State ex rel. Haskins v. County Court of Dodge County

• Decision Date: 18 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Gerald HASKINS et al., Petitioners, v. COUNTY COURT OF DODGE COUNTY, Hon. Joseph E. Schultz, County Judge, presiding, et al., Respondents. tate 38.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 575

214 N.W.2d 575

62 Wis.2d 250

STATE ex rel. Gerald HASKINS et al., Petitioners, v. COUNTY COURT OF DODGE COUNTY, Hon. Joseph E. Schultz, County Judge, presiding, et al., Respondents.

No. State 38.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 18, 1974.

Howard B. Eisenberg, State Public Defender, Madison, for petitioners

[62 Wis.2d 253] James H. Olson, Dist. Atty., Juneau, for respondent County Court of Dodge County.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., in pro. per., William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for Atty. Gen.

E. Michael McCann, Dist. Atty., Richard P. Keinkowitz, Asst. Dist. Atty., amicus curiae, for respondents.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

This original action for declaratory judgment is brought by the State Public Defender on behalf of named persons and It is contended by the State Public Defender and acknowledged by the Attorney General that the petitioners have not regained their competency, nor is it likely that they soon will.

others similarly situated who have been found incompetent to stand trial and who have been committed to a mental institution until such time that criminal proceedings against them may be resumed or until there be some dispositions of the individuals by treatment under a civil commitment or by discharge. Each of the named petitioners was committed to a state mental institution until such time as he was able to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. The period of confinement ranges from fifteen months to eleven years.

It is contended that under a recent holding of this court, State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert (1973), 57 Wis.2d 315, 204 N.W.2d 13, and a decision of the United States Supreme Court, Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, the period for which the defendants may be held in the course of the criminal process because they are incompetent to stand trial is limited, and when it appears that competency to stand trial is not likely soon to be regained, the state has an obligation either to dismiss the cases against such persons and to discharge them or to further commit them for treatment under the appropriate civil procedures.

Jackson v. Indiana, supra, basically prohibits the commitment of a person as incompetent to stand trial longer than is necessary to determine whether that person can become competent to meaningfully take part in the criminal procedures against him.

Matalik, supra, was this court's response to the mandate of Jackson. While Matalik was concerned in part with the important question of the requirements of due process that must be afforded to all criminally accused persons who are alleged to be incompetent to stand trial, it went further and prescribed procedures for future disposition of such cases when it appeared that the accused person would not soon or would never recover competency. We said:

'We consider that a period of six months after commitment has commenced should be long enough to determine whether such a person as petitioner will never recover or will not soon recover his competency so as to be able to stand trial, and if the respondent desires that petitioner be permanently committed, he either commence civil commitment proceedings under ch. 51, Stats., within sixty days from the date of this order, or otherwise release petitioner.' (57 Wis.2d at p. 328, 204 N.W.2d at p. 19.)

Counsel agree that one of the problems posed by the mandates of Jackson and Matalik is what disposition should be made by the committing court when, after the six-month period mandated in Matalik has passed, the court is informed by the Department of Health and Social Services that, alternatively, a defendant is competent to stand trial, is not now competent to stand trial but will probably become competent within the ensuing six-month period, or is not likely to become competent in the foreseeable future.

The Attorney General agrees with the basic position of the State Public Defender that, at such time and after a proper hearing it is determined that the defendant is not competent to stand trial and will not be competent within the foreseeable future, he should no longer be held under the criminal statutes relating to incompetency for trial, but should be diverted to a non-criminal type of custody.

The State Public Defender takes the position that, if at the end of the first six-month period the court determines that the defendant is not then competent but will probably become competent within the ensuing six-month period, he may continue to be held as a defendant awaiting trial for The Attorney General takes the position that, if at the end of the twelve-month period the defendant has not regained his competency but will probably become competent within an additional six-month period, he may be held for an additional six-month period or for a total of eighteen months. If at the end of that time he is not restored to trial competency, the Attorney General agrees that a non-criminal form of custody must be substituted. He argues, however, in no case should the criminal charges be dropped unless, in the discretion of the district attorney, a motion of nolle prosequi is entered and accepted by the court.

a total period not to exceed twelve months. It is the State Public Defender's position that, at the end of the twelve-month period if the defendant has not regained competency, the underlying criminal action should be dismissed with prejudice, and that under some circumstances a civil commitment may follow.

When it is determined by the committing court that the defendant is unlikely to regain competency and the facts warrant a civil commitment, an additional procedural problem is presented: By whom should the application for the civil commitment be made and by what court should jurisdiction for the civil commitment be assumed--a court in the county in which the defendant has been incarcerated or in the county from which he was committed.

An additional problem remains, and that is: When, if ever, should the criminal proceedings be terminated with prejudice.

The State Public Defender takes the position that at such time as the defendant is found 'hopelessly incompetent,' the underlying criminal action must be dismissed with prejudice. The State Public Defender urges that this dismissal of a criminal action occur when the committing court makes that finding, irrespective of whether that finding is made after six months, twelve months, or eighteen months.

The Attorney General argues that a dismissal with prejudice should not be of course on the finding of probable indefinite incompetency but only at such time when it appears that an individual defendant could not even, were he to recover competence, have a fair trial because of his deprivation of a speedy trial.

It is apparent that the problems implicit in this case raise a panoply of policy considerations that cannot be completely dealt with by a court. Eventually they must be resolved by considered legislative judgment. We are, to the extent that we are able, obliged to cope with the problems that were not envisaged by the legislature and which were forced upon the State as the result of the mandate of the United States Supreme Court.

We are primarily concerned with two portions of the statutes, those that appear in secs. 971.13 and 971.14, Stats., relating to incompetency to stand trial, and the provisions relating to civil commitments in ch. 51.

Sec. 971.13, Stats., provides:

'Competency to proceed. No person who as a result of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or committed for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.'

Sec. 971.14, Stats., sets forth the steps to be followed in the examination of a defendant with respect to competency to proceed. It is in many respects a highly enlightened statute. It provides that commitment cannot be made pending trial unless there is a hearing that establishes that the defendant has probably committed the crime charged or he has been bound over for trial after a preliminary examination which incorporates a finding of probable cause. In the event probable cause is established, the court is required to appoint at least one physician to examine and report In the class of defendants before us, the appropriate court has followed the procedure by which the defendants were found incompetent to proceed.

upon the defendant's condition. In lieu of such appointment, the court may order the defendant committed to a suitable mental facility for the purpose of examination for a period of not more than sixty days. The report thereafter made must include a description of the examination, the diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant, and, if the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, an opinion of the defendant's mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him and his capacity to assist in his own defense.

Sec. 971.14(5), Stats., provides in part:

'If the court determines that the defendant lacks competency to proceed, the proceeding against him shall be suspended and the court shall commit him to the custody of the department (Health and Social Services) to be placed in an appropriate institution of the department for so long as such condition endures.'

Sec. 971.14(5), Stats., also provides that:

'When the maximum period for which the defendant could have been imprisoned if convicted of the offense charged has elapsed, the court shall dismiss the case and shall order the defendant to be discharged subject to the right of the department to proceed against the defendant under ch. 51.'

Sec. 971.14(6), Stats., provides:

'The fact the defendant is not competent to proceed does not preclude any legal objection to the prosecution pursuant to s. 971.31 which is susceptible of a fair determination prior to trial and without the personal...