State ex rel. Fidelity Natl. Bank & Trust v. Buzard, 38207.

• Decision Date: 07 September 1943
• Docket Number: No. 38207.,38207.
• Citation: 173 S.W.2d 915
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and HERBERT V. JONES and HARRY E. MINTY, as Liquidating Trustees of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, Relators, v. PAUL A. BUZARD, Judge of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

173 S.W.2d 915 STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and HERBERT V. JONES and HARRY E. MINTY, as Liquidating Trustees of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, Relators,
v.
PAUL A. BUZARD, Judge of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City. No. 38207. Supreme Court of Missouri. Division Two, September 7, 1943.

Prohibition.

PRELIMINARY RULE DISCHARGED.

Bowersock, Fizzell & Rhodes and Lathrop, Crane, Reynolds, Sawyer & Mersereau for relators.

(1) The final order of revival must be entered on or before the third term after the suggestion of death. R.S. 1939, secs. 1042-1047; 1 C.J.S. 939. (2) The conditions laid down in the statute must be strictly complied with. Page v. N.Y. Realty Co., 59 Mont. 505, 196 Pac. 871; Comm. v. Glover, 132 Ky. 558, 116 S.W. 769; Windfall City v. State, 172 Ind. 302, 88 N.E. 505; Stanton v. Thompson, 234 Mo. 7; Cole v. Parker Washington Co., 276 Mo. 220; Bostick v. McIntosh, 278 Mo. 395; Rutherford v. Williams' Legal Representatives, 62 Mo. 252; State ex rel. Porter v. Falkenhainer, 321 Mo. 613; DeHatre v. Ruenpohl, 341 Mo. 749; Hinkle v. Ward, 133 Kan. 516, 1 Pac. (2d) 83. (3) Section 1042 definitely limits the power of the court to three terms. State ex rel. v. Yates, 231 Mo. 276; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 139; Rutherford v. Williams' Legal Representatives, 62 Mo. 252; Bostick v. McIntosh, 278 Mo. 395; 1 Houts on Missouri Pleading & Practice, sec. 234, p. 432; Gallagher v. Delargy, 57 Mo. 29; Johnson v. Hiller, 299 S.W. 135; Ranney v. Bostic, 15 Mo. 215; Fine v. Gray, 19 Mo. 33; Ferris v. Hunt, 18 Mo. 480; Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E. (2d) 608; American R.R. Co. v. Coronas, 230 Fed. 545; Jelke Co. v. Smietanka, 86 Fed. (2d) 470. (4) The preliminary rule entered at the third term was a mere order to show cause. The administrator could be made a party only after notice by scire facias. 59 C.J., sec. 4, p. 868; Marty v. Ahl, 5 Minn. 34; In re Dahnke's Estate, 222 Pac. 381; Spaeth v. Sells, 176 Fed. 797; 18 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 1137; 15 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 362; 1 Bates, Pl. & Pr. 638; State ex rel. Porter v. Falkenhainer, 321 Mo. 613; Tefft v. Citizens' Bank, 36 Kan. 457, 13 Pac. 783; Berkley v. Tootle, 62 Kan. 701, 64 Pac. 620; Reaves v. Long, 63 Kan. 700, 66 Pac. 1030; Steinbach v. Murphy, 70 Kan. 487, 78 Pac. 823; Thompson v. Bristow, 244 Pac. 430; M.P. Railroad Co. v. Fox, 56 Neb. 746, 77 N.W. 130; Holman v. Clark, 65 So. 913; Prager v. Wootton, 182 Ark. 37, 30 S.W. (2d) 845; Shea v. Starr, 85 Atl. 788; Halle v. Cavanaugh, 79 N.H. 418, 111 Atl. 76; McNutt v. State, 48 Ark. 30, 2 S.W. 254. (5) The origin and background of the present statute confirm the conclusion that the final order must be entered on or before the third term. R.S. 1939, secs. 1042-1047; G.S. 1865, Chap. 170, secs. 1-6; Wagner's Mo. Stats., 1872, Chap. 110, Art. X, pp. 1049 to 1050, secs. 1-6; R.S. 1879, secs. 3663-3668; R.S. 1889, secs. 2196-2201; R.S. 1899, secs. 756-761; R.S. 1909, secs. 1916-1921; R.S. 1919, secs. 1346-1351; R.S. 1929, secs. 891-896; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Paddock v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 155 Mo. 524, 56 S.W. 453; Strottman v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 211 Mo. 227, 109 S.W. 769; 59 C.J., Statutes, secs. 493, 495, pp. 894-897; State ex rel. v. Davis, 314 Mo. 373, 284 S.W. 464.

