State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Terte, 36394.

• Decision Date: 12 September 1939
• Docket Number: No. 36394.,36394.
• Citation: 131 S.W.2d 587
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI at the relation of KANSAS CITY BRIDGE COMPANY, a Corporation, Relator, v. BEN TERTE, Judge of Division Nine of the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

131 S.W.2d 587 STATE OF MISSOURI at the relation of KANSAS CITY BRIDGE COMPANY, a Corporation, Relator,
v.
BEN TERTE, Judge of Division Nine of the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit. No. 36394. Supreme Court of Missouri. Division Two, September 12, 1939.^*

Prohibition.

PROVISIONAL RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.

Lathrop, Crane, Reynolds, Sawyer & Mersereau, Richard S. Righter, R. Arch Smith and William A. Graham for relator.

(1) The respondent is acting in excess of his powers because the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for compensation, including the question whether Cora A. Liechty was the wife of Lewis Edwin Liechty at the time of his death. State ex rel. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 120 S.W. 740; R.S. 1929, secs. 3301, 3310, 3319, 3342; Kemper v. Gluck, 39 S.W. (2d) 330; Pfitzinger to the Use of Stotscky v. Shell Pine Line Corp., 46 S.W. (2d) 955, 226 Mo. App. 86; Sylcox v. Natl. Lead Co., 38 S.W. (2d) 497, 225 Mo. App. 543; 71 C.J. 1480, sec. 1488; Kemmerling v. Koch Erecting Co., 89 S.W. (2d) 674; Cotter v. Valentine Coal Co., 14 S.W. (2d) 660; Delfelder v. Norton Bros. Const. Co., 98 S.W. (2d) 127; State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Comm., 8 S.W. (2d) 897; Caldwell v. Kreis & Sons, 72 S.W. (2d) 201; Ribas v. Stone & Webster Eng. Corp., 95 S.W. (2d) 1221; Denning v. Star Pub. Co., 180 N.E. 685; Reed v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 95 S.W. (2d) 887; Warren v. Amer. Car & Foundry Co., 38 S.W. (2d) 718, 327 Mo. 755; Northern States Contracting Co. v. Swope, 111 S.W. (2d) 610, 271 Ky. 140. (a) The declaratory judgment law does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the circuit court nor authorize it to infringe upon the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Mo. Declaratory Judgment Act, Laws 1935, p. 218, secs. 1, 6; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, 156; Updike Inv. Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 258 N.W. 470; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Savoy Grill, 1 N.E. (2d) 946; Moore v. Louisville Hydro-Electric Co., 10 S.W. (2d) 466; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State Highway Comm., 17 S.W. (2d) 535; Stewart v. Herten, 249 N.W. 552. (b) Having invoked the jurisdiction of the commission, the plaintiff cannot be heard to deny that the commission has jurisdiction to pass upon the issues relevant to her claim. Oren v. Swift & Co., 51 S.W. (2d) 59. (2) Cora A. Liechty's action in the Jackson County Circuit Court is a collateral attack upon the final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, regular on its face, which circuit court has no jurisdiction to entertain. Lieber v. Lieber, 143 S.W. 458, 239 Mo. 1; Ray v. Ray, 50 S.W. (2d) 142, 330 Mo. 530; McDermott v. Gray, 198 Mo. 266, 95 S.W. 435; Barrett v. Barrett, 79 S.W. (2d) 506; Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 450; Keena v. Keena, 10 S.W. (2d) 344; Howard v. Strode, 146 S.W. 792; Reger v. Reger, 293 S.W. 414; Adamson v. Snider, 131 Kan. 284, 291 Pac. 744; Kaufmann v. Annuity Realty Co., 301 Mo. 638; In re Sisk, 305 Mo. 328; State ex rel. Johnson v. Merchants & Miners Bank, 279 Mo. 228. (a) The court has no jurisdiction under the declaratory judgment act to readjudicate matters already finally determined. Feree v. Feree, 115 S.W. (2d) 1055, 273 Ky. 238; Back's Guardian v. Bardo, 27 S.W. (2d) 960, 234 Ky. 211. (3) Since an action is pending before the Compensation Commission, a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, to permit the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction would result in the undue harassment of relator. Bartlett v. Littrell, 26 S.W. (2d) 768; State ex rel. Ingenbohs v. Landis, 158 S.W. 883; State ex rel. Sullivan v. Reynolds, 107 S.W. 487; Maclane v. Wayne County Judge, 52 Mich. 259, 18 N.W. 396.

Cowgill & Popham, Guy Green, Jr., Clinton R. Krimminger and W. Porter Bondies for respondent.

(1) Declaratory judgment suit proper proceeding to determine plaintiff's status. Laws 1935, p. 218, sec. 1097; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, p. 625, chap. 3, p. 391; 43 Har. Law Rev., p. 479; Dodge v. Campbell, 220 N.Y. Supp. 262; Baumann v. Baumann, 226 N.Y. Supp. 576; Gold v. Gold, 275 N.Y. Supp. 506; Pignatelli v. Pignatelli, 8 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 10; Baumann v. Baumann, 165 N.E. 819; Lowe v. Lowe, 192 N.E. 291; Miller v. Currie, 242 N.W. 570; Henry v. Henry, 144 Atl. 18. (2) Declaratory Judgment Act plaintiff's only remedy because plaintiff may not pursue any other action since the party obtaining the divorce is dead. Jonsson v. Erickson, 108 Kan. 580, 196 Pac. 435; Adamson v. Snider, 131 Kan. 284, 291 Pac. 744; Dodge v. Campbell, 220 N.Y. Supp. 262; Baumann v. Baumann, 226 N.Y. Supp. 576; Gold v. Gold, 275 N.Y. Supp. 506; Miller v. Currie, 242 N.W. 570; Henry v. Henry, 144 Atl. 18; Lieber v. Lieber, 143 S.W. 458. (3) Compensation Commission has no jurisdiction to go behind divorce...