State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn Circuit Court, 571S143

Citation277 N.E.2d 370,29 Ind.Dec. 51,257 Ind. 631
Decision Date21 January 1972
Docket NumberNo. 571S143,571S143
PartiesSTATE of Indiana on the Relation of Eddie Louis GARVIN, Relator, v. The DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT, Judge William C. Runyon as Special Judge of the Deaborn Circuit Court, Respondents.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Phillips B. Johnson, Versailles, for relator.

Jack R. Shields, Pros. Atty., Batesville, for respondent.

GIVAN, Judge.

Relator brought this original action seeking a writ of mandate commanding the Dearborn Circuit Court and The Honorable William C. Runyon, special judge, to discharge him or show cause why such should not be done.

The events leading to this original action are as follows:

Relator was convicted of the crime of being an accessory after the fact of armed robbery; that conviction was appealed to this Court resulting in the granting of a new trial. See Garvin v. State (1970), Ind., 263 N.E.2d 371, 23 Ind.Dec. 398.

On December 11, 1970, relator was returned to the Ripley Circuit Court to again stand trial.

On December 24, 1970, he filed a change of venue from the county. At the same time he filed a motion for early trial under CR. 4(B). In due course the venue was changed to Dearborn County, the change being perfected on the 7th day of January, 1971.

On the 23rd of February, 1971, relator filed a petition for discharge under the above rule alleging that more than fifty judicial days had passed since his December 24 motion for early trial. The regular judge of the Dearborn Circuit Court, The Honorable Lester Baker, disqualified himself on the ground that he had previously heard and determined a petition for a writ of habeas corpus concerning the same defendant on the same charges. Thereafter, The Honorable William C. Runyon qualified as special judge in this case. Judge Runyon then denied relator's petition for discharge on the ground that relator himself had caused the delay.

First, we must observe the fifty (50) day period within which the relator was required to be brought to trial after making a motion under the rule did not begin to run until the 7th day of January, 1971. The relator's request for change of venue filed in the Ripley Circuit Court constituted delay chargeable to him. See State v. Grow (1970), Ind., 263 N.E.2d 277, 23 Ind.Dec. 348. Since the time did not start to run until the 7th day of January, appellant's petition for discharge filed on the 23rd day of February, 1971, was made at a time when eleven (11) judicial days remained before the expiration of the fifty days referred to in the rule. The filing of this premature petition for discharge, of course, required the trial court to set a date for hearing and rule thereon before proceeding further with the case.

The relator argues that notwithstanding the filing of this premature petition for discharge the fifty-day period continued to run and expired on the 6th day of March, 1971, thus entitling the relator to a discharge any time following that date. We do not agree. We hold that the filing of the premature petition for discharge by the relator was an action on his part which caused a delay in bringing him to trial during the remaining eleven judicial days, and that the fifty-day period required under the rule tolled until the matter of his petition was determined by the court, including the present action in this Court taken subsequent to the trial court's overruling of his petition for discharge. See State v. Grow, supra, and State ex rel. Walker v. Ratliff (1970), Ind., 255 N.E.2d 223, 20...

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8 cases
  • Martin v. State, 1-1280A347
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 21 Abril 1981
    ...has still not been brought to trial. If it is filed prior to the running of the year it is premature. State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn Circuit Court, (1972) 257 Ind. 631, 277 N.E.2d 370. Under prior law, it is generally held that the right to discharge for delay in bringing a defendant to t......
  • Cox v. State, 280S49
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 5 Mayo 1981
    ...a delay of thirty-six days. See Nettles v. State, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 205, 327 N.E.2d 625. See also State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn Circuit Court, (1972) 257 Ind. 631, 277 N.E.2d 370; State v. Grow, (1970) 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277. Second, on August 31, 1978, the defendant filed a "joi......
  • McGary v. State, 1-1080A272
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 17 Junio 1981
    ...Ind.Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 13. Both of these motions constituted delays chargeable to McGary. State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn C. C., (1972) 257 Ind. 631, 277 N.E.2d 370; State ex rel. Walker v. Ratliff, (1970) 253 Ind. 495, 255 N.E.2d 223. On December 1, 1976, the regular judge ......
  • Lyons v. State, 181S25
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 29 Enero 1982
    ...attributed to a defendant's motion for change of venue are delays caused by the defendant's own acts. State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn Circuit Court, (1972) 257 Ind. 631, 277 N.E.2d 370; State v. Grow, (1970) 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277; Schuck v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 838. Ap......
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