State ex rel. Jones v. Johnson Circuit Court
Decision Date | 18 April 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 30232,30232 |
Citation | 181 N.E.2d 857,243 Ind. 7 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana on the Relation of James W. JONES, Relator, v. JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT, Robert B. Lybrook, as Judge of the Johnson Circuit Court, Respondent. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Pogue & Young, Franklin, for relator.
Robert B. Lybrook, pro se, Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Addison M. Dowling and Thomas L. Webber, Deputy Attys. Gen., amici curiae.
Relator has filed a petition for writ of prohibition in which he asks that the respondent court be prohibited from calling a special election relative to the adoption of a comprehensive plan for the reorganization of certain school corporations, which election had been requested by the School Reorganization Commission of Johnson County pursuant to § 28-6118, Burns' 1961 Supp.
The relator asserts that the respondent is without jurisdiction to order the special election for two reasons. First, because an appeal of the proceedings is in progress and, secondly, because the procedure prescribed by the statute, which authorizes such election, had not been followed preliminary to said order. This court issued a temporary writ upon the second ground asserted in relator's petition.
The factual situation with which we are here confronted is not disputed and, therefore, the issue presented thereby is a matter of law. The facts are as follows: On March 17, 1962 the Indiana State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations notified the Johnson County Committee of its approval of the proposed reorganization of certain schools in Johnson County. On March 20, 1962 a written request, signed by a majority of the county committee, requested the respondent to issue an order for a special election on said comprehensive plan to be held on May 8, 1962, the date of the primary election in said county. On March 29, 1962 relator filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the Indiana State Commission.
Respondent indicated his intention to order notice of the election, as requested. Relator then filed a petition challenging the jurisdiction of the court to order the election for the reason hereinabove stated. With respect to the petition the court entered the following finding and judgment:
'And the Court * * * now finds that this Court has jurisdiction denied of it in said petition * * *
'IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that the relief sought in the petition * * * is denied.'
The controlling statutes with which we are here concerned are §§ 28-6116, 28-6117 and 28-6118, Burns' 1961 Supp.
'Any determination by the court with respect to the adjustment of property, debts and liabilities among the school corporations or areas involved shall not otherwise affect the validity of the reorganization or creation of any school corporation or corporations under the provisions of this act.' § 28-6116.
'At any time after the date an approved plan is received by the county committee from the state commission, a community school corporation provided for in such approved plan may be created and established by a petition stating that the signers request the establishment of the community school corporation, as provided in said approved plan, which petition shall be signed by fifty-five per cent [55%] or more of the registered voters residing within the boundaries of the community school corporation. * * *' § 28-6117.
In deciding this case there are certain general fundamental rules and propositions of law by which we are governed.
1. Since the action of the court in ordering notice of a special election is a quasi judicial act [of which an order book entry is made], this court has jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition to confine the court to its lawful authority with respect thereto. Acts 1955, ch. 253, § 1, p. 647 [§ 3-2201, Burns' 1961 Supp.]. See: Ellingham v. Dye (1912), 178 Ind. 336, 400-405, 99 N.E. 1, 24-26; State ex rel. Patton v. Myers (1933), 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872, 90 A.L.R. 570. And although individual citizens have no vested property right in the continuation of a political subdivision of the state in its present form, nevertheless, the individuals so affected may, as a class or on behalf of the state, require that the procedure prescribed for changing such political subdivisions be followed. Woerner v. City of Indianapolis (Ind.1961), 177 N.E.2d 34, 36, and cases cited therein.
2. The establishment of a community school corporation, as here under consideration, being a special statutory proceeding, the procedural requirements prescribed in the act must be strictly followed. The court has no authority to ignore such procedure or adopt a different method of procedure. State ex rel. M. West Ins. Co. v. S. Ct. of Marion Co. (1952), 231 Ind. 94, 100, 106 N.E.2d 924, 927; State ex rel. Gary v. Lake Sup. Ct. (1947), 225 Ind. 478, 493, 76 N.E.2d 254, 261 and cases cited therein.
3. In construing a statute it is the duty of this court to give effect, if possible, to the intention of the legislature which enacted the law, insofar as this intention can be ascertained from all of the express provisions of the statute, the history of the particular legislation, and the legislative records with respect thereto.
We now consider relator's first contention, that the respondent court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the special election pending an appeal by the relator from the decision of the State Committee. A method is set out in § 28-6116(2), supra. Under this section the appeal is limited to 'any question of adjustment of property, debts and liabilities among the school corporations involved.' In this case there was no splitting of existing school districts or corporations; therefore, there was no occasion for the 'adjustment of property, debts and liabilities among the school corporations involved.'
Furthermore, the act makes no provision for staying elections pending such appeals. On the contrary, said section provides that:
'Any determination by the court with respect to the adjustment of property, debts and liabilities among the school corporations or areas involved shall not otherwise affect the validity of the reorganization or creation of any school corporation or corporations under the provisions of this act.'
We conclude, therefore, that the fact that relator was prosecuting an appeal from the...
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...limitation is imposed upon the judicial review available under the School Reorganization Statute. In State ex rel. Jones v. Johnson Circuit Court, 243 Ind. 7, 12, 181 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1962), our Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Achor, 'And although individual citizens have no vested pr......
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...the statute, the legislative history of the statute, and any legislative records with respect thereto. State ex rel. Jones v. Johnson Circuit Court (1962), 243 Ind. 7, 181 N.E.2d 857. Because the Indiana courts have not construed this statute, prior constructions of similar statutes by our ......
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