State ex rel. Harkness v. Gleason

• Decision Date: 21 March 1918
• Docket Number: No. 23424.,23424.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HARKNESS et al. v. GLEASON, Judge, et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

187 Ind. 297

119 N.E. 9

STATE ex rel. HARKNESS et al.

v.GLEASON, Judge, et al.

No. 23424.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 21, 1918.

Original action by the State, on relation of John R. Harkness, against William T. Gleason, as Judge of the Superior Court of Vigo County, and others, for writ of prohibition. Demurrer to complaint sustained.

Charles E. Cox, of Indianapolis, and Davis, Moore, Cooper, Royse & Bogart and Daniel V. Miller, all of Terre Haute, for appellants. Geo. O. Dix, McNutt, Wallace & Randel, and Frank S. Rawley, all of Terre Haute, for appellees.

LAIRY, J.

This is an original action brought by the state of Indiana on the relation of John R. Harkness against William T. Gleason as judge of the superior court of Vigo county and others to obtain a writ of prohibition from this court prohibiting the Vigo superior court and the regular and special judge thereof from enforcing a temporary injunction granted by said court at the suit of one Charles A. Haupt. The writ is sought on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the order for a temporary injunction, and that such order is therefore void.

[1] Relators assert that the order granting the temporary injunction is void for two reasons. It is first claimed that the complaint does not disclose such a state of facts as to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court to grant an injunction, and it is asserted that, as the complaint was not sufficient to invoke the equity powers of the court, any order entered by the court in the exercise of its equitable powers was without jurisdiction and void for the reasons urged. The position of relators cannot be sustained on this point. By the act creating it the Vigo superior court was given general jurisdiction at law and in equity, and by section 14 of the act it was expressly given power to grant restraining orders and injunctions. It thus appears that the court had general jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and had power to grant injunctions in proper cases. It is not denied that the court had obtained jurisdiction of the parties to the proceeding. It has been uniformly held that a court which has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action, and which has obtained jurisdiction of the parties, has power to hear and determine such action. A judgment rendered under such circumstances may be erroneous, but it is not void. Young v. Wiley (1915) 183 Ind. 449, 107 N. E. 278;De Haven v. Covalt (1882) 83 Ind. 344, 346.

If a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action and has acquired jurisdiction of the parties it has power to determine whether or not its jurisdiction is properly invoked in a proceeding before it. An erroneous decision of such question does not render its subsequent proceedings therein void as being without jurisdiction. An order, decree, or judgment based on such proceedings might be reversed as erroneous, but it could not be collaterally attacked as void. The temporary injunction entered by the superior court of Vigo county at the suit of Haupt was not void upon the ground first stated, and its enforcement will not be prohibited on such account. It if be conceded that a temporary injunction was granted on a state of facts which did not entitle the plaintiff to an injunction or to any other form of equitable relief, still the order granting such relief would not be void, but merely erroneous. In such case the remedy is by appeal.

The Legislature has provided for an appeal from an interlocutory order granting an injunction. Section 1392, cl. 17, Burns, 1914. Upon a proper showing that public interests were involved, such an appeal would be placed on the advanced docket of the court and speedily decided. The legitimate scope of a writ of prohibition is to keep inferior courts within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred on them by law, and to prevent them from encroaching on the jurisdiction of other tribunals. Board v. Spitler (1895) 13 Ind. 235. It has been generally held that the power of the writ will not be exercised to review the rulings or decisions of an inferior court or to control its discretion. State v. Malone (1898) 40 Fla. 129, 23 South. 575;...