State ex rel. Huckfeldt v. State Board of School Land Commissioners

• Decision Date: 26 March 1912
• Docket Number: 696
• Parties: STATE EX REL. HUCKFELDT v. STATE BOARD OF SCHOOL LAND COMMISSIONERS et al
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

122 P. 94

20 Wyo. 162

STATE EX REL. HUCKFELDT v. STATE BOARD OF SCHOOL LAND COMMISSIONERS et al

No. 696

Supreme Court of Wyoming

March 26, 1912

ORIGINAL proceeding in mandamus.

The action was instituted in the Supreme Court on the relation of John Huckfeldt for a writ of mandamus to compel the State Board of School Land Commissioners to issue to him a lease of school lands in renewal of a former lease, the right of renewal being based upon the provisions of section 613 Compiled Statutes, 1910, (Laws, 1903, Ch. 78, sec. 16). Heard on demurrer to petition and alternative writ. The material facts are stated in the opinion.

Peremptory writ denied.

W. E Mullen and C. W. Burdick, for relator.

Prior to 1903 there was but one state land board, and all lands were referred to in the statutes as state lands. By an act of 1903, following the Constitution in that respect, two separate land boards were created, viz: a school land board (Comp. Stat. 1910, sec. 602), and a state land board (Id. sec. 603). The sections of the law now in effect and bearing upon this controversy are a part of the act of 1903, with the exception of section 615, Compiled Statutes, and are included in Chapter 51 of the Compiled Statutes of 1910. These sections should be considered and construed together in order to determine the legislative intent. (France v. Connor, 3 Wyo. 445, 27 P. 569; In re Moore, 4 Wyo. 981, 31 P. 980; People v. Dolan, 5 Wyo. 245, 39 P. 752.) After providing for two separate boards, the act of 1903 refers to the lands under the jurisdiction of each board in a general way as "state lands," but it was clearly intended that the administrative features of the act should cover both state and school lands and lands granted to the state for other purposes. At any rate the duties of both boards with respect to leasing and renewing leases is set forth in section 12 of the act of 1903, as amended in 1905, now section 609 of the Compiled Statutes. Section 613 expressly provides that the lessee named in any lease of state lands, or his assigns, shall be entitled to a renewal thereof every five years, covering a total period of 20 years, with a provision for re-appraisement. The relator's assignor was granted a lease May 11, 1907, which was assigned to the relator December 16, 1908, and which assignment was accepted and recognized by the defendant board. At the time said lease was granted section 613 was in effect, and it is in effect now. A lease of state lands is a contract, and where such a contract is made pursuant to the existing law, the law is a part of the contract. (15 Ency. Law, 1040; Edwards v. Keazey, 96 U.S. 601; U. S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 898; Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N.Y. 252; Goodale v. Fenner, 27 O. St. 432.) Subsequent legislation cannot impair the obligation of contracts. (Wyo. Const. Art. I, sec. 35.) The obligation of a contract consists in its binding force on the party who makes it, and this depends on the laws in existence when it is made. These laws are necessarily referred to in all contracts and form a part of them as a measure of the obligation. (McCracken v. Howard, 2 How. (U.S.) 608.) The re-appraisement provided for in section 613 is the procedure prescribed in section 609, as both sections were incorporated in the act of 1903, and the relator's application for a renewal stated that it was made pursuant to both sections. Auction bidding between applicants does not apply where an applicant has acquired a right to a lease by virtue of any statute of the state. (Comp. Stat. sec. 609.) The lands in question were re-appraised pursuant to section 609, the rentals fixed by the defendant board, and plaintiff accepted said appraisement, tendered payment, and requested a renewal lease. No discretion is vested in the board to refuse such renewal, or to make a lease to another applicant in a case like this. The duty of the board is fixed by statute, and performance may be required by mandamus. (State ex. rel. Harrison v. Board, 10 Wyo. 413.)

