State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't v. Rawls

• Decision Date: 06 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 30,989.,30,989.
• Citation: 279 P.3d 766,2012 -NMCA- 052
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico ex rel. HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Joseph W. RAWLS, Respondent–Appellant, and Diana De Alba–Garcia, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

279 P.3d 766

2012 -NMCA- 052

STATE of New Mexico ex rel. HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.Joseph W. RAWLS, Respondent–Appellant,andDiana De Alba–Garcia, Respondent.

No. 30,989.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

April 6, 2012.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Anthony C. Porter, Special Assistant Attorney General, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellee.

Jones, Snead, Wertheim & Wentworth, P.A., Roxie P. De Santiago, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Joseph W. Rawls agreed to a judgment of paternity and to payment of child support. Later, through paternity testing, it was determined that he was not the child's biological father. Based on Rule 1–060(B) NMRA, Rawls sought in the district court to have accrued and continuing child support abated on that ground and on the ground that he never had any relationship with the child. The child had been cared for by the child's maternal grandmother. The child's biological parents had been deported to Mexico. The district court denied relief. We hold that, under the unique circumstances of this case, Rawls should have been granted the relief he requested. We reverse the district court.

BACKGROUND

{2} In November 2002, the New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) sought the adjudication of Joseph W. Rawls as the father of a child (Child) and also sought an order requiring Rawls to pay child support. A district court hearing officer entered a report and decision in April 2003. This report and decision adjudicated Rawls the parent of Child, required Rawls to begin paying child support, and awarded judgment against Rawls for retroactive child support. This report and decision was entered by default because Rawls “failed to appear, answer, or otherwise plead within the time prescribe[d] by law and [was therefore] in default.” We will hereinafter refer to the April 2003 report and decision as “the default judgment.” In August 2004, HSD moved to reopen the case. Subsequently, a stipulated report and decision signed by the hearing officer and approved by HSD and Rawls was filed with the court. This August 2004 stipulated report and decision reiterated that Rawls was Child's parent and was obligated to pay child support. It also contained an order and judgment determining that Rawls was in contempt of court and could purge the contempt as long as he was in strict compliance with the support payment and other requirements set out in the order and judgment. In this Opinion, we refer to the stipulated report and decision as “the stipulated order.”

{3} In February 2009, Rawls moved under Rule 1–060(B) to set aside the default judgment and the stipulated order on the ground that a paternity test administered in June 2008 with results acquired in September 2008, with the cooperation of the Child Support Enforcement Division of the HSD, showed that he was not Child's biological father. The court conducted a hearing on that motion in March 2010. At the hearing, Rawls' counsel explained that Rawls would testify that he signed the stipulated order because it was the only option available in order to have his driver's license reinstated, that he did not understand signing the stipulated order was an acknowledgment on his part that he was the biological father of Child, and that he understood HSD would schedule a paternity test. He states that when he later became aware, in 2008, that his driver's license continued to be suspended for non-payment of child support he again contacted HSD, now with the assistance of counsel, and was able to schedule paternity testing. In addition, along with citing to the record of the lab results indicating that Rawls was not the biological father of Child, Rawls states that Child's mother had represented to HSD that Rawls was the father of Child, and that the mother knew the representation was false because at a hearing in April 2011, when asked for the name of the biological father, she provided a name other than that of Rawls. We see no refutation of any of these statements in HSD's answer brief. In his reply brief, Rawls states that he “requested the paternity testing from [HSD] when he was first served with the [p]etition and again when he met with [HSD] officials to discuss his driver's license suspension.”

{4} In an oral ruling in March 2010, the district court denied Rawls' motion insofar as it was grounded on Rule 1–060(B)(1), (2), and (3), but indicated that testimony was necessary before the court could rule on the applicability of Rule 1–060(B)(5) and (6). In April 2010, Rawls moved pursuant to Rule 1–060(B)(5) and (6) to abate child support payments based on the grounds that the paternity test excluded him as Child's biological father and that he did not have any emotional relationship with Child. In May 2010, the court instructed counsel to prepare briefs with points and authorities on the application of Rule 1–060(B)(6) relating to the fact that Rawls was excluded as Child's biological father. In its points and authorities brief, HSD stated, among other things, that it did not foreclose the possibility, at some point in the future, of disestablishing paternity as to Rawls and prospectively setting aside a portion of the default judgment, contingent upon the cooperation of Rawls' counsel in gathering information about Child's biological father and the maternal grandmother.

