State ex rel. Fredericktown School Dist. No. 20 v. Underwood School Dist. No. 16

Citation250 S.W.2d 843
PartiesSTATE ex rel. FREDERICKTOWN SCHOOL DIST. NO. 20 v. UNDERWOOD SCHOOL DIST. NO. 16 et al. No 28434.
Decision Date01 July 1952
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

J. B. Schnapp, Fredericktown, for appellants.

Melvin Englehart, Fredericktown, for respondent.

BENNICK, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus in a proceeding to compel one school district of such county to levy taxes for the satisfaction of a judgment obtained against it by another school district of such county.

On August 22, 1951, Fredericktown School District No. 20, the relator in the present proceeding, obtained a judgment in the circuit court against Underwood School District No. 16 for the aggregate amount of $1,157.81 and costs. While the record itself is silent upon the matter, it seems to be conceded that the judgment was for the amount of tuition due the Fredericktown District from the Underwood District for pupils residing in the latter district who had attended the former district's high school upon their completion of the work in the highest grade offered in the school of their own district. Section 165.257 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. No appeal was taken from such judgment, and in due time it became final according to law.

On October 18, 1951, in an attempt to obtain satisfaction of its judgment, the Fredericktown District instituted this proceeding in mandamus against the Underwood District, the individual members of its board of education, and Paul Rose, the clerk of the County Court of Madison County.

After referring to the rendition of the judgment and the fact that it had not been satisfied, the petition alleged that by virtue of Art. X, Sec. 11(c), Constitution of 1945, V.A.M.S., as well as by Section 165.080 RSMo 1949, Vernon's Missouri Statutes Service, Laws 1951, the Underwood District was authorized 'by a majority vote' to levy a tax rate aggregating $1.95 on the $100 assessed valuation on all taxable property, real and personal, of such district.

The prayer was that the court issue a writ of mandamus commanding the members of the board of education of Underwood District, together with the county clerk, to certify and extend upon the tax books a total rate of $1.95 on the $100 assessed valuation of all taxable property of the district, and that such levy be credited to the incidental funds of the district.

An alternative writ of mandamus was thereupon issued, which the respondent district and officers moved to quash upon the grounds, among others, that no cause of action was stated by relator's petition; that there was no allegation in the petition that an election had been held and the increased tax rate approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon; and that without such election and approval any certification of such additional levy by the members of the board, and any extension of it upon the tax books by the clerk, would be 'unconstitutional' and unlawful.

After a hearing the court overruled the motions to quash and made its alternative writ peremptory. Following an unavailing motion for a new trial, respondents gave notice of appeal to this court, and by proper successive steps have caused the case to be transferred here for our review.

The parties agree that we have appellate jurisdiction, and we think correctly so.

A school district is not a political subdivision of the state as the term is used in Art. V, Sec. 3, Constitution of 1945, V.A.M.S., and our jurisdiction is consequently not defeated by reason of the circumstance that the two school districts are parties to the proceeding. Hydesburg Common School Dist. of Ralls County v. Rensselaer Common School Dist. of Ralls County, Mo.Sup., 214 S.W.2d 4; Young v. Brassfield, Mo.Sup., 223 S.W.2d 491. Nor are the respondent directors and county clerk to be regarded as state officers within the meaning of such constitutional provision. Young v. Brassfield, supra.

Any doubt that might exist with respect to our jurisdiction would more likely depend upon the question of whether the case involves the construction of either the revenue laws or the Constitution of this state. While the revenue laws are indirectly and incidentally involved, they are not present in the case in such a sense as to vest the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction. To do that it would be necessary that they be directly and primarily concerned. Young v. Brassfield, supra; Hurtgen v. Gasche, Mo.Sup., 223 S.W.2d 493. So also as regards the...

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2 cases
  • Consolidated School Dist. No. 1 of Jackson County v. Bond, KCD
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • September 4, 1973
    ...Common Sch. Dist., 214 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.1948); Young v. Brassfield, 223 S.W.2d 491 (Mo.1949); State ex rel. Fredericktown Sch. Dist. No. 20 v. Underwood Sch. Dist. No. 16, 250 S.W.2d 843 (Mo.App.1952); Koch v. Bd. of Regents of N.W. Mo. State College, 256 S.W.2d 785 (Mo.1953); State ex rel. Dah......
  • Hughes v. Civil Service Commission of City of St. Louis, 36643
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • May 11, 1976
    ...State ex inf. Rice v. Hawk, 360 Mo. 490, 228 S.W.2d 785 (1950); Utt v. Oster, 235 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.App.1951); State v. Underwood School Dist. No. 16, 250 S.W.2d 843 (Mo.App.1952); New v. Corrough, 370 S.W.2d 323 (Mo.1963). School districts are political subdivisions of the state, § 70.210(2),......

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