As to the land in question the board seems to have acted according to its interpretation of the force and effect of section 615, Compiled Statutes, enacted in 1909. In this, it is contended, the board was in error. Section 615 must be construed to operate prospectively and to control in cases where land is open to original applications, and not where renewal rights have attached. It cannot operate to impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts of lease made prior to its enactment. (State v. McPeak, (Neb.) 47 N.W. 691; State v. Thayer, (Neb.) 64 N.W. 700; Stansey v. Cather, (Neb.) 123 N.W. 318; Morgan v. Ins. Co., (Neb.) 87 N.W. 145; State v. Commissioners, 4 Wis. 432; Blum v. Fristoe, (Tex. Cr.) 47 S.W. 658; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 328-29.) The doctrine of renewal rights conferred by statute was recognized by this court, (Cooper v. McCormick, 10 Wyo. 379, 69 P. 301.) and this court has held that original proceedings would lie in mandamus to enforce lease renewal rights. (State v. Board, 10 Wyo. 413.)

The defendant board is without authority to insert a "subject to a sale" clause in a renewal lease coming within the provisions of section 613. While the land boards have power to sell state or school land whenever deemed advisable, such power does not exist where renewal rights have attached. There were no contest proceedings instituted by the other applicant for the lands in question. Even if a contest could have been properly entertained, the board could not decide a question of fact involving property rights of this character in the absence of a contest brought in the manner prescribed by the statute and the rules of the board, and the introduction of evidence.

It is not necessary that a right of renewal should be written in the lease. The authorities which will be cited by defendant with reference to the necessity of a provision for renewal in a lease where a renewal right is claimed will be found to be cases relating to private persons, and not involving public property governed by statutory law. We find nothing in the act of admission bearing upon the question here involved except the clause restricting the term of a lease to five years, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the legislature. That clause is not in conflict with the state Constitution or statutes, for the reason that our legislation has not provided lease terms in excess of five years. The right here claimed is not affected by the provision in the lease requiring the lessee to yield up the premises at the expiration of the term or upon cancellation of the lease, for that provision does not constitute a waiver of renewal rights conferred by law. (Alexander v. Griswold, 17 N.Y.S. 522; 18 Id. 950; Scott v. Wasson, 2 O. Dec. 460; Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86; Paige v. DePuy, 40 Ill. 506; Fabri v. Bryan, 80 Ill. 182; Associates v. Howland, 5 Cush. 214.) In leases made between private persons renewal options are always provided for by a special clause, and are not affected by the common covenant to yield up at the expiration of the term. It was never intended that a covenant to yield up the premises at the expiration of the term should operate as a waiver of renewal rights under state land leases, and it is clear that it was not so intended in the case of the lease in controversy, for several reasons: (1) This clause may be found in all state leases, including those where a positive right of renewal is granted in case of the reclamation of the land. (2) Renewal rights of state leases have always been regulated by statute. (3) This clause was in the lease involved in the Harrison case wherein a writ of mandamus was directed. (10 Wyo. 413.) (4) To hold such covenant to be a waiver would conflict with Rule 3 of the Land Boards, advising the public as to renewal rights. (5) The school land board evidently does not itself construe the surrender clause to be a waiver, since it has adopted another form of lease containing an express waiver of renewal rights, said form being expressly intended for use where it is intended to cut off a right of renewal. But if the surrender clause was intended to cut off the renewal right it cannot affect a right established by law. (Stansey v. Cather, 123 N.W. 318.) This is not a suit against the state, but a proceeding in mandamus against state officers for the performance of a public duty.

The petition is sufficient although it does not set forth a copy of the lease, for it states the legal effect of the lease by proper averments. (Comp. Stat., secs. 4405, 5064-5065; Ins. Co. v. Kahn, 4 Wyo. 372.) The waiver of the right to renew would be a matter of defense. The petition shows no such waiver. A petition is good on demurrer unless it totally fails to state a cause of action. (Ins. Co. v Kahn, supra.) The lease in question was for five years, and therefore not objectionable under any possible construction of the clause relied upon in the Act of Admission. Under that clause leases may be made "under such regulations as the legislature may prescribe for periods of not more than five years." That is precisely what the legislature has done. It has provided for five year lease periods. A power to prescribe regulations means a power to establish rules of management or government. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 186.) Congress only has the power to enforce the conditions of the grant of lands to the state, either by revocation thereof, or by other suitable action in a case of a clear violation of conditions. A third party has no authority to enforce such conditions when the government does not complain of a breach. (Emigrant Co. v. Adams County, 100 U.S. 69; Godwin v. Davis, 74 Miss. 742, 21 So. 764; Barrett v. Brooks, 21 Ia. 144; Audubon County v. Page Co., 40 Ia. 460; ...