State Ex Rel. Hoover v. Town Council Of Chester

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtPOPE, J
Citation39 S.C. 307,17 S.E. 752
Decision Date16 May 1893
PartiesSTATE ex rel. HOOVER. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF CHESTER. STATE ex rel. GROESCHEL et al. v. SAME.

17 S.E. 752
39 S.C. 307

STATE ex rel. HOOVER.
v.
TOWN COUNCIL OF CHESTER.

STATE ex rel. GROESCHEL et al.
v.
SAME.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 16, 1893.


Statutes — Impeachment—Titles of Acts—Liquor License—Constitutionality.

1. The fact that a bill has been signed by the presiding officers of the general assembly, approved by the governor, and duly deposited in the office of the secretary of state, shows, in the absence of anything on its face to the contrary, that;t has become a law, and it is not competent to impeach the same by the journals of the two houses or other evidence. State v. Piatt, 2 S. C. 150, and State v. Ha-good, 13 S. C. 46, overruled.

2. Act Dec. 24, 1892, entitled "An act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this state, except as herein permitted, " does not conflict with the constitutional injunction that every law shall embrace but one subject, which is to be expressed in its title.

3. Said act is rot unconstitutional in making all licenses to be granted by any town expire on June 30, 1893.

Petitions by the state at the relation of W. H. Hoover and by the state at the relation of Groeschel & Co. for writs of mandate to the town council of Chester. Denied.

S. P. Hamilton, for petitioners.

D. A. Townsend, Atty. Gen., and Paul Hemphill, for respondent.

POPE, J. The relator, by petition, in each of the above-entitled proceedings, asks that this court will issue a mandamus to the respondent, requiring that a license shall be granted to the petitioners, respectively, as liquor dealers in the town of Chester, in this state, from the 2d day of January, 1893, up to and inclusive of the 31st day of December, 1893. Both petitions, being based upon facts identical in character, have been heard together. The respondent denies the right of each peri tioner, and traverses some of the allegations of fact. Under such circumstances, by an agreement of counsel for relators and respondent, it was referred to Thomas S. Moorman, Esq., to take the testi

[17 S.E. 753]

mony as to the foots in dispute. The report of such testimony was made to this court. At the hearing before us the following facts were disclosed: In 1888 (20 St. 140) the town council of Chester were authorized by the general assembly of this state to grant licenses to sell spirituous and intoxicating liquors under certain restrictions and modifications. Under the general laws of this state pertaining to such matters, no license could be given for a longer period than one year, and not extending beyond the 31st day of December of any year. On the 2d day of January, 1893, the relators, after a strict compliance with all the requirements of the statutes of this state, as well as with all the ordinances and regulations of the town of Chester, applied for a license as retail liquor dealers to begin on the 2d January, 1893, and ending on the 31st day of December, 1893. The respondent, however, refused to grant a license beyond the 30th day of June, 1893, alleging, as the basis for such action on their part, that the state had passed an act approved on the 24th day of December, 1892, whereby all licenses to be granted by any towns or cities in this state should cease and determine on the 30th day of June, 1893, and providing pains and penalties upon all persons who should disregard such legislation; and this refusal of the town of Chester, with the above ground therefor, was put upon the minutes of such town council. The relators under protest at every step, paid for and took out licenses until 30th June, 1893, but, conceiving they were entitled to licenses up to 31st December, 1893, they have applied to this court in its original jurisdiction for the writ of mandamus to force such license from the respondent, and allege that the act of 24th December, 1892, was unconstitutional on the following grounds: (1) Because, if said town council (of Chester) had any discretionary power to grant or refuse licenses to sell spirituous or intoxicating liquors under the act of 1888, the said town council of Chester never exercised their discretion. (2) Because the act of 1888, and chapter 55 of the General Statutes, were not repealed by "An act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this state. except as herein permitted, " the said last-named act being approved December 24, 1892; the said last-named act being void. (3) That said act never acquired the force of law in this state, because the original bill which was sent from the senate to the house was altered and changed by Ira B. J ones, speaker of the house of representatives, at the time or after it passed the house, and amended as he saw fit, when it appears in the journal of the house, of date of 23d December, 1892, that no such changes, alterations, or amendments were ever sanctioned or ordered by the house of representatives. (4) That the original bill substituted for the Roper hill was a bill pure and simple to raise a revenue for the state of South Carolina, and originated in the senate, contrary to the constitution of this state. (5) Because the original bill was one whose object was to raise a revenue for the state, and such object was not expressed in its title. (6) Because said bill, not b;ing an amendment to the Roper bill, never received three readings in the house, never became an act and is void. (7) Because no power was ever given to the legislature by the peo pie of South Carolina to create for the state a monopoly in a lawful mercantile business to the exclusion of her own citizens. (8) Because the act which was enrolled and ratified by the two houses of the general assembly, and approved by the governor, was not the bill passed by the two houses. (9) Because section 2 of said act violates section 3 of article 3 of the constitution, wherein it clothes the governor of the state, as chairman of the board of control, with power prohibited by said section. (10) Because it was never delegated by the people of South Carolina, in the constitution of 1868, to the state of South Carolina, to enter into a mercantile business to sell spirituous liquors, and to carry on such business to the exclusion of her own citizens. (11) That no power was ever delegated to appropriate $50,000 to carry on such business by the state, as given in section 18 of said act. (12) That sections 23 and 25 of said act violate the constitution of the United States.

