State ex rel. Hager v. Marten

• Decision Date: 16 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-3841-W,97-3841-W
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael J. HAGER, Petitioner-Petitioner, v. Gary MARTEN, Sheriff, Marathon County Jail, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 791

594 N.W.2d 791

226 Wis.2d 687

STATE of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael J. HAGER, Petitioner-Petitioner, v. Gary MARTEN, Sheriff, Marathon County Jail, Respondent.

No. 97-3841-W.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Feb. 12, 1999.

Decided June 16, 1999.

For the petitioner-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by Gerhardt F. Getzin, assistant state public defender.

For the respondent the cause was argued by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

¶1 JON P. WILCOX, J

The petitioner, Michael J. Hager, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals' order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Hager was held in custody from July 1997 to December 1997, awaiting an examination to determine whether he was competent to stand trial for numerous criminal charges against him. He now seeks dismissal of all of the pending criminal charges and release from custody due to violations of the time limit for a competency examination under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c)(1997-98). ¹

¶2 This case presents two issues for review: (1) Can a petitioner raise an issue of statutory interpretation on a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) If so, does the failure to conduct a competency examination within the time frame of Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c) constitute a jurisdictional defect. We answer the first question in the affirmative; a question of statutory interpretation may be considered on a writ of habeas corpus only if noncompliance with the statute at issue resulted in the restraint of the petitioner's liberty in violation of the constitution or the court's jurisdiction. As to the second issue, we conclude that no jurisdictional defect is present because there was no time limit violation under the statutory section applicable in this case. We further conclude that under the facts of this case, Hager was not denied due process based on the length of his pre-examination confinement. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' order denying the writ of habeas corpus.

¶3 The facts are not in dispute. This action stems from four criminal complaints filed against Hager. The first complaint, dated June 10, 1994, involved a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. Hager was present at the initial appearance on August 2, 1994, but failed to appear on October 26, 1994. A bench warrant was issued on October 31, 1994.

¶4 The second complaint was filed in June 1996. The complaint charged Hager with five counts of felony failure to pay child support from February 1, 1994, to June 7, 1996. The next proceeding in this action was in December 1996.

¶5 On December 18, 1996, Hager was charged in yet another complaint, the third, with two counts of intentionally causing bodily harm to another over the age of 62 and one count of disorderly conduct for an incident involving his parents. The initial appearance for this matter was held on the same day. At the hearing, the Marathon County Circuit Court, Michael J. Hoover, Judge, found reason to doubt Hager's competency to proceed and ordered a competency examination by the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS).

¶6 The competency examination was completed on January 9, 1997, and forwarded to the circuit court. The report concluded that Hager was incompetent to stand trial. However, after being returned from the Winnebago Mental Health Facility (Winnebago), where the examination was conducted, Hager was released from custody on a $1,000 recognizance bond. In both April and May 1997, Hager appeared in court claiming to be competent. Yet, his counsel questioned Hager's ability to participate in formulating a defense. A second competency hearing was scheduled for July 10, 1997; however, Hager failed to show for the hearing, and the circuit court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

¶7 On July 16, 1997, Hager was taken into custody and additional criminal charges (the fourth complaint) were filed for battery to a law enforcement officer, felony bail jumping, resisting an officer, and disorderly conduct. Hager's counsel informed the court that Hager had been found incompetent in the prior pending matters, and raised the question of competency to proceed with the new charges as well. Based on the passage of time from the January 9th report to the new charges, the Marathon County Circuit Court, Vincent K. Howard, Judge, ordered a new competency examination to be conducted at Winnebago. The court acknowledged that this examination was to be conducted within the statutory time limits. The court also ordered $500 cash bond.

¶8 Hager was never taken to Winnebago for the competency examination; unable to post bond, he remained in jail. At a November 5, 1997, hearing, Hager's counsel asked that Hager be released until another competency hearing could be rescheduled. The circuit court authorized a $1,500 signature bond which had to be cosigned by a relative pending the hearing. None of Hager's relatives signed for his release, and he remained in jail.

