State ex rel. Human Services Dept. in Matter of Kira M.
| Decision Date | 04 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 21721,21721 |
| Citation | 883 P.2d 149,1994 NMSC 109,118 N.M. 563 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT in the Matter of KIRA M., a Child, Petitioner-Petitioner, And Concerning Michelle B., Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
We granted certiorari to review an opinion of the Court of Appeals, In re Kira M., 116 N.M. 514, 864 P.2d 803 (Ct.App.1993), deciding that relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption may be withdrawn on grounds that consent was involuntary and thus ineffective. Id. at 518, 864 P.2d at 807. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, we discern no legislative intent to expand the grounds for withdrawal of relinquishment or consent beyond that of fraud, the single ground expressly stated in the Adoption Act, NMSA 1978, Secs. 40-7-29 to -61 (Repl.Pamp.1989) (amended and recodified as NMSA 1978, Secs. 32A-5-1 to -45 (Repl.Pamp.1993)).
Kira, now eleven years old, has been in the custody of the Department of Human Services (HSD) since August 1991. Her natural parents are divorced and remarried to new spouses. Kira first came to HSD's attention in May 1990, when HSD found she had been subjected to excessive discipline and emotional abuse in the home of her mother and stepfather. HSD attempted to address the problem in the family setting, but ultimately Kira was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for counseling and treatment. After her discharge she went to live with her natural father and stepmother. About nine months later, her father and stepmother informed HSD they could no longer endure the stress of having Kira in their home. Kira's mother and stepfather also were unwilling to have the child live with them. After both of her parents rejected her, the children's court placed Kira in custody of HSD who placed her in the home of a specially trained foster parent. Several months later Kira's parents refused to participate in any further attempts to keep the family together, and they stated that they wished to relinquish their parental rights to the child and have HSD place her for adoption.
In November 1991, Kira's parents appeared before the children's court and signed documents relinquishing their parental rights to HSD and consenting to Kira's adoption. After a lengthy inquiry, the documents were accepted and certified by the children's court judge. The record shows that Kira's mother received extensive counseling regarding the consequences of relinquishing her parental rights, and that HSD and the children's court judge took great pains to ensure that the relinquishment was her own freely-made decision. Six months later, however, Kira's mother filed a motion to revoke or withdraw her relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption. Mother's motion contained no allegations of fraud, but alleged she had signed the relinquishment under threats from her husband (Kira's stepfather) that overrode her free will and desire.
After Mother's motion to withdraw her consent, HSD filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or for summary judgment based on the specific allegations contained in Mother's motion and supporting affidavit. After a hearing on all motions, the children's court denied Mother's motion, stating that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and concluding that there was no sufficient basis to void the relinquishment.
Mother appealed this decision and the parties stipulated to a stay of any proposed adoption proceedings for the child.1 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the children's court. In re Kira M., 116 N.M. at 519, 864 P.2d at 808. Noting issues of substantial public interest, we granted certiorari. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the order of the children's court.
The New Mexico Adoption Act provides that "consent to or relinquishment for adoption shall not be withdrawn prior to the entry of a judgment of adoption unless the court finds ... that the consent or relinquishment was obtained by fraud." NMSA 1978, Sec. 40-7-38(F) (Repl.Pamp.1989) (recodified as Section 32A-5-21(I) (Repl.Pamp.1993)). This provision is the only expressly-stated ground in the Adoption Act upon which to base the withdrawal of parental consent prior to the entry of a final decree of adoption.2
The Adoption Act also requires that the consent or relinquishment document signed by the parent "state ... that the person executing the consent or relinquishment has been counseled [by a qualified professional] regarding alternatives to adoptive placement and with this knowledge is voluntarily and unequivocally consenting to the adoption of the named adoptee." NMSA 1978, Sec. 40-7-38(A)(4) (Repl.Pamp.1989) (amended in part and recodified as Section 32A-5-21(A)(5) (Repl.Pamp.1993)). The latter requirement is part of a series of provisions added to the Adoption Act in 1985 and enlarged upon in 1993, presumably to insure that a relinquishment of parental rights is free, voluntary, and well informed.3
The issue, as we see it, is whether in adding the various provisions regarding the form of the required written consent document under Section 40-7-38(A), the legislature intended to enlarge the grounds upon which to invalidate parental consent once given and accepted by the children's court. The Court of Appeals found an apparent inconsistency between Section 40-7-38(A)(4) and Section 40-7-38(F) and stated that "equal effect must be given to all parts of Section 40-7-38." 116 N.M. at 517, 864 P.2d at 806. The Court concluded that despite the initial acceptance and certification of the consent document by the children's court, the court was required to determine at an evidentiary hearing whether the consent was involuntary and, therefore, not in compliance with Section 40-7-38(A)(4). Id. at 518, 864 P.2d at 807.
