State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 96-1328
Decision Date | 16 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-1328,96-1328 |
Citation | 78 Ohio St.3d 181,677 N.E.2d 343 |
Parties | , 1997 SERB 4-5 The STATE ex rel. GRADY, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Law Offices of Lester S. Potash, and Lester S. Potash, Cleveland, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Daniel P. Jones and Joseph D. Rubino, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Grady asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in granting SERB's summary judgment motion and denying the writ. Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.
R.C. 4117.12(B) governs the filing of unfair labor practice charges with SERB and provides:
* * * "
A determination by SERB whether to issue a complaint in an unfair labor practice case is not reviewable by direct appeal. See Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp., Chapter 643, AFSCME/AFL-CIO v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 159, 572 N.E.2d 80, syllabus. Nevertheless, mandamus will issue to correct an abuse of discretion by SERB in dismissing unfair labor practice charges. State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 149, 151-152, 593 N.E.2d 288, 290-291. An abuse of discretion connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude. State ex rel. Richard v. Seidner (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 666 N.E.2d 1134, 1136. In addition, courts must defer to SERB's interpretation of R.C. Chapter 4117. State Emp. Relations Bd. v. Miami Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 351, 353, 643 N.E.2d 1113, 1115.
Consequently, in order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus compelling SERB to issue a complaint and hold a hearing on the unfair labor practice charge, Grady must establish that SERB abused its discretion by dismissing the unfair labor practice charge.
SERB dismissed Grady's unfair labor practice charge because the events giving rise to the charge occurred more than ninety days before Grady filed the charge with SERB and no mitigating circumstances warranted equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. R.C. 4117.12(B) provides that "[t]he board may not issue a notice of hearing based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than ninety days prior to the filing of the charge with the board * * *." By enacting a ninety-day statute of limitations, the General Assembly intended employees to seek redress for unfair labor practices promptly. State Emp. Relations Bd. v. Ohio State Univ. (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 1, 3, 520 N.E.2d 597, 599. The ninety-day time period does not commence until the charging party knew or should have known of the conduct which constituted the improper conduct and actual damage ensued. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Hubbard Twp. Trustees (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 843, 847, 589 N.E.2d 1386, 1389.
In his first proposition of law, Grady asserts that SERB abused its discretion in dismissing his unfair labor practice charge as untimely. Grady contends that actual damage from the local union's decision not to pursue his grievance to arbitration did not occur until after he had exhausted his attempt to secure relief from the national union in May 1995.
Grady's contention is meritless. Grady knew of the events underlying his unfair labor practice charge by February 27, 1995, when he admits he received the local union's letter notifying him that it would not advance his grievance to arbitration. Any damage to Grady would have occurred by March 6, 1995, the date the city notified Grady of his termination from employment and the exhaustion of the collectively bargained grievance procedure due to his local union's refusal to submit his grievance to arbitration. The national union could not have submitted a timely request for arbitration because the national union was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. Because the March 6, 1995 date was more than ninety days before Grady filed his unfair labor practice charge with SERB, SERB did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge as untimely.
Grady next asserts in his second proposition of law that SERB abused its discretion by failing to consider and provide reasons for rejecting his argument that the ninety-day period in R.C. 4117.12(B) was equitably tolled by his request for internal administrative remedies from the national union.
R.C. 4117.12(B) does not require SERB to issue findings of fact to support its dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge prior to issuing a notice of hearing on the complaint. State ex rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 133, 138, 666 N.E.2d 1119, 1124; cf. R.C. 4117.12(B)(3), requiring SERB to state findings of fact in any decision following the issuance of a...
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