{5} In November 2010, the court entered an order denying relief under Rule 1–060(B)(1), (2), and (3) and denying Rawls' motion to set aside the stipulated order. Also in November 2010, the court entered an order “denying motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 1–060(B)(5)(6).” The court entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law and gave no written explanation or ground for the denial. Rawls appeals the November 2010 order entitled “Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to [Rule] 1–060(B)(5)(6).” On appeal, Rawls asserts that the November 2010 order relating to Rule 1–060(B)(5) and (6) denied his Rule 1–060(B)(5) and (6) motions to abate ongoing child support and to set aside the default judgment and stipulated order, and was inconsistent with the law. Furthermore, he “assumes that the district court relie[d] on the undisputed fact that [he was] not the biological father of [C]hild.”

{6} Rawls specifically faults the court for failing to grant the prospective relief of child support abatement requested in his motion to abate child support and for failing to set aside the default judgment and the stipulated order. He seeks “[p]rospective relief” as available under “statutes granting courts continuing jurisdiction to modify and revoke child support orders” by setting aside the default judgment and stipulated order, thereby setting aside “the determination of paternity and ... reliev[ing him] of ongoing child support obligations[.]” And he wants to be absolved of all related accrued child support.

DISCUSSIONStandard of Review

{7} Rawls asserts that the issues on appeal are to be reviewed de novo because all pertinent facts are undisputed, the issues are of pure law, and the district court's rulings were not consistent with the law. He also asserts that even if the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the issues turn on whether the court misapplied the law, thus calling for de novo review. HSD contends that a ruling on a motion for relief from a final judgment under Rule 1–060(B) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

{8} We review denials of Rule 1–060(B) motions generally for abuse of discretion, unless the issue is one of law. Stein v. Alpine Sports, Inc., 1998–NMSC–040, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 258, 968 P.2d 769. To the extent an issue requires us to determine whether the district court misapprehended the applicable law or otherwise requires us to decide a pure matter of law, we turn to de novo review. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999–NMSC–028, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450;Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2009–NMCA–019, ¶ 9, 145 N.M. 579, 203 P.3d 110.

{9} As pertinent to the issues before us, Rule 1–060(B)(5) and (6) read:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order[,] or proceeding for the following reasons:

...

(5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time[.]

The Merits

{10} HSD seeks to avoid the merits with its argument that Rawls failed to move for relief within a reasonable time. SeeRule 1–060(B)(6) (“The motion shall be made within a reasonable time[.]”); Thompson v. Thompson, 99 N.M. 473, 475, 660 P.2d 115, 117 (1983) (stating that “Rule 60(b)(4), (5) [,] and (6) may be presented within a ‘reasonable time’ ”). HSD fails to point out where in the record it preserved this argument. We will not search the record for procedural events to which a party fails to cite, and we therefore will not consider HSD's timeliness point. See Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep't of Taxation & Revenue, 2005–NMCA–022, ¶ 14, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273 (“Absent [a] citation to the record or any obvious preservation, we will not consider the issue.”).

{11} As we have indicated in this Opinion, Rawls seeks relief from all accrued, unpaid child support, as well as relief from any obligation for future child support. We interpret Rule 1–060(B)(5)'s reference to prospective relief to mean relief from the date the Rule 1–060(B) motion was filed, not from the time of the default judgment or stipulated order. If the grounds for relief are met, we interpret Rule 1–060(B)(6) as intended to provide relief with respect to the accrued and prospective child support. Intermixed in the Rule 1–060(B) analyses is the extent, if any, to which the notion of changed circumstances under the applicable Uniform Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40–11–1 to –23 (1986, as amended through 2004) (current...