State ex rel. Harrison v. Menaugh

• Decision Date: 01 July 1898
• Citation: 51 N.E. 357,151 Ind. 260
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HARRISON v. MENAUGH et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

151 Ind. 260

51 N.E. 357

STATE ex rel.

HARRISON

v.MENAUGH et al.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 1, 1898.

On petition for rehearing. Overruled.

For former opinion, see 51 N. E. 117.

PER CURIAM.

Counsel for appellant, in their brief filed in support of the petition for a rehearing, in the main insist that it be granted upon the grounds urged at the former hearing of this cause. 51 N. E. 117. Counsel preface their argument by asserting that: “In view of the bitter and intense feeling in many communities of Indiana at the continuance in office of a number of township trustees who are looked upon with suspicion by the people,” etc., they are impressed with the “solemn duty” to file the petition for rehearing, and “in every-day language to argue it, * * * in the hope that mature consideration has changed the opinion of the majority of this court, and in the belief that a few suggestions will lead the minority to modify their final conclusion.” Counsel recognize the fact that the minority opinion of Judges HACKNEY and HOWARD expressly declares that the final conclusion therein reached must result in affirming the judgment of the lower court which denied the right of the relator to demand that an election for township trustees be held at the November election of the present year. This court, under the two opinions in question, may properly be said to have been unanimous in holding that the judgment below must be affirmed for the reason that there was no existing law which authorized the election of township trustees at the November election of 1898. While it is true that the minority opinion in this cause does not agree with the premises from which the final conclusions of the majority of the court were deduced, nevertheless it is evident that it is nothing more nor less than a concurrence in the court's final conclusion that the judgment must be affirmed, and that there could be no election of trustees at the ensuing November election. The material difference or distinction between the two opinions consists in the reasoning by which the ultimate conclusion in each is reached. That of the majority, as will be seen, is arrived at by affirming the constitutional validity of the act of 1897; while that of the minority is reached by denying the constitutional validity of the act of 1897, and, for like reasons, that of the act of 1893.

As to the assertion of counsel that such a “bitter and intense feeling” exists in many communities against the present township trustees, and which, as counsel for appellant seem to intimate, has, in part at least, actuated them to discharge the “solemn duty” by applying for a rehearing in this appeal, we may say that, in regard to this feeling upon the part of these communities, this court has no concern, and in no wise is it responsible for its existence.

We are informed by counsel's brief of the fact, as they therein assert, that some members of the bar, not of counsel, however, in this case, “for some occult reason” are imbued with the desire to have this cause tried and determined in the “forum of public opinion,” and that these particular attorneys declare with “charming frankness” that the majority opinion in this case “is not an opinion, but an argument.” If the majority opinion can be said to be impressed with this infirmity, the responsibility therefor should be charged to the writer thereof, and not to the court, for the latter is only responsible for the final result reached in the case. We may also say, in passing, that this tribunal, in the determination of questions involved in causes pending therein, cannot be influenced by any “bitter and intense feeling” that may exist in some communities relative to the merits of such...