State ex rel. Fox v. Board of County Commissioners of Carroll County
| Decision Date | 09 December 1931 |
| Docket Number | 24,904 |
| Citation | 178 N.E. 563,203 Ind. 23 |
| Parties | State, ex rel. Fox v. Board of County Commissioners of Carroll County et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendent of Schools---Salaries---Increased According to Law---Complaint to Recover Increase.---A complaint by a county superintendent of schools to recover an unpaid portion of his salary as fixed by law, which alleged that he was the elected qualified and acting superintendent of schools for a named county; that the salary for such office had been increased as provided by law (Acts 1919, ch. 78, p. 445); that he had not been paid said increased salary for the time he had been such official; that the official authority which had the duty of making the appropriations from which such salary should be paid has continuously refused to make such appropriation that the official authority whose duty it was to allow funds to pay such salary has continuously refused to make such allowance; and that the official authority to issue warrants for the payment of said salary has continuously refused to issue orders or warrants for the payment of such salary, alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action p. 33.
2. STATUTES---Supplemental---Whether Supplemental Question for Judicial Determination.---The question whether a statute is supplemental to another statute, or to all of the statutes which relate to the same subject, is one for judicial investigation, consideration and determination. p. 34.
3. STATUTES---Interpretation---Paramount Rule---Statute must be Interpreted According to Legislative Intent.---The paramount rule of judicial interpretation of statutes is that a statute is to be interpreted according to the legislative intent. p 34.
4. STATUTES---Construction---Effects or Consequences of Proposed Construction should be Considered.---In construing a statute, or a part thereof, susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects or consequences which would follow a proposed construction. p. 35.
5. STATUTES---Construction---Departure from Primary or Literal Meaning of Words used---Also from Usual Grammatical Construction.---In construing a statute, it is not infrequently necessary to limit the effect of the words contained therein and sometimes to depart, not only from their primary and literal meaning, but also from the rules of grammatical construction, in cases where it seems highly improbable that the words in their primary or grammatical meaning actually express the real intention of the Legislature. p. 35.
6. STATUTES---Construction---General Title---Does not Require Act to be General.---The fact that the title to an act is general does not require that the act itself should be general, but the enactment under a general title may be restrictive and limited. p. 35.
7. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendents of Schools---Increase of Salaries---Act of 1919 Supplemental to Act of 1913---Applied to Counties of 77,000 Population or Less.---The 1919 act of the Legislature relative to increasing the salaries of county school superintendents (Acts 1919, ch. 78, p. 445) was supplemental to the act of 1913 on the same subject (Acts 1913, ch. 45, p. 78, 6400a Burns 1914), in that it provided a procedure by which the salaries of county superintendents of schools in counties having 77,000 inhabitants or less might be increased, but by a different procedure than that prescribed in the 1913 act, which was limited to counties having more than 77,000 population. p. 35.
8. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendents of Schools---Increase of Salaries---Act of 1921---Did not Affect Increases under Former Laws.---Under the express provision of the act of 1921 relative to increasing the salaries of county superintendents of schools and repealing the acts of 1913 and 1919 on the same subject (Acts 1921, ch. 54, p. 132, 6512 Burns 1926), the repealing act was not to be "so construed as to reduce the salary which any county superintendent" then received, and did not take away the increase in salary which had been made under the former laws. p. 37.
9. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendents of Schools---Increase of Salaries---Pertinent to the Official and not to Person then in Office.---The fact that the petitions for an increase of the salary of the county superintendent of schools merely asked that the salary of the then incumbent of the office (naming him) be increased did not indicate that an increase was purely personal to such incumbent, as the salary pertains to the official and not to the person who happened to be in office at the time of the increase. p. 37.
10. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendent of Schools---Acceptance of Salary as Fixed by County Council---Recovery of Balance to which he was Entitled.---The fact that a county superintendent of schools accepted the salary as fixed by the county council did not preclude his recovery of the balance of the salary to which he was entitled under the law, including an increase which had been granted to the superintendent in that county under former laws. p. 37.
11. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendent of Schools---County Council cannot Increase or Decrease Salary of Office.---The county council has no power to increase or decrease the salary of the county superintendent of schools, as its power is no greater than is provided by law. p. 37.
12. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendent of Schools---Appropriation of Salary---Duty of County Council.---Under the provision of 6515 Burns 1926, the county council is required to make the necessary appropriation to pay the salary of the county superintendent of schools as fixed by law, together with any increase of such salary made under the provisions of any former or existing law (Acts 1911, ch. 94, p. 156, Acts 1919, ch. 78, p. 445, Acts 1921, ch. 54, p. 132). p. 38.
13. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---County Superintendent of Schools---Salary and Compensation---Duty of County Council to Make Appropriation.---Since the act relative to the salary and compensation of county superintendents of schools makes it mandatory on the county council to make the necessary appropriations to carry out the provisions of the act (6515 Burns 1926), it is the duty of the council to appropriate sufficient money each year to pay the superintendent's salary, although the superintendent has not filed with the auditor an estimate of his salary as required by the "County Reform Law" (5877 Burns 1926). p. 38.
14. PLEADINGS---Demurrer Admits Truth of Facts well Pleaded---Averment as to Amount of Salary---Admitted to be True in Reviewing Ruling on Demurrer.---Since a demurrer to a pleading admits (for the purpose of the demurrer) the truth of the facts well pleaded, an averment in a complaint for mandate by a county superintendent of schools to compel the appropriation of his salary, which was averred to be $2,400 per year, the fact stands as admitted in reviewing the ruling on demurrer. p. 39.
ON PETITION TO DISMISS APPEAL.
15. APPEALS---Dismissal of Appeal---For Indefiniteness of Assignment of Error.---Where the record showed that all defendants joined in filing a separate and several demurrer to the complaint, an assignment of error that the court erred in sustaining "appellee's" demurrer to the complaint, thus making the word "appellees" a possessive singular instead of a possessive plural, was not so indefinite as to require the dismissal of the appeal. p. 40.
16. MANDAMUS---Judgment for Costs as in Civil Actions---Rule as to Relators in Civil Actions.---The mandate statute provides that "costs shall be awarded in these proceedings as in civil actions" (1251 Burns 1926), and the rule in civil actions is that, "when the state is plaintiff [as in actions of mandate], the relator only shall be liable, and judgment for costs shall be rendered accordingly," excepting when some state officers are relators (645 Burns 1926). p. 41.
17. PARTIES---State ex rel. Cases---Relator is Real Party---State only a Nominal Party.---When an action must be prosecuted in the name of the state on the relation of some one (as in actions of mandate), the relator is the real party and the state is but a nominal party. p. 42.
18. MANDAMUS---Parties Plaintiff---State on Relation of Party in Interest---Word "Plaintiff" may Refer to either Party.---In an action of mandate, there are two parties plaintiff, one (the state) is but a nominal party and the other (the relator) the real party in interest, and the designation "plaintiff" may refer to either party. p. 43.
19. APPEALS---Appeal Bond in Action of Mandate---Referring to Relator as Appealing Party---Held Sufficient.---On appeal from a judgment for costs against the plaintiff in an action of mandate, an appeal bond naming the relator as the appealing party was sufficient, as he was the only party plaintiff to which the judgment could legally apply. p. 43.
From Carroll Circuit Court; Benjamin F. Carr, Judge.
Action of mandate on the relation of Arthur G. Fox against the Board of Commissioners of Carroll County and others. From a judgment for defendants, on their demurrer to the complaint, the relator appealed.
Reversed.
Claycombe & Stump, Wood Unger and William C. Smith, for appellant.
Pollard, Cartwright & Wasson, George M. Smith and E. E. Pruitt, for appellees.
This is an action by appellant for mandate to compel the appellees, the county council of Carroll County, and the members thereof, to make the necessary appropriation, and the board of county commissioners of Carroll County, and the members thereof, to allow the necessary funds, and the auditor of Carroll County to issue the...
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