State ex rel. Fault v. Utecht, 34066.

• Citation: 19 N.W.2d 706,220 Minn. 431
• Decision Date: 27 July 1945
• Docket Number: No. 34066.,34066.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. DU FAULT v. UTECHT, Warden.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

220 Minn. 431
19 N.W.2d 706

STATE ex rel. DU FAULT
v.
UTECHT, Warden.

No. 34066.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 27, 1945.

Habeas corpus proceeding by the State, on the relation of Robert DuFault, against Leo F. Utecht, Warden of the State Prison, Stillwater, Minn. From an order quashing the writ and remanding relator to custody, relator appeals.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In ascertaining a jurisdictional fact, the court will pursue its inquiry through the record of the proceedings, and where the court is one of general jurisdiction, habeas corpus can be invoked only where lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record.

2. In view of the fact that a special appeal statute covering habeas corpus has been enacted in this state, which statute also provides for a trial de novo in supreme court, basis of common-law doctrine permitting a renewal of the petition on the same set of facts no longer exists, and doctrine of res judicata applies.

Appeal from District Court, Washington County; Alfred P. Stolberg, Judge.
Bert A. Minwegen, of St. Paul, for appellant.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., and Ralph A. Stone and William C. Green, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

MAGNEY, Justice.

On January 9, 1940, an information was filed in the district court of Carlton county charging Robert DuFault, the relator, with the crime of robbery in the second degree. He was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to the state penitentiary at Stillwater. Respondent is the warden of that institution. Prior thereto, relator had served one term in the state reformatory at St. Cloud and one at the penitentiary at Stillwater.

On February 2, 1943, relator filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court of Washington county. On April 1, 1943, that court granted respondent's motion to quash and remanded the prisoner. Again, on February 27, 1945, a second writ of habeas corpus was issued. In each petition the same grounds were urged.

Relator alleges that his imprisonment is illegal because he is an Indian and a member of the Chippewa Indian tribe, and that the crime of which he was convicted was committed upon an Indian allotment for which a trust patent had been issued. He claims that because of these facts the district court of Carlton county had no jurisdiction to try and punish him. The warrant of commitment is printed as a part of

[19 N.W.2d 707]

the return, and attached thereto are a copy of the indictment, the verdict of guilty, the judgment of conviction and sentence, and the minutes of the proceedings with transcript of the questions asked and the answers given at the time of sentence. The return alleges that the court had determined the same questions as are now raised upon the first habeas corpus proceeding and that the matters attempted to be raised in the instant case are res judicata. The answer to the return realleges the facts claimed by relator as to his membership in the Chippewa tribe, that the crime was committed upon trust patent land, and that he did not know of this until after his trial.

Respondent moved for an order quashing the writ and remanding relator to his custody as warden of the state prison. The court quashed the writ, and relator appeals to this court.

It is relator's contention that the Carlton county district court was without jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and thus without authority to render judgment against him for the crime charged, such jurisdiction being vested exclusively in the United States and the proper federal court, and that consequently the judgment of the state district court is null and void and relator's imprisonment illegal.

The facts set out in petitioner's application for the writ of habeas corpus, if true, would deprive the state courts of jurisdiction in this matter. A state's jurisdiction does not extend over individual members of an Indian tribe in so-called ‘Indian country.’ State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752. The jurisdiction of state courts does extend over ‘Indian country’ except as limited by Indian treaties or federal laws. They have the power to prosecute white persons or nontribal Indians for crimes committed upon Indian reservations. State v. Jackson, supra.

In the original proceedings before the district court of Carlton county, there is no reference to the fact that the place where the crime was committed was within an Indian reservation on an Indian allotment, and no reference to the fact that relator is a member of the Chippewa tribe of Indians and a ward of the government, except that at the pre-sentence examination relator was asked by the court:

‘Q. Let's see: Do you belong to the Chippewa tribe? A. Yes.

‘Q. And you get allowances from the Government, the same as the other Chippewas do? A. Yes.’

