State ex rel. Johnson v. Niederer
| Decision Date | 30 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 19293,19293 |
| Citation | 123 Idaho 282,846 P.2d 933 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, ex rel. Ann M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard B. NIEDERER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Reginald R. Reeves of Denman & Reeves, Idaho Falls, for defendant-appellant.
Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., John X. Combo, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Idaho Falls, for plaintiff-respondent.
This is a paternity action filed by the State of Idaho on behalf of the relator and mother, Ann Johnson, against Richard Niederer, the putative father. Niederer appeals the order of filiation and judgment entered by the magistrate and affirmed by the district court. We also affirm.
The state filed a complaint in February, 1989, seeking an order that Richard Niederer was the biological father of a minor child born in 1979. In addition, the state sought reimbursement of public assistance payments paid by the state to the mother since October, 1986, for the benefit of the child. Niederer moved to dismiss the complaint. The magistrate denied the motion. Thereafter the parties stipulated to the entry of judgment.
The stipulation for judgment established that Niederer is the natural father of Johnson's child, born on February 11, 1979. It also provided that judgment be entered against Niederer in the compromised amount of $5,000 for payments made by the state to Johnson for the child in the previous three years. The stipulation for judgment was made subject to Niederer's right to appeal. Thereafter, the magistrate entered an order of filiation and judgment. Niederer first appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate's decision denying the motion to dismiss.
In his appeal before this Court, Niederer contends: that the complaint filed by the state, containing the paternity claim and claim for reimbursement, was filed after the statutes of limitation had run; that the state should be barred from filing this action by the equitable doctrine of laches; that he was denied due process; and that the state cannot bring this action on behalf of the mother. Each party seeks attorney fees on appeal.
The issues before us are the same as those presented to the district court on appeal. Therefore, we will review the trial court's record with due regard for, but independently from the district court's appellate decision. Robinson v. Joint School District No. 331, 105 Idaho 487, 670 P.2d 894 (1983).
Niederer first asserts that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the state did not file its complaint within the applicable statutes of limitation. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the applicability of a particular statute of limitation. Modern Mills, Inc. v. Havens, 112 Idaho 1101, 739 P.2d 400 (Ct.App.1987). Niederer relies upon Dept. of Health & Welfare ex rel. Gage v. Engelbert, 114 Idaho 89, 753 P.2d 825 (1988). There, as in this case, the department had furnished assistance to a child born in 1979. Niederer contends that, because the child was born February 11, 1979, and the instant complaint was filed on February 2, 1989, the paternity claim is time barred. In Engelbert, the Supreme Court applied the version of I.C. § 7-1107 in effect in 1979 which allowed a paternity action to be brought within three years. The Court also applied I.C. § 5-230, which allowed the statute of limitation to be tolled up to six years based upon the minority of the child for whose rights the department was subrogated. Because the department brought its action in 1985, within nine years of the child's birth, the Supreme Court held that the department had timely filed its complaint. Niederer urges this Court to apply the three-year statute of limitation in effect in 1979 as the Supreme Court did in Engelbert with regard to the issue of paternity.
When a statute or constitutional provision is "plain, clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself and must be given the interpretation the language clearly implies.' " Moon v. Investment Board, 97 Idaho 595, 596, 548 P.2d 861, 862 (1976) (quoting State v. Jonasson, 78 Idaho 205, 210, 299 P.2d 755, 757 (1956)). In Engelbert, the Court stated, "[t]he statute of limitation in effect when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines the statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise." 114 Idaho at 90, 753 P.2d at 826 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Although the version of I.C. § 7-1107 in effect in 1979 provided that paternity actions must be brought within three years, the statute has been amended. In 1985, the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 7-1107 to provide that actions for paternity must be brought after the birth of the child and before the child reaches the age of majority. 1985 Idaho Sess.Laws ch. 159 § 4, p. 422. In effect, the statute created an eighteen-year statute of limitation. In 1986, the legislature expressly made I.C. § 7-1107 retroactive. 1986 Idaho Sess.Laws ch. 221 § 1, p. 584. Although Engelbert was issued on April 25, 1988, the complaint in that case was filed in 1985; therefore, the Supreme Court did not apply the eighteen-year statute of limitation. Because the state's complaint in the instant case was filed on February 2, 1989, we hold that the 1986 amended version of I.C. § 7-1107 applies, and the claim is not barred.
