie Wasik, another City employee. Krainz maintained that these emails contained relevant information that the City should have produced pursuant to the public records request. As a result, on March 20, 2009, Krainz filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to add causes of action for alleged violations of R.C. 149.351 and 149.43.
{¶6} During the pendency of Krainz's leave to amend its complaint, Mayor Jackson filed a motion for summary judgment. After receiving Krainz's brief in opposition, on February 24, 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayor Jackson, stating in pertinent part as follows:
* * * To be entitled to a writ on [sic] mandamus, one must establish: 1) that he has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, 2) that respondents are under a clear legal duty to perform the acts, and 3) that the moving party has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Goudlock v. State, Cuyahoga App. No. 84135, 2004-Ohio-2352. Having failed to satisfy the first prong set forth in Goudlock, supra, relator is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. * * *
{¶7} The trial court never ruled on Krainz's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action for alleged violations of R.C. 149.351 and 149.43. Consequently, Krainz appealed the trial court's de facto denial of its motion for leave to amend the complaint because of its decision granting summary judgment in favor of Mayor Jackson.
{¶8} In State ex rel. A.F. Krainz Co., LLC v. Jackson, 8th Dist. No. 94864, 2010-Ohio-6029, we reversed the trial court's de facto denial of Krainz's motion for leave to amend its complaint. Having found that the trial court should have granted Krainz leave to amend the complaint to add the additional causes of action, our court declined to review the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Mayor Jackson. We held that for us to consider the summary judgment issue would result in a review of only one of Krainz's three claims and constitute piecemeal litigation. Id.
{¶9} On May 25, 2011, Krainz filed its amended complaint setting forth the additional two causes of action for alleged violations of R.C. 149.351 and 149.43. Ultimately, on November 8, 2011, Mayor Jackson filed a motion for summary judgment on Krainz's two additional causes of action stating in pertinent part that:
* * * This Court has previously disposed of Count I of Relator's Amended Complaint by entering judgment in favor of Respondent and that judgment remains undisturbed by the decision by the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Relator's remaining claims both concern alleged violations of Ohio's Public Records Act. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
{¶10} On December 2, 2011, Krainz filed its motions for summary judgment stating in pertinent part as follows:
* * * Relator set forth three Counts in its Amended Complaint. Count I was previously dismissed by this Court in favor of Respondent. Count II and III allege Respondent's violations of Ohio Public Records law. Relator is entitled to summary judgment on Counts II and III, based on the Ohio Revised Code, applicable case law, and the underlying public policy of Ohio's Public Records Act. Relator State Ex Rel. A.F. Krainz Co. LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment. * * *
{¶11} On February 17, 2012, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayor Jackson on Counts II and III of Krainz's Amended Complaint.
Summary Judgment
{¶12} Preliminarily, and as previously stated, Krainz has assigned 19 errors for our review. Although all concern the merit of the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in Mayor Jackson's favor, we find several assigned errors to be repetitive in nature. In addition, a number of assigned errors advance arguments not raised in Krainz's cross-motion for summary judgment or in its response to Mayor Jackson's motion for summary judgment, and are now being raised for the first time on appeal. As an appellate court, we do not consider arguments that the trial court did not address. Roush v. Butera, 8th Dist. No. 97463, 2012-Ohio-2506, citing Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 1992-Ohio-95, 604 N.E.2d 138. We, therefore, will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Id.
{¶13} Based on the foregoing, we will address the appropriate errors together with a focus on the central issues raised by Krainz in its cross-appeal and in its response to Mayor Jackson's motion for summary judgment.
{¶14} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 746 N.E.2d 618 (8th Dist.2000), citing Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987); N.E. Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 121 Ohio App.3d 188, 699 N.E.2d 534 (8thDist.1997). Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
{¶15} Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when, (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party.
{¶16} The moving party carries an initial burden of setting forth specific facts that demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the movant fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate; if the movant does meet this burden, summary judgment will be appropriate only if the nonmovant fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 293.
{¶17} Pertinent to the instant action, the requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law, such as appeal. Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compel a court to exercise judgment or to discharge a function, it may not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is grossly abused. State ex rel. McGrath v. Calabrese, 8th Dist. No. 97082, 2011-Ohio-4833. See also Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914 (1987); State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176,631 N.E.2d 119 (1994); State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman, 34 Ohio St.2d 55, 295 N.E.2d 659 (1973); and State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967).
{¶18} In the instant case, the gravamen of Krainz's complaint is the City's alleged failure to properly respond to the public records request, entitle it to court costs, attorney fees, and statutory damages pursuant to the public records law.
{¶19} Ohio's Public Records Act reflects the policy that "open government serves the public interest and our democratic system." State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472. R.C. 149.43 must also be liberally construed in favor of broad access to public records, with any doubt resolved in favor of disclosure. State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty Bd. of Commrs., 8th Dist. No. 93058, 2009-Ohio-5573, citing State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 82 Ohio App.3d 202, 611 N.E.2d 838 (8th Dist.1992). See also State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. Of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174; State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 1996-Ohio-214, 662 N.E.2d 334.
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