State ex rel. Kemper v. St. Louis

Citation9 Mo.App. 532
PartiesSTATE OF MISSOURI, EX REL. HENRY KEMPER, Respondent, v. THE ST. LOUIS, KANSAS CITY, AND NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
Decision Date08 February 1881
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

1. Where a municipal corporation has, in the due exercise of a power conferred upon it by the Legislature, assessed and levied a tax upon certain property within its limits, the Legislature may, by an act retrospective in its terms, and which takes effect before such tax becomes due, annul the assessment so made, and vest in another body the power to make the assessment for that year.

2. The act “to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes on bridges owned by joint-stock companies, and property and franchises owned by telegraph and express companies,” is not a special law within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition against the passage of local or special laws.

3. Sect. 15 of the Bill of Rights was not intended to prohibit the passage of retrospective acts which do not disturb rights of a private character.

APPEAL from the St. Charles Circuit Court, EDWARDS, J.

Reversed, and judgment.

WELLS H. BLODGETT and GEORGE S. GROVER, for the appellant: The purposes for which counties and cities may levy and collect taxes, and the time and manner in which property may be assessed and taxed by municipal authorities, are under the absolute control of the Legislature, and no city or county can acquire any vested right to any particular portion of its revenue, or to any particular assessment, or method of assessment, which cannot be controlled, modified, or taken away by the Legislature.--Dill. on Mun. Corp. 147, 148, sects. 35, 36; Cooley on Tax. 34; Burr. on Tax. 2; Hill. on Tax. 3, 4, sect. 3; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; Guilford v. Chenango County, 13 N. Y. 149; The People v. Mayor, 4 Comst. 419; The State ex rel. v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378; Pacific R. Co. v. Watson, 61 Mo. 57.

C. DAUDT, T. S. CUNNINGHAM, and F. W. HINMAN, for the respondent: Retrospective enactments are not valid.--Const., Art. II., sect. 15. The passage of special laws is prohibited.--Const., Art. IV., sect. 53. When the power of taxation has been once conferred on a corporation, the corporate authorities alone have the right to exercise it, and the Legislature creating the corporation cannot vest the whole or any part of that taxing power in any other body.--Dill. on Mun. Corp., chap. 5, sect. 64; Railroad Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176; Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Gratt. 387. When the General Assembly has authorized a municipal corporation to acquire revenue by taxation for its local and corporate needs, its (the General Assembly) constitutional power over local taxation in that political subdivision of the State has been exhausted, and all taxes levied and collected for the use of that municipality must be levied and collected by the local authorities.-- Const. Mo., Art. X., sects. 1, 10; Howard v. Drainage Co., 51 Ill. 130; Dill. on Mun. Corp., chap. 19, sects. 590, 592; chap. 4, sect. 38; chap. 5, sects. 55, 64.THOMPSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

In April, 1877, the local authorities of St. Charles city and county, Missouri, assessed all the property of the St. Charles Bridge Company in said city and county for the year 1877 at a valuation of $200,000, under the provisions of the general revenue-law of the State, and levied taxes thereupon. The taxes so assessed and levied became due and payable on August 1, 1877, and were payable without penalty thereon at any time prior to January 1, 1878. On the twenty-first day of April, 1877, the Legislature passed an act entitled “An act to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes on bridges owned by joint-stock companies, and property and franchises owned by telegraph and express companies.” Acts 1877, p. 391. The provisions of this act which are material to this controversy are as follows:--

Sect. 1. All bridges over streams in this State, or over streams dividing this State from other States, owned by joint-stock companies, and all such bridges where a toll is charged for crossing the same, which are now constructed, which are in the course of construction, or which shall hereafter be constructed, and all property, real and personal, including the franchises owned by telegraph and express companies, shall be subject to taxation for State, county, municipal, and other local purposes, to the same extent as property of private persons, and taxes levied thereon shall be levied and collected in the manner as is now or may hereafter be provided by law for the taxation of railroad property in this State; and County Courts and the county and State boards of equalization are hereby required to perform the same duties, and are given the same powers in the assessing, equalizing, and adjusting the taxes on the property set forth in this section, as the said courts and boards of equalization have, or may hereafter be empowered with, in the assessing, equalizing, and adjusting the taxes on railroad property; and the president or other chief officer of any such bridge, telegraph, or express company, or the owner of any such toll-bridge, is hereby required to render statements of the property of such bridge, telegraph, or express company, in like manner as the president or other chief officer of railroad companies is now or may hereafter be required to render for the taxation of railroad property.

