State ex rel. Jackson v. School Dist. 2

• Decision Date: 07 July 1934
• Docket Number: 31775.
• Citation: 140 Kan. 171,34 P.2d 102
• Parties: STATE ex rel. JACKSON, Co. Atty., v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 et al.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

34 P.2d 102

140 Kan. 171

STATE ex rel. JACKSON, Co. Atty., v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 et al.

No. 31775.

Supreme Court of Kansas

July 7, 1934

Syllabus by the Court.

Statute regarding subject of detaching land from one school district and attaching it to another held unconstitutional attempt to delegate legislative power in that certain landowners, by exercise of own will, were authorized to exclude their land from school district (Laws 1933, c. 263).

An act of the Legislature relating to the subject of detaching land from one school district and attaching it to another school district, considered, and held, the act is unconstitutional and void.

Appeal from District Court, Rice County; Ray H. Beals, Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of Bronce Jackson, County Attorney of Rice County, against the School District No. 2 and others. From an adverse judgment, defendants appeal.

A. C Malloy, Roy C. Davis, Warren H. White and Frank S. Hodge, all of Hutchinson, and John W. Blood, of Wichita, for appellants.

Roland Boynton, Atty. Gen., and Bronce Jackson, Co. Atty., and Ben Jones, both of Lyons, for appellee.

BURCH Justice.

The action was one by the state to determine constitutionality of an act of the Legislature relating to the subject of detaching land from one school district and attaching it to another district (Laws 1933, c. 263). A copy of the act is appended hereto. ^[1] Pursuant to the act, land was detached from district No. 1 of Rice county and attached to defendant districts. The district court held the act to be void as transgressing section 17 of article 2 of the Constitution, which reads:

"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; and in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted and whether or not a law enacted is repugnant to this provision of the constitution shall be construed and determined by the courts of the state."

The section constitutes an amendment to the Constitution adopted at the general election held in November, 1906. The original section read as follows:

"§ 17. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; and in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."

Considering the original provision, the court held the Legislature was the judge of when special legislation was necessary. The practical results were so shocking to the sense of civic decency, and so detrimental to the public welfare, the amendment was adopted. The amendment "scotched the snake, not killed it," and crudely or cunningly conceived special laws masquerading as general laws are continually coming before the court. In the course of years since the Constitution was amended, a few essentially special acts have gotten by, but the intention of the court is to apply the amendment in such a way it will accomplish the purpose of its adoption.

In this instance the subject of the act was the common subject of disorganization and organization of school districts by detaching land from one district and attaching it to another. In form, the act was a general act, framed on the principle of classification. In "any school districts" where the classifying conditions exist, a qualified property owner may petition for withdrawal. It is perfectly true that what the Legislature was in fact doing was to offer to a few individuals special privilege to withdraw, at their option; but the Legislature attempted to do this by a general law. While the principle of classification was burlesqued, the Legislature attempted to frame a general law. A division of the brief of appellants is devoted to defense of the law as a general law, and the face of the act discloses determination by the Legislature that a general law could be made applicable to the situation with which it was dealing.

It is idle to discuss validity of the act as a piece of general legislation. It was flagrantly special, and consequently failed to accomplish its purpose.

In the district court, as here, defendants adopted Zekle's attitude when watching Huldy peelin' apples:

"He stood a spell on one foot fust, Then stood a spell on t'other."

Counsel said:

"We take two positions: One is that the act is and can be under the decisions, termed a 'general law,' but if termed a 'special law,' that the facts we will offer to prove will amply justify a special law."

An act of the Legislature cannot be both general and special. Whether the legislative design was to pass a general act or a special act must be determined from the act itself. Perhaps determination may be aided in some instances by consideration of general criteria utilized in any case of statutory interpretation. If an act is designed to be general, its validity must be tested in one way. If designed to be special, its validity must be tested in another way. What test shall be applied to determine validity cannot be known until the nature of the act is ascertained.

While contending in the district court that the act is special, defendants offered oral testimony to prove the conditions were so peculiar no general law could do the work of this law. The district court held the testimony to be inadmissible, but received it for purpose of review, at the hearing on the motion for new trial.

When the Constitution was amended, a new judicial duty was imposed on the courts. In due time this court considered how that duty should be discharged, and the notion that oral evidence might be received to determine whether a general law could be made applicable was definitely rejected.

"The Constitution expressly forbids special laws where a general law can be made to apply. When a special law is passed therefore, the Legislature necessarily determines, in the first instance, that a general law can not be made to apply. But their determination is not final. There is, of course, a presumption that public officers have discharged their duties properly and every act of the Legislature is presumed to be valid until there is a judicial determination to the contrary. But when a special law has been enacted, and its validity is assailed in the courts, the question is to be finally determined by the courts as a judicial question, uncontrolled by the determination of the Legislature. The courts must determine the question as other purely judicial questions are determined, by reference to the nature of the subject, not upon proof of facts or conditions, but upon the theory that judicial notice supplies the proof of what courts are bound to know, and that courts must be aware of those things which...