State ex rel. J.D.
| Citation | 252 A.3d 1063,467 N.J.Super. 345 |
| Decision Date | 05 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-0548-20 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey IN the INTEREST OF J.D., a Juvenile. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Thomas C. Huth argued the cause for appellant (The Law Offices of Jonathan F. Marshall and Jeff Thakker, attorneys; Jeff Thakker, of counsel; Thomas C. Huth, Newark, on the briefs).
Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the brief).
Mary Clare Patterson, admitted pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(b), argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic, Rutgers Law, and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Laura A. Cohen, Distinguished Clinical Professor of Law, of counsel and on the brief; Alexander Shalom, Newark, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Carol M. Henderson, Trenton, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Fisher, Gilson, and Gummer.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILSON, J.A.D.
In 2019, three women alleged that J.D. sexually assaulted them years earlier when they and J.D. were minors. The State filed juvenile delinquency complaints against J.D. and moved to waive certain charges to the Criminal Part to try J.D. as an adult on the alleged assaults that occurred when he was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen.
This appeal presents a question of first impression: whether the waiver procedures and hearing should be governed by the current statute, which became effective in March 2016, or by a hybrid of the statute at the time of the alleged offenses and the current statute. The trial court held that the current statute would govern.
On leave granted, J.D. argues that because all the waiver statutes are ameliorative, he should be allowed to select those parts of the repealed and current statutes that give him the greatest benefit. We hold that the current statute governs the waiver proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm.
J.D. was born in October 1990. He grew up in a household with his parents and several siblings, including two adopted sisters:
K.D. and M.N. The adopted sisters are both approximately a year younger than J.D. M.N. was born in August 1991, and K.D. was born in February 1992.
In 2019, K.D. and M.N. alleged that J.D. had sexually assaulted them numerous times over the course of several years when they were all minors. They both gave statements to law enforcement personnel. In her statements, K.D. detailed that J.D. sexually assaulted her beginning when she was approximately ten or eleven years old and continuing until she was seventeen years old. According to K.D., the assaults included forced oral, vaginal, and anal penetrations.1
M.N. reported that J.D. sexually assaulted her several times when she was between the ages of ten and sixteen. The assaults included forced oral and vaginal penetrations.
Law enforcement personnel also interviewed D.M., who had dated J.D. when she was between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. D.M. reported that she had had sexual relations with J.D. while they were dating. She asserted that J.D. was physically abusive to her when she did not want to have sex with him. She described two occasions when J.D. started to have sexual intercourse with her, she told him to stop, but he did not. Instead, J.D. got angry, she became frightened, and although she did not want to continue, J.D. continued having sexual intercourse until he was finished.
In 2019 and 2020, J.D. was charged with delinquency in seven juvenile complaints. Some of the complaints issued in 2020 superseded complaints issued in 2019. Three of the complaints charged J.D. with sexual assaults involving the three victims that occurred between October 2005 and October 2008, when J.D. was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen. Those juvenile complaints alleged that if the offenses had been committed as an adult, they would constitute second-degree sexual assaults, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1). The four other juvenile complaints charged J.D. with sexual assaults committed prior to his fifteenth birthday.
On January 30, 2020, the State moved to waive from the Family Part and refer to the Criminal Part the three complaints charging J.D. with the sexual assaults that allegedly occurred when J.D. was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen. In preparation for the waiver hearing, an issue arose concerning whether the hearing would be governed by the statute in place when the assaults allegedly occurred, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, or the statute that became effective on March 1, 2016, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1, after the alleged assaults occurred.
After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument, the trial court issued an order on September 15, 2020, ruling that the waiver hearing will be governed by the current statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1. In making that ruling, the court relied on the recent Supreme Court decision, State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 231 A.3d 710 (2020). In J.V., the Court held that a juvenile "who was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced" before N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 "became effective cannot claim the benefit[s] of the new juvenile waiver statute." Id. at 448, 231 A.3d 710. The trial court reasoned that the J.V. Court's discussion of the prospective application of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 meant that the statute was to govern all waiver proceedings after March 1, 2016.
