State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey

JurisdictionOregon
CourtOregon Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtTONGUE
CitationState ex rel. Karr v. Shorey, 575 P.2d 981, 281 Or. 453 (Or. 1978)
Decision Date28 February 1978
PartiesSTATE of Oregon ex rel. Sheridean Deborah KARR, Petitioner, v. Douglas W. SHOREY, Respondent.

Dean Heiling, Roseburg, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent.

Al Laue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., W. Michael Gillette, Sol. Gen., and John W. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem.

TONGUE, Justice.

This is a proceeding to set aside a paternity decree declaring defendant to be the father of plaintiff's illegitimate child and ordering him to pay $50 per month child support.

Defendant filed a "special appearance motion" to set aside that decree upon the ground that the court had no personal jurisdiction over him, supported by affidavits to the effect that despite the fact that he signed both a paternity agreement and a stipulation for entry of an order establishing paternity, that stipulation was "undated," and that defendant had "no notice" of paternity proceedings filed subsequently and no opportunity to appear and contest the paternity claim. 1 The trial court denied that motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. 30 Or.App. 137, 567 P.2d 118 (1977), with a dissenting opinion by Thornton, J. We granted review because of the public importance of this case as it reflects upon the validity of such paternity agreements and stipulations.

The paternity agreement and stipulation were as follows:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

For the County of Douglas

STATE OF OREGON ex rel

SHERIDEAN DEBORAH KARR,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DOUGLAS W. SHOREY,

Defendant.

No.

PATERNITY AGREEMENT

WHEREAS Sheridean Deborah Karr alleges that she gave birth to a () (male)

child named Scott D. Karr on the 7th day of April, 1969, in the City of

Roseburg, County of Douglas, State of Oregon; and

WHEREAS the said Sheridean Deborah Karr names Douglas W. Shorey as the

fater of said child; and

WHEREAS it is the desire of Sheridean Deborah Karr and Douglas W. Shorey to

enter into and agreement providing for the support and acknowledgment of the

paternity of said child;

NOW THEREFORE, It Is Hereby Agreed by and between Sheridean Deborah Karr

and Douglas W. Shorey that the sais Douglas W. Shorey hereby acknowledges

that he is the fater of said child and agrees to pay the sum of $50.00 to be

made on or before the 1st day of majority, is emancipated, or until further

order of this Court.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 1969.

WITNESSES:

/s/ James R. Warren s/s Sheridean Deborah Karr

DATED this 22nd day of May, 1969.

WITNESSES:

/s/ James R. Warren s/s Douglas W. Shorey

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

For the County of Douglas

STATE OF OREGON ex rel

SHERIDEAN DEBORAH KARR,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DOUGLAS W. SHOREY,

Defendant.

No.

STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF

AN ORDER ESTABLISHING PATERNITY

WHEREAS a Court Proceeding has been instituted by by Sheridean Deborah

Karr, Plaintiff, against Douglas W. Shorey, Defendant, for the purpose of

establishing paterntiy and requiring said Defendant to pay support money for

Scott D. Karr, a child(ren) born out of wedlock; and

WHEREAS the parties desire to settle the matter without dispute;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED TO between Sheridean

Deborad Karr and Douglas W. Shorey that an order based upon an agreement

attached hereto and made a part hereof be entered in this matter establishing

paternity and allowing support for said child(ren).

/s/ Douglas W. Shorey

Defendant

/s/ Sheridean Deborah Karr

Plaintiff

/s/ Eugene E. Laird

Assistant Attorney General

Welfare Recovery Division Both documents were on printed forms and were apparently signed at the same time prior to the filing of the complaint, which was not personally served upon defendant, and also prior to the entry of the order establishing paternity on June 4, 1969, at which time defendant was not personally present. It appears, however, that defendant made monthly payments of $50 each for the months of July and August 1969 and $20 in September 1969, after which he apparently made no further payments. Contempt proceedings for failure to make such payments were served personally upon the defendant on February 10, 1973, but were not prosecuted to any conclusion. In any event, defendant took no action to set aside that order until May 29, 1975.

During the course of defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant's primary contention was that the trial court erred in ruling that a "confession of judgment" prior to institution of suit dispenses with constitutional notice requirements and in ruling that the "confession of judgment" in this case complied with Oregon law. The state contended, to the contrary, that defendant's signing of the paternity agreement and stipulation constituted an "appearance" and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon the court to enter such an order.

The majority opinion by the Court of Appeals proceeds upon the premise that "(u)nder ORS 15.030, the only means by which a court may obtain personal jurisdiction are service of process or voluntary appearance" and that, there having been no service of process, "(t)he issue, therefore, is whether, by signing those documents, or either of them, defendant made a voluntary appearance." The majority then undertakes to demonstrate that the signing of these documents, under these facts, did not constitute either a "voluntary appearance" or an appearance by "confession of judgment," under ORS 26.040 and 26.120. Based upon that reasoning it was held by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals that "(c)onsequently, the court lacked jurisdiction over (defendant's) person and the order (of paternity) must be vacated." 2 We disagree.