With regard to the state's claim for past debt, Niederer contends that the state had even fewer than nine years within which to file a claim. Niederer asserts that the applicable statute of limitation to collect upon the liability created by statute, I.C. § 56-203B, is three years pursuant to I.C. § 5-218. Niederer implicitly argues that the time from which to measure this three years is identical to that in a proceeding to determine paternity, namely, the birth of the child.
The state asserts, however, that the time from which to start the limitation period is when the claim accrued, which it asserts is October, 1986. See I.C. § 5-201. This is because the payments the state seeks to recover commenced in October, 1986, and continued through May, 1990, as set forth in the stipulation for judgment. We agree with the state and conclude that, although Niederer correctly identifies I.C. § 5-218 as the applicable statute of limitation, the state did not exceed the three-year period when it filed its claim on February 2, 1989.
Next, Niederer contends that the state is barred from maintaining this action based on the equitable doctrine of laches. Niederer correctly sets forth the elements he must show in order to prevail on this defense. They are stated in Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252, 259, 706 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Ct.App.1985) (quoting Huppert v. Wolford, 91 Idaho 249, 257, 420 P.2d 11, 19 (1966)):
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiff's rights, (2) delay in asserting plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and (4) injury or prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred. Lapse of time, although an important element, is not alone controlling in determining the applicability of the defense of laches, unless the party claiming laches was injured or placed at a disadvantage by such delay.
Niederer asserts many facts in his brief which he contends supports the application of laches. However, most of these facts are not part of our record. We are constrained to review this case only upon the facts in the record. Neer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 92 Idaho 361, 442 P.2d 771 (1968). Thus, we may look only to the facts, if any, established by the pleadings, and those contained in the stipulation for judgment.
Niederer cites Moore v. Hafeeza, 212 N.J.Super. 399, 515 A.2d 271 (Ch.Div.1986), for the principle that a party may be barred by the doctrine of laches from bringing a paternity action. Moore, however, is distinguishable from this case. In Moore, a county board of social services brought a paternity action against the putative father. In 1971, approximately two years after the child's birth, the court had issued an order finding "no filiation" and entered a judgment to that effect. Approximately fifteen years after the entry of judgment, the mother, who was a witness in the prior case, but not a party, filed another paternity action against the putative father. The court concluded that the mother was barred by laches, among other reasons, because of the time that had passed, stating that the unfairness to the defendant was clear.
Here, the magistrate concluded that Niederer had failed to present sufficient facts in the record to demonstrate any other element of laches except a delay in bringing the action. The district court affirmed the magistrate's finding. We agree with the lower courts.
Rather than address each prong and the lack of supporting evidence in the record, we merely note that Niederer cannot prove the fourth prong, prejudice or injury, as a result of the delay in bringing an action. Therefore he cannot rely solely upon the lapse of time because he suffered no injury or disadvantage. Huppert v. Wolford, supra. The only facts of record relevant to the application of the doctrine of laches are that the child was born February 11, 1979, and the state filed its complaint on February 2, 1989. Although almost ten years passed between the birth and start of this action, the filing was well within the statute of limitation. All of the other factors Niederer relies upon to demonstrate prejudice are not part of our record. The magistrate's ruling that Niederer failed to show the elements necessary to support the doctrine of laches is affirmed.
Niederer also contends that the statute authorizing the state to pursue its claim, I.C. § 56-203B, is unconstitutional. He asserts that his due process rights were violated because the statute allows the state to pay funds to the...
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