State ex rel. Graves v. Williams

• Citation: 298 N.W.2d 392,99 Wis.2d 65
• Court: Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
• Decision Date: 29 August 1980
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Gerald GRAVES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Edwin WILLIAMS, Sheriff of Adams County, Respondent

Page 392

298 N.W.2d 392

99 Wis.2d 65

STATE ex rel. Gerald GRAVES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Edwin WILLIAMS, Sheriff of Adams County, Respondent.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 29, 1980.

No. 80-907.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Opinion Released Sept. 4, 1980.

Opinion Filed Sept. 4, 1980.

Review Denied.

David Niblack, State Public Defender, and Bryan J. Borman, Baraboo, on brief, for petitioner-appellant.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., and Michael R. Klos, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief, for respondent.

Before GARTZKE, P. J., and BABLITCH and DYKMAN, JJ.

BABLITCH, Judge.

This appeal is from an order and judgment entered May 14, 1980, dismissing a petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner was arrested on an extradition warrant issued pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, sec. 976.03, Stats., on the request of the State of New York shortly after his release on parole from the federal penitentiary in Oxford, Wisconsin. He is being held in the Adams County jail pending this appeal, which has been expedited.

Subsequent to the petitioner's 1976 arrest in New York on charges of first degree robbery, he was released to federal officials on outstanding forgery charges. He pled guilty to the federal charges and was sentenced to two years in prison plus a three-year special probation consecutive to his prison term. Shortly after the federal sentence was imposed he was returned to New York, where he was convicted by a jury on the state charges. He was sentenced to serve from five to fifteen years in state prison, concurrent with the federal sentence. After he had served 29 months of his state sentence, the petitioner was again released to federal authorities and was incarcerated in a federal prison until his parole and arrest on the Wisconsin extradition warrant.

The central issue on appeal is whether a prisoner who is released on parole by federal authorities is subject to extradition by a state having an unsatisfied judgment of conviction against him under the uniform act. The petitioner also contends that New York waived its right to require his return to complete his state sentence by voluntarily relinquishing his custody to federal authorities so that he could serve his federal sentence prior to the state sentence. We hold against the petitioner on each ground and affirm the order and judgment dismissing his petition. ¹

The state contends that the central issue on appeal is governed by this court's decision in State ex rel. O'Connor v. Williams, 95 Wis.2d 378, 383, 290 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Ct.App.1980), where we said:

(W)e hold that a convict who is released on parole prior to the expiration of a sentence is subject to extradition by a demanding state having an unsatisfied criminal sentence against him, and that he is a "fugitive from justice" within the contemplation of the Uniform Extradition Act.

Although the language of the holding is broad enough to cover the instant case, the petitioner correctly points out that the precise issue raised in this case was not raised in O'Connor. The petitioner in that case conceded that a person against whom an unsatisfied judgment of conviction and sentence existed was a "fugitive from justice" within the meaning of the uniform act but argued that he would not become such a fugitive until the technical expiration of his federal sentence and completion of his parole. The petitioner in this case makes no such concession, but contends that the extradition act and the federal constitutional ² and legislative ³ provisions it was intended to supplement apply only to persons who are charged but not yet tried in the demanding state, and to persons who have escaped imprisonment in the demanding state or broken the terms of bail, probation or parole.

It is true that neither the Uniform Extradition Act nor the corresponding federal law make an express provision for the extradition of persons from an asylum state to a demanding state in which an unexpired sentence of imprisonment remains to be served. Section 976.03(2), Stats., ⁴ provides that it is the duty of the governor to deliver to a demanding state "any person charged" with a crime in that state "who has fled from justice and is found in this state." Section 976.03(3) ⁵ provides that no demand shall be recognized unless it is in writing and alleges that the accused "fled from the state," and unless it is also accompanied either by a copy of a charging document, or by a judgment of conviction or sentence "together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole." Similarly, sec. 976.03(23), which governs the manner of applying for an extradition, is couched exclusively in terms of a person "charged with crime" and sought to be returned to the demanding state "for trial," and a person "who has been convicted ... and has escaped from confinement" or violated conditions of release.

Despite the fact that these provisions refer expressly to only two categories of persons subject to extradition, however, the courts in the jurisdictions which have adopted the act have almost uniformly held that it also applies to persons who have an unexpired sentence in the demanding state, even if they have not literally "escaped" from that state's jurisdiction by deliberately fleeing from it. Some of these courts have rested the conclusion on a determination that a person remains "charged" within the meaning of the act, even after conviction, until the expiration of any sentence imposed. ⁶ Others have held, more broadly, that regardless of the reasons the person sought to be extradited is outside the demanding state, so long as an unsatisfied sentence is outstanding such a person is a "fugitive from justice" within the meaning of the uniform act. ⁷ A similar logic could be employed to hold that one whose sentence has not been satisfied in a demanding state has "escaped" from the jurisdiction of that state if he is found in any other jurisdiction. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969, 971-72 (1976), touched all three bases:

We have previously held the clause "any person charged with a crime" includes a person whose judgment of conviction remains unsatisfied.... Moreover, the phrase "fled from justice" has generally been interpreted to cover individuals who are merely absent from the state when they are sought to answer for a crime, irrespective of their manner of leaving the state....

Furthermore, the extradition law is designed to prevent the successful escape of all persons accused of crime, whether convicted or not, and to secure their return to the state from which they fled for their due punishment.... Consequently, we have held that the extradition statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to enable offenders against the laws of a state to find permanent asylum in another state....

In light of ... the Act's purposes, we believe that (the counterpart of sec. 976.03(3), Wis.Stats.) does not limit the extradition of an individual convicted of a crime to instances where he has "escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole." Such language was only meant to be illustrative, but not exhaustive, of the occasions when a convicted person can be considered to have fled from the justice of another state. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

The petitioner complains that Gottfried and other cases reaching a similar conclusion ⁸ fail to give a rationale for departing from the "plain meaning" of the statutory language. He contends the state courts must interpret the Uniform Extradition Act consistently with federal law, (citing Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978)).

Doran reiterated the long-standing principle that the courts of an asylum state are bound by art. IV, sec. 2 of the federal constitution, and by the federal legislation implementing it. ⁹ Doran does not, however, support the petitioner's position that the uniform act must be narrowly limited to those classes of fugitives from justice specifically mentioned in the statute and that it cannot be applied to persons such as the petitioner. Although the court recognized that the extradition clause "was intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed," 439 U.S. at 287, 99 S.Ct. at 534, it also recognized a far broader purpose underlying the constitutional provision:

The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state and thus "balkanize" the administration of criminal justice among the several states. It articulated, in mandatory language, the concepts of comity and full faith and credit, found in the immediately preceding clause of Art. IV. The Extradition Clause, like the Commerce Clause, served important national objectives of a newly developing country striving to foster national unity.... In the administration of justice, no less than in trade and commerce, national unity was thought to be served by deemphasizing state lines for certain purposes, without impinging on essential state autonomy. 439 U.S. at 287-88, 99 S.Ct. at 534-35. (Emphasis supplied.) (Citations omitted.)

The principles of comity and national unity in the administration of criminal justice would hardly be benefitted if each state were to insist that its prisoners serve their full sentences before being released to other jurisdictions in which they are accused of crimes. This would doubtless be the consequence of adopting the petitioner's literal reading of the act, since under that reading convicted criminals would be immunized from extradition to a demanding state which had deferred execution of a sentence and yielded jurisdiction over them for any reason. Among the possible reasons for yielding jurisdiction are a prisoner's own...