State ex rel. George v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 09 December 1935
• Docket Number: 25851.
• Citation: State ex rel. George v. City of Seattle, 52 P.2d 360, 184 Wash. 560 (Wash. 1935)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GEORGE v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

52 P.2d 360

184 Wash. 560

STATE ex rel. GEORGE v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

No. 25851.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 9, 1935

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Hugh C. Todd, Judge.

Mandamus proceeding by the State of Washington, on the relation of Raymond E. George, against the City of Seattle and others.Decree for relator, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

A. C. Van Soelen, Glen E. Wilson, Tom M. Alderson Jr., and Joseph E. Gandy, both of Seattle, for appellants.

Meier &amp Meagher, of Seattle, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

This is a mandamus action to compel the reinstatement of a civil service employee to the position formerly held by him, and further, to compel the issuance to him of salary warrants covering the period of his enforced lay off.Upon a trial to the court, a decree granting the relief prayed for was entered.The defendants have appealed.

The question Before us involves, primarily, the right of priority between two civil service employees claiming the same position; namely, that of lineman.The facts are not in dispute.

The government of the city of Seattle is divided into 14 departments, included in which are the department of police and the fire department.Article 3, § 1, Seattle City Charter.The city maintains what is known as a police and fire alarm system, which is under the supervision of the chief of the fire department.The expense of maintaining the system is, for budget purposes, allocated 60 per cent. to the fire department, and 40 per cent. to the department of police.Each of the two departments just referred to his its own pension system.

On February 1, 1930, after written examination, relator, Raymond E. George, was appointed to the position of limeman in the department of police.On the same day, appellantCharles Payne was in like manner appointed to the position of lineman in the fire department.The duties of the two appointees were identical; they being connected with the police and fire alarm system.As will hereinafter be more fully explained, George held his position until December 31 1934.Payne held his position until August 19, 1932, and was then laid off because of a reduction of force in the fire department.On August 26, 1932, a vacancy occurred in the position of lineman in the department of police, and Payne was thereupon transferred from the fire department to the police department, partment, and was appointed to the vacant position, which he held until December 31, 1934.Payne's transfer from the one department to the other was made pursuant to rule 10,§ 4(a), of the civil service rules of the city of Seattle.

The civil service records of the two men disclosed that, after allowing for leaves of absence and lay offs, George, on December 31, 1934, had been employed in the department of police a period of time totaling 4 years, 9 months, and 22 days.Payne's record showed that, on the same date and on the same basis, he had been employed for a period of 2 years, 6 months, and 22 days in the fire department, and a period of 2 years, 3 months, and 4 days in the department of police, or a total period of 4 years, 9 months, and 26 days in both departments.It will thus be observed that Payne's combined employment in both departments exceeded that of George by 4 days, but that Payne's employment in the department of police alone was 2 years, 6 months, and 17 days less than that of George in the same department.

On December 31, 1934, owing to the fact that the 1935 budget provided for one less lineman than did the budget for the preceding period, it became necessary to lay off either George or Payne.The civil service commission computed, and took into consideration, Payne's combined service in both departments, and, having found that such combined service exceeded the service of George by 4 days, gave Payne seniority, and accordingly approved the lay off of George.This action was then instituted by the relator, and resulted in a decree reinstating George in preference to Payne.

The determination of the question Before us rests wholly upon the proper application of rule 10,§ 5, of the civil service rules of the city of Seattle, under which the lay off was made.That rule, so far as it is material, or to be noticed, here, reads as follows: 'Section 5.Lay-Offs.In reduction of force in a given position in a department, those who have no civil service standing shall be first laid off, then probationary employees; then civil service employees with least service under their last examination, dating from appointment for the same position in that department.In computing service, full consideration shall be given for actual service when the employee is serving in a higher grade or position in the same department whether in or out of the classified service. * * *'

We have italicized that portion of the section which is particularly applicable to this case.

The appellants offered to prove that the civil service commission had previously made an executive and administrative construction and interpretation of the lay off rule, rule 10, § 5, supra, in the light of its rule covering transfers, rule 10,§ 4(a), and that its construction of the lay off rule was to the effect that where an employee was transferred from one department to another, his service was to be considered as continuous from date of appointment to the position from which he was transferred.The court sustained an objection to the offered evidence.However, the record contains, as an exhibit, an extract from the minutes of a meeting of the civil service commission held November 9, 1932, which sets out specifically such construction.We shall, therefore, consider the record as though the proof offered had actually been admitted.

Such rules as the civil service commission adopts and promulgates under the authority delegated to it by the city charter have the force of law.5 R.C.L. 611, § 5.The ordinary rules of statutory construction are, therefore, applicable to them.

A cardinal rule of statutory construction, followed by the courts, is that where a statute is clear upon its face and is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given.Burdick v. Kimball,53 Wash. 198, 101 P. 845;Tsutakawa v. Kumamoto,53 Wash. 231, 101 P. 869, 102 P. 766;Pacific Match Co. v. Burroughs Adding Machine Co.,157 Wash. 434, 289 P. 16.Stated in another way, interpretation is unnecessary when the statute is plain and admits of but one meaning.In re Eaton's Estate,170 Wash. 280, 16 P.2d 433.

It is true that where the Legislature has put its positive construction upon a statute, whether done contemporaneously or by later enactment, such construction will control.State v. Youngbluth,60 Wash. 383, 111 P. 240;State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Clausen,63 Wash. 535, 116 P. 7;State v. Herr,151 Wash. 623276 P. 870;25 R.C.L. 1047, § 275.But it is also true that administrative or executive officers may not place a construction...