State ex rel. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Florida Indus. Commission, 31891
| Decision Date | 03 April 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 31891,31891 |
| Citation | 151 So.2d 636 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida ex rel. IOWA NATIONAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and Wilson Leonard's Hardware Store, Petitioners, v. The FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Joseph A. Scarlett, and Henry Hudson Parker, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Monroe E. McDonald of Sanders, McEwan, Schwarz & Mims, Orlando, for petitioners.
Edward H. Hurt, Orlando, for Henry Hudson Parker.
Burnis T. Coleman and Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission.
This is a workmen's compensation case and the question, primarily, is the interpretation of the second sentence of section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as relates to a lump sum discharge, often referred to as a 'wash out.' It is before us on original prohibition at the suggestion of the employer, Wilson Leonard's Hardware Store, and the insurer, Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company.
The factual picture is this: Respondent workman, Henry Hudson Parker, is a married white male, and at the time of the injury was 58 years of age. He is a high school graduate, was the manager of a department store in Franklin, Louisiana, manager of a shoe store in Dallas, Texas, salesman for Studebaker in New Orleans, Louisiana, and at the time of the accident was employed as a salesman in an Orlando hardware store. While lifting a keg of nails in this last employment he felt a 'pain in his back,' which was later diagnosed as a herniated intervertebral disc in the lumbar area of the spine at L-4-5.
Insurer afforded to Parker all medical treatment requested by him and paid him compensation for temporary total disability from October 15, 1960, until February 24, 1961, when he had reached maximum benefits from medical treatment, absent surgery. The treating physician advised this course to diminish the remaining partial disability in the back but Parker refused to submit to surgery and, thereupon, the carrier refused to make further payments.
Parker was rated as having a 25% permanent partial disability of his body as a whole and had prior to February 24, 1961, received $30.00 weekly. Future medical expenses were anticipated.
In the light of this impasse between Parker and the carrier and the desire of the former to move to New Orleans and establish himself in business, a joint petition was filed as provided for by the second sentence of 440.20(10), supra, reciting the 25% disability, controversy between the workman and carrier, anticipated future medical expenses, and the desire of Parker to move to New Orleans to engage in business. The lump sum of $4,000.00 was agreed upon. The deputy commissioner approved the proposed commutation on March 21, 1961, ordering that the carrier
Before the entry of the approval order the deputy commissioner referred the matter to the Rehabilitation Department of the Commission for investigation. See Rules of Procedure, in Workmen's Compensation Cases before the Florida Industrial Commission, 16(3c). Such investigation was made and its report and recommendations submitted to the deputy commissioner. The report reflects a sedulous labor of craftsmanship, thoroughly covering the salient economic points as relating to a lump sum settlement. Rule 16, supra, provides that 'the stipulation [meaning the petition] and the report and recommendations of the Rehabilitation Department will be deemed a part of the record of the proceeding.'
Parker appeared before the deputy commissioner and due to the brevity of the investigation the questions and answers are set forth in full, Deputy Commissioner Haines inquiring:
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Apparently the approving order was based upon the joint petition, report of the Rehabilitation Department and the testimony of the employee. The $4,000.00 was paid and the matter was in a complete state of quiescence until on or about March 8, 1962, when the employee filed before the deputy commissioner a petition to modify, 'requesting that the stipulation heretofore entered herein be set aside and be declared null and void * * *.' An amendment was filed. Employee sought additional compensation. The controlling points raised will hereinafter be discussed. The deputy commissioner over the objections of the relators indicated that he intended to move forward in receiving evidence in support of the petition for modification, as amended. It is at this point the relators suggested prohibition to this court and rule issued. The Florida Industrial Commission filed its return, stating that 'This Respondent agrees with Petitioners that they are entitled to a writ of prohibition * * *.' The respondent employee in his return prays a discharge of the rule and that the suggestion as the predicate therefor be quashed.
We wish to say at the outset that from an examination of the record we do not find any taint of fraud, mutual mistake, overreaching, nor any other reason which would invalidate the stipulation and order. Having so found, we are of the further opinion that the critical provision of 440.20(10) is controlling and not 440.28, which permits modification.
Respondent employee in his brief raised several points covered in his petition for modification, as amended. The first appears in his brief within which he says: 'It is obvious from the record that neither the stipulation nor the order complies with the prerequisites as set out by the Legislature in Section 440.20(10) and if these prerequisites are not met, it is obvious that the stipulation is subject to modification by the Florida Industrial Commission.' With this contention the court cannot agree. 440.20(10) provides, inter alia, as relating to the authority of the deputy commissioner that '* * * if he finds that it is for the best interests of the person entitled to compensation a deputy commissioner may enter a compensation order approving and authorizing the discharge of the liability of the employer * * *by the payment of a lump sum * * *.' (Italics for emphasis.) Prior to 1959 this responsibility was vested in the full commission and it had to 'determine' whether or not the 'wash out' was for the best interests of the employee. It is noted that the law as amended uses the word 'finds.' Webster defines the word as 'To arrive at, as a conclusion; to determine and declare * * *.' The finding to be made by the deputy commissioner under 440.20(10) is to be distinguished from 440.25(3)(c) which states that: 'The order * * * shall set forth a statement of the findings of fact and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue * * *.' (Italics for emphasis.)
Patently, the purpose of throwing safeguards around the employee in commutation cases is to insure him against his own improvidence, to the end that he will not experience the horrific metamorphosis of being Croesus on Saturday night and a mendicant on Monday morning.
In an interpretation of 440.25(3)(c) this court in Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, Fla., 81 So.2d...
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