A motion to quash the writ amounts to a demurrer to the petition. 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, s 136. Solely for the purpose of testing their sufficiency in law, a demurrer admits the material or issuable facts well pleaded. The same is true of a motion to quash. In the instant case, therefore, respondent admits, for the purpose of testing their sufficiency, the facts that relator is a member of the Fond du Lac tribe of Minnesota Chippewa Indians; that he is a ward of the government; that the crime for which he was convicted was committed on an Indian allotment within the Fond du Lac Indian reservation. In his return, respondent sets out facts which he contends do not entitle relator to a release under the writ, irrespective of the facts set out in the petition and the answer to the return.

In these proceedings relator is attacking collaterally the judgment of conviction under which he is now confined in the penitentiary. He claims that the state district court of Carlton county lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and entered judgment therein; that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.

The district court of Carlton county has jurisdiction of crimes committed in that county. It is a court of general jurisdiction. The relator had entered a plea of not guilty. The case was tried to a jury, which convicted. Relator was represented by counsel throughout, except on the pre-sentence examination. He did not plead want of jurisdiction on the part of the state court, nor were the facts upon which he now bases his claim of lack of jurisdiction called to the attention of the court and jury during the trial. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not have jurisdiction over the offense and the person of relator. The information charges, and the judgment of conviction establishes, the fact that the offense was committed in Carlton county. No appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction in the state court. Relator now contends that in these proceedings under writ of habeas corpus he can attack the judgment collaterally by raising issues which he could and should have raised in the state district court.

1. In 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, s 16, p. 456, the rule is stated thus:

[19 N.W.2d 708]

‘In ascertaining a jurisdictional fact the court will pursue its inquiry through the record of the proceedings, and where the court is one of general jurisdiction, habeas corpus can be invoked only where lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record, * * *.’

In 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, s 26, p. 161, the general rule is stated as follows:

‘* * * The tendency of the courts is to hold that unless the lack of jurisdiction appears clearly upon the face of the record, habeas corpus ought not to be granted to review an erroneous determination by a court that it has territorial jurisdiction over an offense, but that in the absence of exceptional circumstances calling for the issuance of the writ, and subject always to the discretion of the court to issue the writ where justice so demands, an applicant for habeas corpus, in such a case, will be left to his remedy by writ of error or appeal.’

In State ex rel. Slayton v. Whittier, 108 Minn. 447, 122 N.W. 319, this court held that a judgment entered in proceedings under L. 1905, c. 285, authorizing the committal of incorrigible minors to the state training school, which recites all the jurisdictional facts, cannot be impeached or contradicted collaterally on a writ of habeas corpus. That case cited State ex rel. Noonan v. Sheriff of Hennepin County, 24 Minn. 87;State ex rel. Schulman v. Phillips, 73 Minn. 77, 75 N.W. 1029; and State ex rel. Bales v. Bailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N.W. 676, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 775, 130 Am.St.Rep. 592,16 Ann.Cas. 338. And in State ex rel. Jackson v. McDonald, 112 Minn. 428, 128 N.W. 454, 455, this court stated:

‘It is clear that, inasmuch as it affirmatively appears that the court had jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the relator, its judgment and proceedings cannot be impeached on habeas corpus.’

The court there distinguished the case of State ex rel. Sheehy v. Bates, 96 Minn. 150, 104 N.W. 890, by saying that in that case the defect in the proceedings there complained of appeared on the face of the record.

In State ex rel. Newman v. Wall, 189 Minn. 265, 266, 249 N.W. 37, 38, the rule was again stated:

‘We do not permit a writ of habeas corpus to be used as substitute for writ of error or appeal. It may not be made a cover for collateral attack on a judgment of conviction.’

In State ex rel. Dunlap v. Utecht, 206 Minn. 41, 44, 287 N.W. 229, 231, the court, after stating that the judgments of conviction were fair on their face and imported regularity, said:

‘The question now arises whether the relator may by habeas corpus at this late date raise and test the question as to whether there was double jeopardy. Habeas corpus is an independent proceeding to enforce a civil right and therefore is a collateral attack upon a criminal judgment. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 336, 43 S.Ct. 555, 67 L.Ed. 1009, 1011;State ex rel. Beekley v. McDonald, 123 Minn. 84, 86, 142 N.W. 1051;State ex rel. Shapiro v. Wall, 187 Minn. 246, 244 N.W. 811, 85 A.L.R...