State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey
| Jurisdiction | Oregon |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | TONGUE |
| Citation | State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey, 575 P.2d 981, 281 Or. 453 (Or. 1978) |
| Decision Date | 28 February 1978 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon ex rel. Sheridean Deborah KARR, Petitioner, v. Douglas W. SHOREY, Respondent. |
Dean Heiling, Roseburg, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent.
Al Laue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., W. Michael Gillette, Sol. Gen., and John W. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem.
This is a proceeding to set aside a paternity decree declaring defendant to be the father of plaintiff's illegitimate child and ordering him to pay $50 per month child support.
Defendant filed a "special appearance motion" to set aside that decree upon the ground that the court had no personal jurisdiction over him, supported by affidavits to the effect that despite the fact that he signed both a paternity agreement and a stipulation for entry of an order establishing paternity, that stipulation was "undated," and that defendant had "no notice" of paternity proceedings filed subsequently and no opportunity to appear and contest the paternity claim. 1 The trial court denied that motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. 30 Or.App. 137, 567 P.2d 118 (1977), with a dissenting opinion by Thornton, J. We granted review because of the public importance of this case as it reflects upon the validity of such paternity agreements and stipulations.
The paternity agreement and stipulation were as follows:
PATERNITY AGREEMENT
WHEREAS Sheridean Deborah Karr alleges that she gave birth to a () (male)
child named Scott D. Karr on the 7th day of April, 1969, in the City of
Roseburg, County of Douglas, State of Oregon; and
WHEREAS the said Sheridean Deborah Karr names Douglas W. Shorey as the
fater of said child; and
WHEREAS it is the desire of Sheridean Deborah Karr and Douglas W. Shorey to
enter into and agreement providing for the support and acknowledgment of the
paternity of said child;
NOW THEREFORE, It Is Hereby Agreed by and between Sheridean Deborah Karr
and Douglas W. Shorey that the sais Douglas W. Shorey hereby acknowledges
that he is the fater of said child and agrees to pay the sum of $50.00 to be
made on or before the 1st day of majority, is emancipated, or until further
order of this Court.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 1969.
WITNESSES:
/s/ James R. Warren s/s Sheridean Deborah Karr
DATED this 22nd day of May, 1969.
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF
WHEREAS a Court Proceeding has been instituted by by Sheridean Deborah
Karr, Plaintiff, against Douglas W. Shorey, Defendant, for the purpose of
establishing paterntiy and requiring said Defendant to pay support money for
Scott D. Karr, a child(ren) born out of wedlock; and
WHEREAS the parties desire to settle the matter without dispute;
Deborad Karr and Douglas W. Shorey that an order based upon an agreement
attached hereto and made a part hereof be entered in this matter establishing
paternity and allowing support for said child(ren).
/s/ Douglas W. Shorey
Defendant
/s/ Sheridean Deborah Karr
Plaintiff
/s/ Eugene E. Laird
Welfare Recovery Division Both documents were on printed forms and were apparently signed at the same time prior to the filing of the complaint, which was not personally served upon defendant, and also prior to the entry of the order establishing paternity on June 4, 1969, at which time defendant was not personally present. It appears, however, that defendant made monthly payments of $50 each for the months of July and August 1969 and $20 in September 1969, after which he apparently made no further payments. Contempt proceedings for failure to make such payments were served personally upon the defendant on February 10, 1973, but were not prosecuted to any conclusion. In any event, defendant took no action to set aside that order until May 29, 1975.
During the course of defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant's primary contention was that the trial court erred in ruling that a "confession of judgment" prior to institution of suit dispenses with constitutional notice requirements and in ruling that the "confession of judgment" in this case complied with Oregon law. The state contended, to the contrary, that defendant's signing of the paternity agreement and stipulation constituted an "appearance" and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon the court to enter such an order.