¶9 The competency hearing was originally scheduled for December 12, 1997, but Hager, who was represented by new counsel, requested an outpatient examination to bring his report current. The State stipulated to the outpatient examination and the competency hearing was rescheduled for December 17, 1997. At the hearing, Hager moved to dismiss all of the criminal charges for violation of the time limits imposed under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c). The Marathon County Circuit Court, Dorothy L. Bain, Judge, denied Hager's motion concluding that dismissal was unsupported in the law and that it would be an extreme measure in light of the previous finding that he was not competent.

¶10 The court then proceeded with the competency hearing as scheduled. Based on review of the two medical reports, the testimony from a clinical psychologist who conducted the second competency examination of Hager, and conversations with Hager at the hearing, the circuit court found that Hager was not competent to proceed but would likely become competent within a 12-month period or less. Accordingly, the court ordered medication and treatment be administered, regardless of consent, and that Hager be committed to the custody of DHFS for placement in an appropriate institution, with periodic examinations.

¶11 Consequently, Hager filed petitions for leave to appeal the circuit court's non-final order and for a writ of habeas corpus with the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded that dismissal of the criminal complaints was not an appropriate remedy and denied all petitions. This court granted Hager's petition for review from the court of appeals' denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

¶12 The first question we must address is whether habeas corpus is available to address a question of statutory interpretation. Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding guaranteed by the Wisconsin and United States constitutions "to test the right of a person to his personal liberty." State ex rel. Dowe v. Waukesha County Circuit Court, 184 Wis.2d 724, 728, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994). The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to protect and vindicate the petitioner's right of personal liberty by releasing the petitioner from illegal restraint. State ex rel. Zdanczewicz v. Snyder, 131 Wis.2d 147, 151, 388 N.W.2d 612 (1986).

¶13 The State challenges Hager's ability to raise an issue of statutory construction on a writ of habeas corpus. However, the court of appeals, in State ex rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis.2d 325, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct.App.1982), addressed this very question. ²

¶14 The petitioner in Lockman submitted a writ of habeas corpus and discharge of the complaint alleging the final hearing on her involuntary civil commitment was not held within 14 days of her detention as required by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(c)(1979-80). Lockman, 107 Wis.2d at 326-27, 320 N.W.2d 27. The issue before the court of appeals was whether the 14-day time limit in § 51.20(7)(c) (1979-80) refers to calendar days or business days--a question of statutory construction. Lockman, 107 Wis.2d at 327, 320 N.W.2d 27. The court concluded that the statute meant 14 calendar days; therefore, the "trial court lost jurisdiction over Lockman as a consequence of its failure to hold a final commitment hearing within fourteen calendar days of Lockman's detention and [it] should have dismissed the proceedings against her." Id. at 328-29, 320 N.W.2d 27.

¶15 When considering whether or not to grant habeas corpus review, the habeas court determines only whether the order resulting in the restraint of liberty was made in violation of the constitution, or whether the court which issued the order lacked the jurisdiction or legal authority to do so. Zdanczewicz, 131 Wis.2d at 151, 388 N.W.2d 612. It follows then that statutory construction may only be considered on habeas corpus review in the context of these constitutional or jurisdictional violations. See State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 133, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968).

¶16 To determine whether to grant Hager's writ of habeas corpus for an alleged violation of the statutory time frame in Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c), this court must determine whether noncompliance with the statutory time frame resulted in Hager's restraint of liberty in violation of the constitution, or whether noncompliance with the time frame resulted in a jurisdictional defect. In a habeas corpus action, we apply a de novo standard to issues of law, State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis.2d 266, 276-77, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct.App.1986), and the burden is on the petitioner, here Hager, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his detention is illegal, State ex rel. Alvarez v. Lotter, 91 Wis.2d 329, 334, 283 N.W.2d 408 (Ct.App.1979).

¶17 Thus, we must address whether Hager's five-month stay in the Marathon County jail without the ordered competency...