The legal power to adopt children is entirely a creature of statute since adoption was unknown at common law. Heirich v. Howe, 50 N.M. 90, 92, 171 P.2d 312, 313 (1946). Consequently, the procedures for the relinquishment of parental rights and subsequent adoption of children is an area particularly within the province of the legislature, where in a sound expression of public policy the state has sought to provide for the welfare of the children involved. Thus, the interpretation of these statutes should be guided by their fundamental purpose which is to determine and further the best interests of the children involved. See Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 190, 307 P.2d 175, 180 (1957). After a relinquishment of parental rights to HSD the children are wards of the state. See id. at 191, 307 P.2d at 180. It follows that the state has an important interest in the finality and stability of these proceedings.
Early versions of New Mexico Adoption Act contained no specific grounds for the withdrawal or revocation of parental consent to adoption. See generally NMSA 1953, Secs. 22-2-1 to -19. In Barwin, one of our earliest decisions addressing the validity and revocability of consent to adoption, we suggested a discretionary standard: "The better authority is that prior to the entry of an adoption decree, the court may grant or refuse revocation of consent giving due consideration to the circumstances of the particular case ... and all those matters pertaining to the past, present and future welfare of the child." 62 N.M. at 198, 307 P.2d at 185.
In 1971, the New Mexico legislature limited judicial discretion in this area by amending the Adoption Act to state but a single ground for the revocation of a relinquishment of parental rights or the consent to adoption: fraud. NMSA 1953, Sec. 22-2-27(D) (Supp.1975). Although the effect of this provision if strictly applied might be viewed as unnecessarily harsh under some circumstances, the new provision was undoubtedly intended to increase the stability of adoption proceedings.4 In discussing NMSA 1953, Section 22-2-27(D), the Court of Appeals has correctly acknowledged that the legislature has created a presumption that once a natural parent has consented to adoption, absent fraud, it is in the best interests of the child to proceed with the adoption. In re Adoption of Doe, 87 N.M. 253, 255, 531 P.2d 1226, 1228, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975). Although the legislature has amended the Adoption Act in numerous respects since 1971, the statutory limitation originally embodied in NMSA 1953, Section 22-2-27(D) has been retained by the legislature essentially unchanged. See NMSA 1978, Sec. 40-7-38(F) (Repl.Pamp.1989); NMSA 1978, Sec. 32A-5-22(I) (Repl.Pamp.1993).
After the 1971 amendments to the Adoption Act, the question was directly raised in Doe whether the New Mexico legislature intended to make fraud the sole ground for withdrawal of consent. 87 N.M. at 255, 531 P.2d at 1228. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to decide that question and held instead that the specific facts alleged by the mother were insufficient, as a matter of law, to void her consent on the ground that it was involuntary. Id. The dissent in that case argued that the consent of the parent must be "valid," and that to interpret the statute to make fraud the sole ground upon which to base revocation of consent would imply a far more stringent and inflexible standard than was intended by the legislature. Id. (Hernandez, J., dissenting).
The question left unanswered by the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Doe is in essence the same one before this Court today. For the following reasons, we think that...
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