State ex rel. Gatlin v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 84-961

• Decision Date: 17 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-961,84-961
• Citation: 18 OBR 302,480 N.E.2d 487,18 Ohio St.3d 246
• Parties: , 18 O.B.R. 302 The STATE, ex rel. GATLIN, Appellant, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 246

18 Ohio St.3d 246

480 N.E.2d 487, 18 O.B.R. 302

The STATE, ex rel. GATLIN, Appellant, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. et al., Appellees.

No. 84-961.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 17, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

Regardless of the existence of a legislatively prescribed court appeal, the Industrial Commission has inherent power to reconsider its order for a reasonable period of time absent statutory or administrative regulations restricting the exercise of reconsideration. (Todd v. General Motors [1981], 65 Ohio St.2d 18, 417 N.E.2d 1017 [19 O.O.3d 195], approved and extended.)

This mandamus action arises as a result of a lower-back injury sustained by appellant, Clarence R. Gatlin, on November 10, 1978 during the course of his employment with appellee Yellow Freight System. Appellant's claim was initially certified by Yellow Freight, a self-insured employer, and appellant received temporary total workers' compensation benefits.

On May 6, 1982, appellant filed an application seeking temporary total disability benefits for a period beginning September 3, 1981. The application was denied by the district hearing officer whose decision was affirmed by the Columbus Regional Board of Review in October 1982. Appellant appealed this decision to the Industrial Commission and the matter was heard by two staff hearing officers pursuant to R.C. 4121.35(B)(6). ¹ Their order, dated March 16, 1983, reversed the regional board's decision and directed that appellant be paid, "temporary total compensation from 9-3-81 to 3-27-82, to continue upon submission of additional medical and wage information."

On April 15, 1983, Yellow Freight filed a notice with the commission in an attempt to obtain further review of the March 1983 order. The notice was improperly designated as a "notice of appeal." However, the commission construed it as being an application for reconsideration. The application was granted by order dated May 26, 1983, which stated:

"Employer's Notice of Appeal filed April 15, 1983 is construed as an Application for Reconsideration of the Staff Hearing Officer's [sic ] order dated March 16, 1983 and that such be granted and it is further ordered that the order of the Staff Hearing Officer's [sic ] dated March 16, 1983 be vacated, set aside, and held for naught and that the Claimant's Appeal filed November 12, 1982 from the order of the Columbus Regional Board of Review dated October 25, 1982 be reconsidered by the full Commission in the Conference Room with a Statement of Facts to be prepared."

Appellant initiated the instant mandamus action in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County seeking the issuance of a writ compelling the commission to reinstate the order of its staff hearing officers dated March 16, 1983. Appellant claimed that no jurisdiction existed for the commission to vacate a final order by its staff hearing officers because no further appeal could be taken to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. ² Concluding that limited jurisdiction is conferred on the commission to reconsider and modify its orders, but that no reasons were given in the instant case for the vacation of the previous award and the decision to reconsider the matter, the court of appeals granted a limited writ compelling the commission to specify its reasons and the evidence relied upon when it vacated the order of its staff hearing officers and ordered the matter to be reconsidered. In short, the court of appeals based the issuance of the writ on our decision in State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 453 N.E.2d 721. ³

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Joseph A. Marchese, Columbus, for appellant.

Eugene P. Weiss, Columbus, for appellee Yellow Freight System, Inc.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Douglas M. Kennedy, Columbus, for appellee Indus. Com'n.

CELEBREZZE, Chief Justice.

The thrust of our decision in Mitchell, supra, involved this court's concern that "[c]laimants and employers alike, who appear before the commission, are frequently informed that requested benefits are either being granted or denied based on 'the evidence in the file and/or the evidence adduced at the hearing.' " Id., 6 Ohio St.3d at 483, 453 N.E.2d 721. Accordingly, the commission was ordered to henceforth specifically state which evidence was relied upon, accompanied by a brief explanation stating why a claimant is or is not entitled to "benefits." Id. at 483-484, 453 N.E.2d 721.

A careful review and examination of Mitchell reveals that we intended it to apply to orders of district hearing officers, regional boards of review and the commission itself, pertaining to the grant or denial of benefits. The order of the commission in the case at bar is not a final order pertaining to the grant or denial of benefits. Rather, it is more akin to an interlocutory order to which the requirements of Mitchell do not apply. Following acceptance of an application for reconsideration the commission will eventually proceed to issue a final order affecting the payment of benefits. It is this final order which must then set forth with specificity the elements required in Mitchell.

Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in granting the writ based on the Industrial Commission's non-compliance with Mitchell. ⁴

The primary issue in this case is whether the commission possessed the requisite jurisdiction to reconsider its order dated March 16, 1983. ⁵ Appellees contend that the commission is vested with continuing jurisdiction to reconsider prior awards pursuant to R.C. 4123.52, which provides, in part: "The jurisdiction of the industrial commission over each case shall be continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified." ⁶ Several sections within the Revised Code, as well as the Ohio Administrative Code, address the subject of reconsiderations before the Industrial Commission, although none are expressly applicable to the case at bar. ⁷ In spite of these opportunities to obtain further administrative review, no published procedure exists to obtain reconsideration of an order pertaining to temporary total compensation. This is in part because the action is not appealable to the court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.519, since the question concerns the claimant's extent of disability and not his right to participate in the workers' compensation scheme. See Gilbert v. Midland-Ross (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 267, 423 N.E.2d 847 [21 O.O.3d 168]; Hospitality Motor Inns v. Gillespie (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 206, 421 N.E.2d 134 [20 O.O.3d 209]. See, also, fn. 2, supra.

We have previously allowed the commission to reconsider its orders absent a statutory or regulatory provision contra, "until the actual institution of an appeal therefrom or until the expiration of the time for such an appeal [under R.C. 4123.519]." State, ex rel. Prayner, v. Indus. Comm. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 206 N.E.2d 911 [31 O.O.2d 192]. See, also, Todd v. General Motors (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 18, 417 N.E.2d 1017 [19 O.O.3d 195]. ⁸ The rationale for authorizing reconsiderations, even absent express statutory authority, was stated in Todd at 19, 417 N.E.2d 1017 as follows:

"In State, ex rel. Borsuk, v. Cleveland (1972), 28 Ohio St.2d 224, 277 N.E.2d 419 [57 O.O.2d 464], paragraph one of the syllabus, this court articulated the well-established principle that an administrative board or agency has jurisdiction to reconsider its decisions until the actual institution of a court appeal therefrom or until expiration of the time for appeal. See, also, Diltz v. Crouch (1962), 173 Ohio St. 367, 182 N.E.2d 315 [19 O.O.2d 312]." Cf. Indus. Comm. v. Dell (1922), 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E. 669, paragraph one of the syllabus.

The facts presented in the case at bar highlight a heretofore unchallenged but recurring practice; that is, the commission has long granted reconsiderations without express statutory authority or administrative rules, and absent the availability of an appeal under R.C. 4123.519. See e.g., State, ex rel. Stanadyne, Inc., v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 62, 465 N.E.2d 418; State, ex rel. Manley, v. Indus. Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 40, 418 N.E.2d 1385 [21 O.O.3d 25]; State, ex rel. Republic Steel, v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 193, 399 N.E.2d 1268 [15 O.O.3d 216]. Inasmuch as staff hearing officers frequently decide matters on behalf of the commission, see R.C. 4121.35(B), the commission occasionally seeks to review those decisions upon request by either party for reconsideration.

In resolving this jurisdictional dilemma, we again note the following language from this court in Indus. Comm. v. Dell, supra, 104 Ohio St. at 396-397, 135 N.E. 669:

" * * * The commission should be held to have inherent power to prevent the misappropriation or the misapplication of the insurance fund to claimants who are afterwards found not to be entitled thereto. The state insurance fund is in the nature of a trust fund and it is the duty of the commission to impartially distribute the same among persons entitled thereto and not permit the fund to be depleted or become the object of fraud or imposition, and it being clearly their moral and legal duty to correct any mistake or fraud or imposition which will result in a misapplication or misappropriation of any part of the fund the law should not be so construed, even in case of ambiguity, neither should the legislature be held to have intended to enact any provisions which would in any manner hamper or interfere with the members of the commission in their efforts to properly protect the fund." (Quoted with approval in State, ex rel. Koonce, v. Indus. Comm. [1985], 18 Ohio St.3d 60, at fn. 2, 479 N.E.2d 876; State, ex rel. Weimer, v. Indus. Comm. [1980], 62 Ohio St.2d 159, 161, 404 N.E.2d 149 [16 O.O.3d 174].)

Appellant recognizes...