Before the waiver hearing took place, we granted J.D. leave to appeal the September 15, 2020 order. We also invited the Attorney General and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) to participate as amici. Both filed briefs and appeared for oral argument. The ACLU's brief was submitted by the Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic.
On appeal, J.D. argues that he should be allowed to proceed under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(e), which allowed a juvenile to oppose waiver to adult court by showing amenability to rehabilitation before reaching nineteen years of age. J.D. articulates that argument as follows:
WHETHER ONE CONFINES THE INQUIRY TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, OR WHETHER ONE CONSIDERS THE PARENS PATRIAE POLICY UNDERLYING JUVENILE JUSTICE, AN ADULT WHO CAN PROVE REHABILITATION UNDER THE STANDARDS WHICH PREEXISTED N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (WHEN THE ALLEGED DELINQUENT ACTS OCCURRED) SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO; RETROACTIVE STATUTORY WAIVER IS ERRONEOUS AND UNJUST IN THIS INSTANCE.
The ACLU supports J.D.'s position and argues that because the current waiver statute is ameliorative, the family court should allow J.D. to try to show he was amenable to rehabilitation as allowed under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(e), which was in effect at the time the alleged assaults were committed.
The prosecutor and Attorney General both argue the trial court correctly decided that the current waiver statute governs. They contend that that ruling is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in J.V., other case law, and the Savings Clause, N.J.S.A. 1:1-15.
In reviewing a juvenile waiver decision, appellate courts normally assess "whether the correct legal standard has been applied, whether inappropriate factors have been considered, and whether the exercise of discretion constituted a ‘clear error of judgment’ in all of the circumstances." State v. R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1, 15, 527 A.2d 834 (1987) (citing State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. 4, 13, 444 A.2d 569 (1982) ). The issue before us, however, is a question of law: which statute governs the waiver proceedings. Accordingly, we conduct a de novo review. Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 608, 177 A.3d 768 (2018) ; Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386, 143 A.3d 254 (2016).
We hold that the language of the current waiver statute, coupled with consideration of the Savings Clause, establishes that the current statute should govern J.D.'s waiver hearing. To give context to our holding, we begin with a brief overview of the prior and present waiver statutes.
"Over the years, the Legislature has revised the waiver statute on a number of occasions." State in the Interest of N.H., 226 N.J. 242, 249, 141 A.3d 1178 (2016) (citations omitted). The two revisions most relevant to J.D.'s circumstances are the 2003 and 2016 statutory revisions. See L. 2003, c. 39, § 8; and L. 2015, c. 89, § 1. The waiver statute was also amended in 2008, but in ways irrelevant to the issues on this appeal.
Under the versions of the waiver statute that existed between 2003 and 2015, a prosecutor had discretion to seek waiver of charges constituting serious crimes, including sexual assault committed by a juvenile fourteen years of age or older. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a) (2003). The Attorney General issued guidelines identifying seven factors prosecutors should consider in exercising that discretion. John J. Farmer, Jr. & Paul H. Zoubek, Off. of the Att'y Gen., Juvenile Waiver Guidelines 5-6 (2000), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/pdfs/AGJuvenile-Waiver-Guidelines.pdf (the AG Guidelines); see also State in the Interest of Z.S., 464 N.J. Super. 507, 515-16, 237 A.3d 344 (App. Div. 2020) ().
The AG Guidelines "directed prosecutors filing a waiver motion to include a statement of reasons addressing the prosecution's consideration and the applicability of the factors." J.V., 242 N.J. at 437, 231 A.3d 710 (citing the AG Guidelines, at 7). Our Supreme Court required prosecutors to submit that written statement of reasons with the waiver motion, so that judges could "determine that the reasons for seeking waiver are not arbitrary." State v. J.M., 182 N.J. 402, 419, 866 A.2d 178 (2005).
The prior waiver statute also included a provision allowing a juvenile who was fourteen or fifteen years old and who had been charged...
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