The attorney general of this state interposed before the hearing, denying the right of petitioners to use the name of the state when no consent had been given to them therefor. We remark that the point raised by the attorney general is one of serious consequences to the relators, for, if it should be determined that only those are entitled to the use of the...

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37 practice notes
  • State Ex Rel. Richards v. Moorer, (No. 12746.)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • October 12, 1929
    ...terms either by entries* in the journals of the two houses or any other evidence.' "In the case of State ex rel. Hoover v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752, decided in 1893, the question was again considered. In a unanimous opinion the court overruled the Piatt and Hagood Cases, and......
  • Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, (No. 12499.)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 25, 1928
    ...its terms either by entries in the journals of the two houses or any other evidence." In the case of State ex rel. Hoover v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752, decided in 1893, the question was again considered. In a unanimous opinion the court overruled the Platt and Hagood Cases, a......
  • State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, No. 16521
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • July 9, 1951
    ...to the 'enrolled bill rule' which does not permit inquiry such as relator would make. State ex rel. Hoover v. Town Council of Chester, 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752, 755. Wingfield v. Tax Comm., 147 S.C. 116, 144 S.E. 846. Parrott v. Gourdin, 205 S.C. 364, 32 S.E.2d 14. Moreover, relator has fai......
  • Rash v. Allen
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Delaware
    • June 7, 1910
    ...26, 52 Pac. 645), or altogether (Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 56 Am. Rep. 825, overruling Brady v. West, 50 Miss. 68; Hoover v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752, overruling State v. Piatt, 2 S. C. 150, 16 Am. Rep. 647, and State v. Hagood, 13 S. C. 46; Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, 95 Am......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
37 cases
  • State Ex Rel. Richards v. Moorer, (No. 12746.)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • October 12, 1929
    ...terms either by entries* in the journals of the two houses or any other evidence.' "In the case of State ex rel. Hoover v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752, decided in 1893, the question was again considered. In a unanimous opinion the court overruled the Piatt and Hagood Cases, and......
  • Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, (No. 12499.)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 25, 1928
    ...its terms either by entries in the journals of the two houses or any other evidence." In the case of State ex rel. Hoover v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752, decided in 1893, the question was again considered. In a unanimous opinion the court overruled the Platt and Hagood Cases, a......
  • State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, No. 16521
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • July 9, 1951
    ...to the 'enrolled bill rule' which does not permit inquiry such as relator would make. State ex rel. Hoover v. Town Council of Chester, 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752, 755. Wingfield v. Tax Comm., 147 S.C. 116, 144 S.E. 846. Parrott v. Gourdin, 205 S.C. 364, 32 S.E.2d 14. Moreover, relator has fai......
  • Rash v. Allen
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Delaware
    • June 7, 1910
    ...26, 52 Pac. 645), or altogether (Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 56 Am. Rep. 825, overruling Brady v. West, 50 Miss. 68; Hoover v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752, overruling State v. Piatt, 2 S. C. 150, 16 Am. Rep. 647, and State v. Hagood, 13 S. C. 46; Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, 95 Am......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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