State ex rel. Hopkins v. Stemmons, No. 7604

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: STONE; McDOWELL, P. J., and RUARK
• Citation: 302 S.W.2d 51
• Docket Number: No. 7604
• Decision Date: 22 April 1957
• Parties: STATE of Missouri at the relation of Ralph Y. HOPKINS and Margaret Hopkins, Relators, v. Hon. Robert STEMMONS, Sr., Judge of the Circuit Court of Newton County, Missouri, Respondent.

Page 51

302 S.W.2d 51 STATE of Missouri at the relation of Ralph Y. HOPKINS and
Margaret Hopkins, Relators,
v.
Hon. Robert STEMMONS, Sr., Judge of the Circuit Court of
Newton County, Missouri, Respondent. No. 7604. Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri. April 22, 1957.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer Overruled May 17, 1957.

Page 52

Henry Warten, Joplin, for relators.

James A. Poynor, Joplin, for respondent.

STONE, Judge.

In this original proceeding in prohibition, relators, Ralph Y. Hopkins and Margaret Hopkins, who purchased certain described real estate in Newton County, Missouri, at a foreclosure sale on July 23, 1956, seek to prohibit respondent, as judge of the circuit court of Newton County, from any further action in a certain statutory redemption proceeding under Sections 443.420 and 443.430. (All statutory references are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.) In response to our preliminary rule in prohibition, respondent filed his 'Motion to Dismiss,' raising only legal issues to be determined upon the facts well pleaded in relators' petition, which here stand confessed. State ex rel. American Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr, 318 Mo. 181, 183, 300 S.W. 294(1); State ex rel. Powers v. Rassieur, Mo., 184 S.W. 116, 118(4); State ex rel. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Barnett, 245 Mo. 99, 114, 149 S.W. 311, 315(2);

Page 53

State ex rel. Fowler v. Calvird, 230 Mo.App. 548, 551, 93 S.W.2d 1106, 1108(1); State ex rel. Harris v. Galloway, Mo.App., 21 S.W.2d 228, 229(1).

Joplin Investors, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the redemptioner) undertook to institute a statutory redemption proceeding in the Circuit Court of Newton County by filing 'Redemption Bond' and 'Motion for Approval of Redemption Bond' on July 31, 1956, and by procuring, on the same date, an ex parte order by respondent judge approving the bond. The question posed in the instant case is whether respondent thereby acquired jurisdiction in the redemption proceeding, notwithstanding redemptioner's failure to give the prior written notice required by Section 443.430, the pertinent portion of which provides that 'A motion or application for the approval shall be filed with the bond in the office of the clerk of the circuit court and at least one day's notice in writing thereof and of the time when the same will be filed and presented shall be given to the purchaser at such sale if he is a resident of the county and can be found therein, otherwise it shall be given to the trustee making the sale.'

As stated in relators' petition in the instant case, they were residents of Newton County and could have been found therein. Cowgill Blair, Jr., the trustee making the sale, was (and is) a practicing attorney in an adjoining county. The record reflects no prior written notice (as required by Section 443.430) either to relators or to the trustee, no attempt by redemptioner to give notice, and no explanation or excuse for failure to do so. We observe parenthetically that on July 20, 1956, three days prior to the foreclosure sale, redemptioner had served written notice of intention to redeem (as required by Sections 443.410 and 443.420) both on the trustee and on one of the relators.

Redemptioner does not here contend that the quoted language of Section 443.430 is of obscure or doubtful meaning, but it insists that the provisions as to notice are merely directory, i.e., that their observance is not necessary to validity of the redemption proceeding. State ex rel. Ellis v. Brown, 326 Mo. 627, 633, 33 S.W.2d 104, 107(3). There is no absolute or universal rule by which statutory provisions may be distinguished and classified as mandatory or directory [State ex rel. Hay v. Flynn, 235 Mo.App. 1003, 1006, 147 S.W.2d 210, 211], and resolution of the ultimate issue in most cases is not materially simplified or substantially facilitated by reiteration of general principles expressed in broad, expansive language. It will suffice to say that "(g)enerally speaking, those provisions which do not relate to the essence of the thing to be done and as to which compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance are directory, while the provisions which relate to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, are mandatory" [State ex rel. Ellis v. Brown, supra, 33 S.W.2d loc. cit. 107(5-6); Morris v. Karr, 342 Mo. 179, 182, 114 S.W.2d 962, 964; Sandrowski v. Sandrowski, 230 Mo.App. 1056, 1060, 96 S.W.2d 81, 83], but that, in each instance, the "prime object is to ascertain the legislative intention as disclosed by all the terms and provisions of the act in relation to the subject of legislation and the general object intended to be accomplished.' State ex...