The majority opinion by the Court of Appeals proceeds upon the premise that "(u)nder ORS 15.030, the only means by which a court may obtain personal jurisdiction are service of process or voluntary appearance" and that, there having been no service of process, "(t)he issue, therefore, is whether, by signing those documents, or either of them, defendant made a voluntary appearance." The majority then undertakes to demonstrate that the signing of these documents, under these facts, did not constitute either a "voluntary appearance" or an appearance by "confession of judgment," under ORS 26.040 and 26.120. Based upon that reasoning it was held by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals that "(c)onsequently, the court lacked jurisdiction over (defendant's) person and the order (of paternity) must be vacated." 2 We disagree.
In advance of oral argument on this petition for review, the parties were requested by letter to be prepared to submit argument on the following questions:
ORS 15.030, by its provisions for personal service and voluntary appearance, was not intended to limit the means of acquiring personal jurisdiction to personal service and voluntary appearance. 3 Cf. Thoenes v. Tatro, 270 Or. 775, 780, 529 P.2d 912 (1974).
As stated in Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure 39-41 (1922), as quoted with approval in the leading case of Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 354, 174 N.E. 706, 707-08, 73 A.L.R. 1453 (1931):
" "
See also Aiutana Bankgenossenschaft v. Perren, 21 Conn.Supp. 5, 141 A.2d 255 (1957), again quoting Scott.
To the same effect, as stated in Restatement of Judgments § 18, Comment c (1942):
"A person may agree that if an action is brought against him the court shall have jurisdiction over him, even though he is not served with process in the action. * * *"
As also stated in James, Civil Procedure 626-27, § 12.6 (1965):
* * *"
See also 3 Freeman on Judgments 3053, § 1487 (1925). Cf. Stites v. McGee, 37 Or. 574, 576-77, 61 P. 1129 (1900).
Of particular significance, in our judgment, is the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972), because of its consideration of the constitutional problem of due process. In that case Overmyer, a corporation, after defaulting in payments owed by it to Frick, executed a "cognovit note" to Frick for $130,997. That note included the following provision:
"The undersigned hereby authorize any attorney designated by the Holder hereof to appear in any court of record in the State of Ohio, and waive this issuance and service of process, and confess a judgment against the undersigned in favor of the Holder of this Note, for the principal of this Note plus interest if the undersigned defaults in any payment of principal and interest and if said default shall continue for the period of fifteen (15) days."
After failure by Overmyer to make payments due under that note, Overmyer filed in New York an action against Frick for $170,000 in damages and to stay all proceedings under the note. Frick then, without notice to Overmyer, and under the "cognovit" provision of the note, caused judgment to be entered in Ohio against Overmyer for $62,370, the balance due under the note, plus interest and costs. Overmyer then filed a motion in the Ohio case to stay execution under that judgment and for a new trial, based upon a tendered answer and counterclaim alleging breach of contract by Frick and damages. The Ohio court overruled that motion. That ruling was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
In so holding, the court (405 U.S. at 183-84, 92 S.Ct. 775) rejected the contention that the Ohio judgment was invalid...
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Hayes, In re
...that the trial court had authority to vacate the judgment irrespective of the applicability of ORCP 71. See State ex rel Karr v. Shorey, 281 Or. 453, 466, 575 P.2d 981 (1978) (court has inherent authority to vacate a judgment based on invalidity of consent and lack of notice and opportunity......
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MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF ADAMS
...as the basis for his motion. Judgments awarded by courts lacking personal jurisdiction are void. State ex rel. Karrv. Shorey, 281 Or. 453, 466, 575 P.2d 981 (1978). We therefore consider husband's motion as raised under ORCP 71 B(1)(d), the provision pertaining to void judgments. See Pacifi......
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MATTER OF DUNCAN
...the party sought to be bound. See State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey, 30 Or.App. 137, 142, 567 P.2d 118 (1977), rev'd on other grounds 281 Or. 453, 575 P.2d 981 (1978). Summons must be served on the defending party pursuant to ORCP 7 D in order to acquire personal jurisdiction. ORCP 4; Baker v. F......
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Riddle's Estate, Matter of
...(1957). Personal jurisdiction may be obtained by service of summons, by voluntary appearance, or by consent. State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey, 281 Or. 453, 461, 578 P.2d 981 (1978). Service of summons is controlled by ORS chapter 15. ORS 15.120 provides that a defendant may be served summons by......