Sect. 2. In case any such bridge, or the property or franchises of any telegraph and express company, shall have been subjected to taxation, prior to the passage of this act, for any year for which it shall not have been assessed and paid taxes, or if any such property having been assessed, and from any irregularity in the assessment, or from any cause, the taxes thereon have not been paid, then a separate return for each year for which taxes have not been paid shall be made, as required by the law governing the taxation of railroad property.”

This statute contained no emergency clause, and hence did not take effect until July 30, 1877; but it is perceived that it took effect two days before August 1, 1877--that is, before the taxes thus levied by the local authorities of St. Charles city and county became payable. The taxes so levied upon the assessment aforesaid were not paid by the Bridge Company, nor by the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern Railway Company, which became the owner of the property so assessed. In the month of May of the following year (1878), the State board of equalization, proceeding under the statute before set out, made a new assessment of the property in question for the year 1877, at a valuation of $150,000. On July 23d of the same year the County Court of St. Charles levied taxes for State and county purposes, and municipal purposes as to the city of St. Charles, upon the assessment thus made by the State board of equalization. The taxes so levied were paid in full by the defendant, the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern Railway Company. Notwithstanding they have done this, the county collector brings this suit to recover the difference between the county and municipal taxes for the year 1877, extended on the valuation of $200,000, as fixed in the first assessment, and the tax which the defendant paid upon the valuation of $150,000, as fixed by the State board of equalization. The parties have filed a stipulation setting forth, in substance, the above facts, and agreeing that if the former assessment shall be adjudged valid the judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff, whereas if the latter assessment is adjudged valid it shall be entered for the defendant.

We are therefore to decide whether the latter assessment superseded the former; and in support of his position that it did not, the plaintiff presses upon us three considerations: First, that the act of April 21, 1877, cannot be allowed to have the effect of vacating the antecedent assessment and levy, because to give it this effect would make it obnoxious to that clause of the Constitution of the State which forbids the passage of retrospective laws. Const., Art. II., sect. 15. Second, that the act in question is obnoxious to that clause of the Constitution which forbids special legislation. Art. IV., sect. 53. Third, that, having conferred upon the corporate authorities of St. Charles county and city a given power of taxation, it was not competent to the...

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5 cases
  • State ex rel. McKittrick v. Bair
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 23 Junio 1933
    ... ... 385; ... State ex rel. Sekyra v. Schmoll, 313 Mo. 706; ... State ex rel. Daily Record v. Hartman, 299 Mo. 410; ... State ex rel. Kemper v. Ry. Co., 79 Mo. 420; ... State ex rel. Kemper v. Ry. Co., 9 Mo.App. 532; ... State ex inf. Barker v. Southern, 265 Mo. 275; ... Forgrave ... taxes is penalty. St. Francis Levee District v ... Dorroh, 316 Mo. 398; also, 316 Mo. 413; Eyerman v ... Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145; St. Louis to use, etc. v ... Allen, 53 Mo. 44. (5) Interest, costs and commissions ... added for nonpayment of taxes is recognized as penalty both ... by ... ...
  • Brady v. Kansas City, St. Louis & Chicago Railroad Company
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    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 6 Noviembre 1907
    ... ... 363; Parks ... v. Railroad, 178 Mo. 120; Bertram v. Railroad, ... 154 Mo. 654; State ex rel. v. Branch, 151 Mo. 636; ... Bank v. Hatch, 98 Mo. 378; Farber v ... Railroad, 139 ... ...
  • Pickton v. City of Fargo
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    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 1 Noviembre 1901
    ... ... and laid. Upon this point, see State v. Railway ... Co. , 9 Mo.App. 532; Gravel Road Co. v ... Sleeth , ... ...
  • State ex rel. Little v. Donnelly
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Febrero 1881
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