State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur

• Decision Date: 03 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 18058.,18058.
• Citation: State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, 947 A.2d 282, 287 Conn. 145 (Conn. 2008)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut ex rel. Richard GREGAN, Animal Control Officer v. Christine KOCZUR.

947 A.2d 282

287 Conn. 145

STATE of Connecticut ex rel. Richard GREGAN, Animal Control Officer v. Christine KOCZUR.

No. 18058.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 10, 2008.

Decided June 3, 2008.

William S. Palmieri, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Jose A. Suarez, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Kimberly P. Massicotte, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

The plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 22-329a¹ against the defendant, Christine Koczur, seeking orders declaring that the defendant had neglected or cruelly treated certain cats in her possession and vesting permanent custody of the cats with the department of agriculture (department). After a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment for the state. The defendant then filed this appeal² claiming that: (1) the court improperly determined that she had neglected the cats under § 22-329a; and (2) § 22-329a is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found the following facts. On January 11, 2006, Richard Gregan, an animal control officer of the state, received a complaint from Laurie Buccieri, a volunteer for the Alliance for Animal Rescue Society³ (society), that the defendant, who was the president of the society, was keeping numerous cats at her residence in Torrington that were neglected and sick. Buccieri also stated that the cats were unsanitary and flea-infested and that the defendant had admitted to her that she had found dead cats in her residence within the previous two years.

The next day, Gregan received a second complaint concerning the defendant from Karen Meares, another volunteer for the society. Meares stated that the defendant had asked her to provide a foster home for two kittens that the defendant could not keep because her residence was infested with fleas that could be fatal to the kittens. The kittens were ill when the defendant gave them to Meares, and Meares' veterinarian diagnosed them as having a respiratory infection. One of the kittens ultimately died.

Several days later, Gregan received a third complaint concerning the defendant from Melanie Mead, another volunteer for the society. Mead stated that the defendant had more than forty cats in her residence, many of which were sick and that the defendant could not afford medical treatment for them. Mead stated that a number of cats had died and that the defendant sometimes would not find them until days after their deaths.

On February 9, 2006, Gregan went to the defendant's residence accompanied by Barbara Godejohn, another animal control officer. The defendant refused to allow Gregan and Godejohn to enter her residence and denied that there were any sick cats inside. She also refused to provide Gregan with rabies certificates for the cats.

Several days later, the defendant asked Edward Dimmick, a veterinarian, to come to her home and vaccinate the cats for rabies. Dimmick was able to vaccinate twenty-nine cats before he ran out of vaccine. None of the cats were current in their vaccinations. He examined all of the cats in the defendant's residence except for seven cats that were too feral to handle.

Thereafter, Gregan obtained a search and seizure warrant and went to the defendant's residence to seize the cats. He was accompanied by Robert Rubbo, a member of the Torrington police department, and by a public health officer for Torrington and several animal control officers from around the state. A strong odor of ammonia, consistent with cat urine, could be detected from outside the residence. Upon entering the residence, the various state officers observed that the kitchen, living room, bedrooms and bathroom were cluttered with trash and garbage, leaving only narrow pathways for walking. The clutter reached the ceiling in certain rooms. The stacks of trash, including more than ten open bags of raw garbage, prevented the officers from opening the bathroom and bedroom doors more than a few inches.

The officers found forty-six cats in the 950 square foot residence and one dead cat in the freezer compartment of the refrigerator. They found several cat litter boxes, some filled with feces. Cat feces, vomit and urine were spread throughout the house, including on shelves, on and next to bottles of cat medicine and on and next to the cats' feeding dishes. There was moldy cat food in the microwave oven and in the refrigerator. Although there were sealed bags of cat food on the premises, there did not appear to be sufficient food available for all of the cats. The trial court expressly rejected the defendant's claim that the conditions in the house were "due to the fact that she had not been able to clean up as usual [on the morning of the search] and the tremendous amount of clutter was due to her collecting material for a tag sale." The court found that based on the volume and dried condition of the feces and urine, they had been there for some time, and that the clutter was trash and junk.

Gregan and the other officers seized the forty-six cats, put them in individual cages and transported them to the offices of Richard O'Grady, a veterinarian. O'Grady examined thirty-six of the cats. Thirty-two cats had ear mites; three had upper respiratory infections; one had a chronic upper respiratory infection; six had runny or crusty eyes; two had conjunctivitis; four had bad teeth; one had no teeth; one had fleas; one had tapeworms; two were thin; and one had scabby skin. O'Grady concluded that most of the cats required further medical treatment. O'Grady's professional opinion was that the cats would not be able to recover their health in the defendant's residence because of the conditions in the residence and the large number of cats.

After O'Grady examined the cats, they were transported to four animal shelters around the state. Thereafter, many of the cats were diagnosed as having Bartonella,⁴ tapeworms, fleas and various other maladies. Two cats died within several weeks of their removal from the defendant's residence and two had to be euthanized. The trial court found that the cats had contracted these maladies while in the defendant's care.

After it seized the cats, the state brought this action pursuant to § 22-329a seeking orders: vesting temporary custody of the cats with the department pending a hearing pursuant to § 22-329a (b); requiring the defendant either to relinquish ownership of the cats to the department or to post a bond with the department in the amount of $450 per cat for the reasonable expenses in caring and providing for them; declaring that the defendant had neglected or cruelly treated the cats in violation of General Statutes § 53-247(a);⁵ vesting permanent ownership and custody of the cats with the department and allowing it to euthanize any injured or diseased cats, if necessary; and requiring the defendant, pursuant to § 22-329a (f), to pay the department $15 per cat per day for each day from the date that the cats were seized until the date that ownership vested in the department. After a trial, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had neglected the cats by depriving them of proper care, food and medical attention. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on several dictionary definitions of the word "neglect."⁶ The court found that the defendant had not treated the cats cruelly because she had no intent to inflict pain and suffering on them. The court awarded permanent custody of the cats to the department and ordered the defendant to reimburse the state for veterinarian bills in the amount of $6248.60 and to pay the state $15 per cat per day from the date that the cats were seized.

This appeal followed. The defendant claims that: (1) the trial court applied an improper standard in determining that she had neglected the cats; and (2) § 22-329a is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree with both claims.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court applied an improper standard in determining that the defendant neglected the cats. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly relied on a broad definition of neglect when § 22-329a expressly provides that actions pursuant to that section may be predicated only on the violation of the specific statutes listed therein. She further contends that she did not violate the provisions of any of those statutes.

The meaning of neglect under § 22-329a is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. Roncari Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 281 Conn. 66, 72, 912 A.2d 1008 (2007). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Ins....