State ex rel. Jones v. Bd. of Educ. of Dayton Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 16 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 28637,28637 |
| Citation | 160 N.E.3d 777,2020 Ohio 4931 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio EX REL. Craig A. JONES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Craig A. Jones, appeals from a judgment awarding him damages against Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Board of Education of Dayton City Schools ("Board"). According to Jones, the trial court should have awarded him additional damages because the Board failed to send him nonrenewal notices after his employment was reinstated by operation of law. In addition, Jones argues that the trial court erred by failing to award him attorney fees.
{¶ 2} In its cross-appeal, the Board contends that the trial court's damages award was incorrect, because it included compensation and benefits that did not fit within the meaning of "increments" under R.C. 3313.22(A).
{¶ 3} For the reasons discussed below, Jones was not entitled to additional damages based on Board's failure to send him further notices of nonrenewal pursuant to R.C. 3313.22(A) after he was reemployed by operation of law. Under the statute, Jones was entitled to only a one-year term of reemployment. The trial court did err, however, in failing to award Jones attorney fees based on the Board's violation of R.C. 121.22(F). Neither prong of R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a) applied, and the court therefore abused its discretion by finding that Jones was not entitled to attorney fees. Finally, the trial court erred in adding damages that were not statutorily authorized under R.C. 3313.22(A), which allows recovery only of Jones's salary and increments. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this cause will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶ 4} This case is before us for the second time, following our reversal of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Board and a remand for further proceedings. See State ex rel. Jones v. Bd. of Edn. of Dayton Pub. Schools , 2018-Ohio-676, 96 N.E.3d 333 (2d Dist.). A detailed history of this case can be found in our prior opinion. For purposes of this appeal, we note that the Board employed Jones as Treasurer pursuant to a three-year contract that began on August 1, 2013, and was to end on July 31, 2016, unless terminated earlier based on various criteria in the contract. Id. at ¶ 5.
{¶ 5} Instead of terminating the contract, the Board held a special meeting in February 2016 and voted not to renew the contract. Id. at ¶ 8. Jones subsequently brought an action for mandamus and declaratory judgment against the Board, claiming that the Board had failed to comply with statutory requirements in R.C. 3313.16 and R.C. 121.22 (Ohio's Sunshine Law) and with the Board's own policies. The trial court rendered summary judgment in the Board's favor, but, on appeal, we disagreed with the trial court.
{¶ 6} First, we held that the Board clearly violated R.C. 3313.16 and its own polices with respect to notice for a special meeting to be held on February 26, 2016. Id. at ¶ 23. We recounted numerous violations, which were matters that the Board easily could have avoided, since they involved the Board's own policies and a statute that was clear. Id. at ¶ 23-26. However, we held that the Board was not liable, based on case law indicating that liability does not lie where a party shows substantial compliance that does not cause prejudice. Our conclusion was based on the fact that Jones had actual notice of the special meeting and therefore could not have been prejudiced by the deficiencies. Id. at ¶ 27-28.
{¶ 7} Violation of the Ohio Sunshine Law involved a different analysis, however. On this point, we held that the Board's notice of the special meeting failed to comply with R.C. 121.22(F) because it Id. at ¶ 47, quoting Doc. #16, Stipulations at No. 3 and Ex. C-1 attached to the Stipulations.
{¶ 8} We stressed that Id. at ¶ 51. See also id. at ¶ 56. One stated reason for this conclusion was as follows:
In fact, the true purpose for the meeting was other than stated, as the Board president knew that the Board was not going to consider recommendations of the superintendent or treasurer with respect to public employees. Considering any such recommendations was obviously not contemplated, since the Board intended to consider these employees' own contracts. The superintendent or treasurer would hardly have recommended nonrenewal of their own contracts. Furthermore, the Board president knew prior to the issuance of the notice that the meeting's purpose was to discuss nonrenewal of the contracts of the treasurer and superintendent. Doc. # 18, Affidavit of Dr. Adil T. Baguirov, ¶ 5.
{¶ 9} We further stated that:
{¶ 10} Because R.C. 121.22(H) requires invalidation of actions taken at meetings that violate the Open Meetings Act, we held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Board. Id. at ¶ 67-68. We therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 85.
{¶ 11} After the case was remanded, the trial court stayed the action for a short time because the Board had appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. However, on June 20, 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept the appeal for review.
State ex rel. Jones v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. , 153 Ohio St.3d 1403, 2018-Ohio-2380, 100 N.E.3d 423. The trial court then resumed consideration of the case.
{¶ 12} After holding a pretrial hearing, the court referred the case to a magistrate for a decision on all remaining matters in the case. The magistrate set deadlines for completing discovery and filing summary judgment motions.
{¶ 13} On February 11, 2019, the Board filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Jones's recovery, after setoff, should be limited to $42,345.78. The Board also argued that Jones was not entitled to recover attorney fees. See Board Motion for Summary Judgment.
{¶ 14} On the same day, Jones also filed a motion for summary judgment. His position was that he was entitled to three years of compensation (the initial automatic renewal for 2016-2017, plus two additional years), minus setoffs, or a total of $173,617.70. This was based on the Board's failure to provide any notice for the years after 2016 of an intent not to renew his contract. In addition, Jones contended that he was entitled by statute to attorney fees.
{¶ 15} On June 7, 2019, the magistrate filed a decision concluding that under the language in R.C. 3313.22, Jones was entitled only to the amount of his base pay, minus set-offs, for one year, and to the standard 14% contribution to the State Employees Retirement System ("SERS"). These damages totaled $42,345.78. In addition, the magistrate found that, while the Board based its application of the special meeting notice on ordinary principles of law, there was no showing that the Board believed it was serving public policy. As a result, the magistrate concluded that Jones was entitled to attorney fees. Magistrate's Decision, p. 12.
{¶ 16} Both sides filed objections to the magistrate's decision and filed memoranda and reply memoranda supporting their positions. After reviewing the record, the trial court overruled Jones's objections in part and sustained them in part on November 14, 2019. See Entry and Order * * * ("Original Entry"). The court held that Jones was only entitled to a one-year renewal contract, but concluded that additional amounts ("increments") should be added to the damages. The court also sustained the Board's objections, concluding that Jones was not entitled to attorney fees...
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