State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Employment Relations Bd., No. 2011–0441.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 130 Ohio St.3d 333,958 N.E.2d 169,2011 -Ohio- 5519
• Decision Date: 01 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2011–0441.
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. KINGSLEY, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.

130 Ohio St.3d 333
2011 -Ohio- 5519
958 N.E.2d 169

The STATE ex rel. KINGSLEY, Appellant,
v.
STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.

No. 2011–0441.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 6, 2011.Decided Nov. 1, 2011.

[958 N.E.2d 170]

Kingsley Law Office and James R. Kingsley, Circleville, for appellant.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Michael C. McPhillips, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

[Ohio St.3d 333] {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint of appellant, Kay A. Kingsley, a former administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for appellee, State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”), for a writ of mandamus to declare Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 of the 128th General Assembly (“H.B. 1”) unconstitutional and to compel SERB to recognize Kingsley as a classified employee and reinstate her to her former position. Because Kingsley had an adequate remedy at law by way of her civil-service appeal to raise her claims, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Facts

{¶ 2} According to Kingsley's complaint for a writ of mandamus, SERB appointed her as an ALJ, which was a classified position, in January 1999. Effective July 17, 2009, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 1, the biennial budget bill. The bill revised R.C. 4117.02(H) by changing the position of SERB ALJ from the classified service to the unclassified service. In October 2009, SERB terminated Kingsley's employment.

{¶ 3} On November 20, 2009, Kingsley filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. She requested that the court of appeals grant a writ of mandamus to declare H.B. 1 unconstitutional as applied to her and to order SERB to recognize her as a classified employee and to reinstate her to her [Ohio St.3d 334] former ALJ position.¹ Kingsley claimed that H.B. 1 is unconstitutional because it violates the one-subject rule, that the bill's amendment to R.C. 4117.02(H) should not be applied retroactively to her, and that the amendment is inapplicable to her because SERB-appointed ALJs like her remained in the classified service. SERB filed a motion to

[958 N.E.2d 171]

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In her memorandum in opposition, Kingsley noted that her complaint raised claims that amended R.C. 4117.02(H) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied and that the amended provision violates R.C. 1.48 if it is applied retroactively to her.

{¶ 4} In February 2011, the court of appeals granted SERB's motion and dismissed Kingsley's mandamus complaint. The court of appeals determined that Kingsley had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of her administrative appeal.

{¶ 5} This cause is now before the court upon Kingsley's appeal as of right.

Legal Analysis

{¶ 6} Kingsley asserts that the court of appeals erred in holding that she has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of her administrative appeal from her termination of employment as a SERB ALJ.

{¶ 7} To be entitled to the writ, Kingsley had to establish a clear legal right to have the amended provision of H.B. 1 reclassifying her position as unclassified declared unconstitutional and to order her reinstated to her classified position as ALJ, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of SERB to provide that relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel. Tempesta v. Warren, 128 Ohio St.3d 463, 2011-Ohio-1525, 946 N.E.2d 208, ¶ 13.

{¶ 8} Kingsley cannot prove either a clear legal right to reinstatement to her former classified position as a SERB ALJ or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of SERB to reinstate her, because, as she concedes, there has been no final determination that she was wrongfully excluded from her employment with SERB. See State ex rel. Ullmann v. Hayes, 103 Ohio St.3d 405, 2004-Ohio-5469, 816 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Baker v. State Personnel Bd. of Rev. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 640, 644, 710 N.E.2d 706.

[Ohio St.3d 335] {¶ 9} We discussed this principle in State ex rel. Weiss v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 470, 605 N.E.2d 37. In Weiss, a former employee of the Industrial Commission who was removed from the classified service and then terminated from her unclassified position petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement and payment of back wages. The former employee challenged the authority for and the constitutionality of her removal from classified service, and she also had appealed her discharge to the State Personnel Board of Review (“SPBR”) and the SPBR's decision dismissing her appeal to the common pleas court. Id.

{¶ 10} We denied the writ because the former commission employee had not received a final determination that her discharge from employment was wrongful:

{¶ 11} “[B]efore a writ of mandamus will issue to compel a classified employee's reinstatement or back pay, there must first be a final determination made in an appeal from SPBR, a local civil service commission, or other quasi-judicial authority that the employee was ‘wrongfully excluded from employment.’ State ex rel. Colangelo v. McFaul (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 200 [201], 16 O.O.3d 239, 404 N.E.2d 745 * * *. Until this determination is made, a ‘wrongful exclu[sion]’ has not occurred, and mandamus does not lie. * * * Thus, mandamus is not available as a substitute for civil service appeals.” Id. at 476–477, 605 N.E.2d 37.

{¶ 12} Similarly, the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Kingsley's mandamus claim here because Kingsley had received no final determination by either SPBR or a court in a further appeal that she had

[958 N.E.2d 172]

been wrongfully terminated from her former...