Homer H. Berger, Watson, Ess, Groner, Barnett & Whittaker and Douglas Stripp for respondent.

(1) Relators' contention that respondent lacked jurisdiction is based exclusively upon the false premise that a second, or so-called final, order of revivor is necessary. On the contrary, the statutes require only one order, whether it be conditional or otherwise, and relators' argument ignores the fact that such an order of revivor was made and that service was had on or before the third term. R.S. 1939, secs. 1042, 1043, 1044, 1047; Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W. (2d) 935; Carter v. Burns, 332 Mo. 1128, 61 S.W. (2d) 933; Noll v. Alexander, 282 S.W. 739; 15 C.J., sec. 96, p. 799; 20 R.C.L. 662; Schafer v. Robillard, 370 Ill. 92, 17 N.E. (2d) 963. (2) Relators' argument is not supported by the statutes or by any decision of a Missouri court. Hinkle v. Ward, 133 Kan. 516, 1 Pac. (2d) 83; Cole v. Parker-Washington Co., 276 Mo. 220; Bostick v. McIntosh, 278 Mo. 395, 213 S.W. 456; Rutherford v. Williams' Legal Representatives, 62 Mo. 252; State ex rel. Porter v. Falkenhainer, 321 Mo. 613, 12 S.W. (2d) 481; DeHatre v. Ruenpohl, 341 Mo. 749, 108 S.W. (2d) 357; 1 Houts, Missouri Pleading & Practice, sec. 234, p. 432; Gallagher v. Delargy, 57 Mo. 29; Johnson v. Hiller, 299 S.W. 135; Wilkinson v. Thom, 194 Mo. App. 173, 185 S.W. 552; Fine v. Gray, 19 Mo. 33; Ferris v. Hunt, 18 Mo. 480. (3) Dissimilar statutes and decisions of other states are neither persuasive nor helpful. (4) The origin and background of the present statute do not confirm, but refute, the conclusion that a so-called final order is necessary, or that such an order must be entered on or before the third term. Laws 1824, Chap. 363, p. 849; R.S. 1825, pp. 622, 636; R.S. 1835, pp. 465, 513; R.S. 1845, Chaps. 37, 136, Art. V; Laws 1849, p. 73; R.S. 1855, Art. XI, p. 1272; R.S. 1865, Chap. 170.

LEEDY, P.J.

Prohibition: Relators, by this original proceeding, seek to prohibit the respondent judge from taking further cognizance of an action brought against them, as defendants, in the Jackson County Circuit Court by Frank E. Jones, as plaintiff, to recover $76,889.50, with interest, which was returnable to the May, 1941, term of said court.

173 S.W.2d 916

The sole question involved is the timeliness of the purported revivor of said action, under facts as follows: Defendants appeared at said May, 1941, term, and demurred. Thereafter, on August 20, 1941, and during the same term, the death of plaintiff, Jones, was duly suggested, the court being advised thereby that said Jones departed this life on or about May 27, 1941; but no steps were taken at the ensuing September and November, 1941, terms. Thereafter, on February 17, 1942, during the January, 1942, term, C.R. Benton, as administrator of the estate of said Jones, filed a motion for an order of revivor, and on the same day the court entered the following order on said motion: "Now on this day comes C.R. Benton and files his motion giving the Court to be informed that he is the duly appointed...