State ex rel. Garner v. Gray

Decision Date05 October 1972
Docket NumberNo. S,S
Citation201 N.W.2d 163,55 Wis.2d 574
PartiesSTATE ex rel. William R. GARNER, Petitioner, v. R. L. GRAY, Warden, Wisconsin State Prison, Respondent. tate 34.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

James H. McDermott, State Public Defender, Madison, for petitioner.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondent.

WILKIE, Justice.

Petitioner raises various objections to the procedure followed here and to the papers filed, contending noncompliance with the provisions of the Uniform Detainer Act, sec. 976.05, Stats. Petitioner alleges six distinct instances of noncompliance:

1. The detainer was filed by the Chicago police department rather than the correct party, the Cook county state's attorney (or his assistants acting for him).

2. There was a premature honoring of the Illinois temporary custody request.

3. There is a lack of judicial 'approval' of the temporary custody request.

4. There is an inference that the Illinois detainer filed in October, 1971, was no longer on file at the time of the Illinois state's attorney's request for temporary custody.

5. Wisconsin authorities failed to furnish the authorities of Illinois with copies of the certificate of inmate status.

6. The Illinois complaint and arrest warrant are defective.

Before considering any of petitioner's objections to the procedure followed here, it is first necessary to consider the two issues raised by petitioner's constitutional challenges to the provisions of the Uniform Detainer Act, under which the Illinois authorities seek the delivery of petitioner.

ISSUES

1. Are any of the provisions of the Uniform Detainer Act subject to constitutional challenge?

2. Is petitioner entitled to a hearing wherein he may contest the legality of his impending delivery to Illinois?

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

Petitioner urges due-process and equal-protection constitutional challenges to the Uniform Detainer Act. Specifically, as to the violation of petitioner's right to due process, petitioner argues that while the Uniform Detainer Act allows him to seek, by motion, to have the governor of this state disapprove a request for temporary custody, there is no provision in the Act which assures him of being notified of this right. For example, there is no provision which assures prompt notice to a prisoner of a detainer which has been lodged against him. Indeed, asserts petitioner, there is no provision at all which requires the warden or anyone else to inform him of his right to petition the governor. 1 This deficiency, according to petitioner, is violative of his right to due process.

Contending a denial of equal protection, petitioner compares the Uniform Detainer Act to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which has also been adopted in this state. 2 He argues that under the Extradition Act there is a right of a person sought to be extradited to be advised by a court of record of his rights under the Extradition Act. He asserts that no such advice is required by the Detainer Act. This difference between the two Acts, he asserts, gives rise to an arbitrary and irrational classification among Wisconsin prisoners who may be sought by out-of-state authorities under one Act rather than the other.

Article IV(a) of the Uniform Detainer Act provides a thirty-day period after receipt of a temporary custody request during which the prisoner sought may petition the governor of the sending state to deny the request. 3 The Act elsewhere requires the warden of an institution confining the prisoner to 'promptly' notify him of any detainer which is lodged against him and of his right to request final disposition of the indictment, information of complaint upon which the detainer is based. 4 Crucially the Uniform Detainer Act nowhere mandates the warden to inform a prisoner of his right to either petition the governor to deny his custody release, or to seek legal relief challenging his custody transfer. A warden must only inform a prisoner of his right to request final disposition, thereby waiving extradition and consenting to the production of his body in another state's court for purposes of further prosecution. 5 However, the Act does state that nothing therein contained shall be construed to deprive a prisoner of any right he may have to contest the legality of his delivery. 6

It is petitioner's basic position that this Act does not protect his right to timely petition the governor to deny the custody request or to bring a habeas corpus writ challenging his impending transfer.

Some of these same objections were in King v. State, 7 wherein the Maryland Court of Special Appeals condemned the Uniform Detainer Act for not including sanctions assuring compliance by the various authorities with the Act's provisions. Thus, according to the Maryland court, there was nothing in the Act compelling the warden's prompt action upon a prisoner's request for prompt disposition provided for in Article III. 8 As well, there is no provision requiring the prompt notification by correctional officials of detainers lodged against a prisoner to the warden of an institution. Thus the warden cannot in his turn 'promptly' inform the prisoner thereof as he is required under Article III(c).

In the instant case (same Act with minor variations) there is nothing in the Uniform Detainer Act mandating even the warden of an institution (as distinguished from a judge) to inform the prisoner of his right to petition the governor or bring a writ of habeas corpus to contest his custody transfer.

The state argues there is no due-process violation herein as it is currently the practice under the Act to inform a prisoner of the existence of a detainer or custody request for him and of his right to petition the governor. Indeed, the state suggests, the Handbook on Interstate Crime Control states that signed copies of the request for temporary custody must be sent to the prisoner. The state also notes a decision in the circuit court for Dodge county requiring timely notice to a prisoner of his right to petition the governor. Finally, the state notes several cases which suggest a prisoner has no inherent right to 'complain if one sovereignty waives its strict right to exclusive custody of him for vindication of its laws in order that the other may also subject him to conviction of crime against it.' 9 Therefore, argues the state, the only rights a prisoner has to contest his delivery to another state are those granted him by statute. The state apparently feels a prisoner has no right to be informed of his rights of petition and habeas corpus when the statute merely gives him those rights.

The state's argument, however, overlooks several established constitutional doctrines. The first is that a statutorily given right, albeit not constitutionally required, cannot be arbitrarily denied. 10 The second doctrine is that of the existence of a right necessarily implying the notification thereof. 11 The one without the other is as meaningless as having the right to an attorney or to appellate review without having the right to be notified thereof. 12

We conclude that the Uniform Detainer Act fails to protect adequately a prisoner's right, granted in the Act, to petition the governor or seek a writ of habeas corpus by failing to mandate notification of these rights to the petitioner. This is a violation of the procedural due-process requirements of the state and federal constitutions. 13 The state argues that because the practice is generally to give notice of rights to prisoners there is no constitutional defect. This court has held that in construing a statute the court 'must ascertain the legislative intention as disclosed by the language of the statute in relation to its scope, history, context, subject matter, and the object intended to be remedied or accomplished.' 14 This court has also stated recently that '(t)he meaning of a legislative act must be determined from what it says.' 15

The prevailing practice with respect to informing prisoners of their rights is not a relevant consideration in determining the constitutional validity of an act. In the instant situation a serious question exists as to whether the petitioner was informed of his right to contest the validity of his custody transfer. This court has held a statute may be construed to require elements which may have been omitted. 16 Thus, we construe the Uniform Detainer Act to require advice to a prisoner of his various rights. Receipt here by Garner of a copy of his detainer was not enough. The statute must be construed to require that he be notified of his right to contest his delivery under that detainer either by petitioning the governor or by going to court.

Asserting a denial of equal protection, petitioner also argues that he has been arbitrarily denied certain rights because the Illinois authorities have chosen to proceed under the Uniform Detainer Act rather than the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The Extradition Act provides:

'(10) Rights of accused; application for writ of habeas corpus. No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this state, who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel; and if the prisoner of his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for, notice thereof, and of the time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given to the prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody, and to the said agent of the...

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