In advance of oral argument on this petition for review, the parties were requested by letter to be prepared to submit argument on the following questions:

"1. Did the defendant's signing of the stipulation and paternity agreement amount to a consent to enter judgment against him?

"2. Did the signed stipulation and paternity agreement constitute a general appearance, conferring personal jurisdiction on the trial court?"

ORS 15.030, by its provisions for personal service and voluntary appearance, was not intended to limit the means of acquiring personal jurisdiction to personal service and voluntary appearance. 3 Cf. Thoenes v. Tatro, 270 Or. 775, 780, 529 P.2d 912 (1974).

As stated in Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure 39-41 (1922), as quoted with approval in the leading case of Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 354, 174 N.E. 706, 707-08, 73 A.L.R. 1453 (1931):

" 'Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired by his consent. This consent may be given either before or after action has been brought. Jurisdiction is conferred when the defendant enters a general appearance in an action, that is, an appearance for some purpose other than that of raising the objection of lack of jurisdiction over him. A stipulation waiving service has the same effect. The defendant may, before suit is brought, give a power of attorney to confess judgment or appoint an agent to accept service, or agree that service by any other method shall be sufficient. The defendant in all these cases has submitted to the control of the state and of the court over him. These principles have long been announced by the courts.' "

See also Aiutana Bankgenossenschaft v. Perren, 21 Conn.Supp. 5, 141 A.2d 255 (1957), again quoting Scott.

To the same effect, as stated in Restatement of Judgments § 18, Comment c (1942):

"A person may agree that if an action is brought against him the court shall have jurisdiction over him, even though he is not served with process in the action. * * *"

As also stated in James, Civil Procedure 626-27, § 12.6 (1965):

"Consent to the jurisdiction of any given tribunal may also be given by an agreement between the parties governing disputes which may arise under the agreement in the future. Such stipulations are given effect where they are not unconscionable. * * *"

See also 3 Freeman on Judgments 3053, § 1487 (1925). Cf. Stites v. McGee, 37 Or. 574, 576-77, 61 P. 1129 (1900).

Of particular significance, in our judgment, is the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972), because of its consideration of the constitutional problem of due process. In that case Overmyer, a corporation, after defaulting in payments owed by it to Frick, executed a "cognovit note" to Frick for $130,997. That note included the following provision:

"The undersigned hereby authorize any attorney designated by the Holder hereof to appear in any court of record in the State of Ohio, and waive this issuance and service of process, and confess a judgment against the undersigned in favor of the Holder of this Note, for the principal of this Note plus interest if the undersigned defaults in any payment of principal and interest and if said default shall continue for the period of fifteen (15) days."

After failure by Overmyer to make payments due under that note, Overmyer filed in New York an action against Frick for $170,000 in damages and to stay all proceedings under the note. Frick then, without notice to Overmyer, and under the "cognovit" provision of the note, caused judgment to be entered in Ohio against Overmyer for $62,370, the balance due under the note, plus interest and costs. Overmyer then filed a motion in the Ohio case to stay execution under that judgment and for a new trial, based upon a tendered answer and counterclaim alleging breach of contract by Frick and damages. The Ohio court overruled that motion. That ruling was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.

In so holding, the court (405 U.S. at 183-84, 92 S.Ct. 775) rejected the contention that the Ohio judgment was invalid...

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6 cases
  • Hayes, In re
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 21 Abril 1999
    ...that the trial court had authority to vacate the judgment irrespective of the applicability of ORCP 71. See State ex rel Karr v. Shorey, 281 Or. 453, 466, 575 P.2d 981 (1978) (court has inherent authority to vacate a judgment based on invalidity of consent and lack of notice and opportunity......
  • MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF ADAMS
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 28 Marzo 2001
    ...as the basis for his motion. Judgments awarded by courts lacking personal jurisdiction are void. State ex rel. Karrv. Shorey, 281 Or. 453, 466, 575 P.2d 981 (1978). We therefore consider husband's motion as raised under ORCP 71 B(1)(d), the provision pertaining to void judgments. See Pacifi......
  • MATTER OF DUNCAN
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 23 Febrero 2000
    ...the party sought to be bound. See State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey, 30 Or.App. 137, 142, 567 P.2d 118 (1977), rev'd on other grounds 281 Or. 453, 575 P.2d 981 (1978). Summons must be served on the defending party pursuant to ORCP 7 D in order to acquire personal jurisdiction. ORCP 4; Baker v. F......
  • Riddle's Estate, Matter of
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 18 Marzo 1980
    ...(1957). Personal jurisdiction may be obtained by service of summons, by voluntary appearance, or by consent. State ex rel. Karr v. Shorey, 281 Or. 453, 461, 578 P.2d 981 (1978). Service of summons is controlled by ORS chapter 15. ORS 15.120 provides that a defendant may be served summons by......
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