State ex rel. Knox v. Board of Sup'rs of Grenada County

• Decision Date: 05 October 1925
• Docket Number: 25037
• Citation: 105 So. 541,141 Miss. 701
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KNOX, ATTY. GEN., v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF GRENADA COUNTY. [*]
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

105 So. 541

141 Miss. 701

STATE ex rel. KNOX, ATTY. GEN., v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF GRENADA COUNTY. ^[*]

No. 25037

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 5, 1925

Suggestion Of Error Overruled October 26, 1925.

(In Banc.)

1 COUNTIES. "County" is subject at all times to legislative control, except where specific provision of Constitution governs.

Since the county is a subdivision of the state, created for administrative and other public purposes, and owes its creation to the state, it is subject at all times to legislative control, except where specific provisions of the Constitution govern.

2 CONSTITUTIONAL. Delegation of legislative power to Senate and House of Representatives held to carry all legislative power not withheld by specific constitutional provisions.

By section 33 of the state Constitution of 1890, the legislative authority of the state is vested in the legislature composed of the Senate and House of Representatives; the delegation being In general terms, carries all of the legislative power not withheld by a specific provision of the Constitution.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Counties. Board of county supervisors held to have no jurisdiction except that conferred by Constitution, which legislature cannot change.

Under section 170 of the state Constitution of 1890, each county is divided into five districts, and a resident freeholder from each district is chosen to constitute a board of supervisors, and such a board has full jurisdiction over roads, ferries, and bridges, to be exercised in accordance with regulations prescribed by the legislature, and other duties may be conferred by law. The board has no jurisdiction (except such as conferred by the Constitution) which the Legislature cannot change.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Court may not declare law invalid except when it is clearly in conflict with Constitution.

It is for the legislature to decide what laws are necessary and for the government of the state and of the counties, and it is not for the court to decide whether the law is needed or whether it is wise. It cannot declare a law passed by the legislature invalid, except when it is clearly in conflict with the Constitution.

5 OFFICER. Statute making officer, neglecting or refusing to perform duties required thereby, subject to removal from office, held not in conflict with constitutional provision for removal of officers from office.

Chapter 325 of the Laws of 1924 is not void as being in conflict with section 175 of the Constitution of 1890, providing that officers may be removed upon conviction of crime in office on indictment by the grand jury, as section 6 of the said act does not prescribe the method of removal. The method prescribed by section 175 is to be construed as being the plan contemplated by the statute.

6 OFFICERS. Statute providing for recovery of damages in suit by district attorney held not to conflict with constitutional provision that district attorneys shall have fixed salary.

Said chapter is not in conflict with section 174 of the Constitution of 1890, which provides for district attorneys "whose compensation shall be a fixed salary." The act does not confer upon the district attorney the right to collect fees.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW. Statute providing for supervision of public offices held not to violate constitutional prohibition against officers of one department of government exercising power of another department.

Chapter 325, Laws of 1924, is not in conflict with sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of 1890, providing for the separate departments of government, and prohibiting the officers of one department from exercising the powers of another department.

8. TAXATION. Statute providing for auditing and supervising public offices held not in conflict with constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity in taxation.

Said chapter is not in conflict with section 112 of the Constitution of 1890, providing for equality and uniformity in taxation, as the act does not provide for taxation nor how the moneys for the payment of the amounts required to be paid by counties shall be raised by the counties. It is in no sense a taxation, statute.

9. STATES. Statute providing for supervision and auditing of offices held not appropriation bill.

The said chapter is not an appropriation bill within the meaning of sections 63 and 69 of the state Constitution of 1890. It is an act creating an auditing system and providing for its operation, the expenses of which are provided from appropriations already made or funds already available to the several institutions and departments.

HON. T. L. LAMB, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Grenada county, HON. T. L. LAMB, Judge.

Mandamus by the state, on the relation of Rush H. Knox, attorney-general, against the board of supervisors of Grenada county. From a judgment dismissing the petition, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Harry M. Bryan, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

I. Mandamus is the proper remedy. Section 170 of the Constitution prescribes the jurisdiction of boards of supervisors. Our supreme court, in Monroe County v. Strong, 78 Miss. 565, 29 So. 530, and Jefferson County v. Grafton, 74 Miss. 435, 21 So. 247, has held that county boards have no life, no attributes, no power, no rights, and no obligations, but such as have been conferred or imposed on them. Therefore, if measured by the constitutional provision creating boards of supervisors, it cannot be successfully urged that such duties as prescribed by chapter 325 of the Laws of 1924 are unconstitutional because invading the judiciary. In other words, our contention is here that the act sought to be performed is one over which the defendants have no discretion, but is for the performance of a duty imposed upon them by the legislature within its constiutional power. See also: 7 R. C. L. 927; 15 C. J. 581; Jackson v. Neville, 95 So. 626; Miller, State Auditor, v. Russell, 94 So. 706.

It was held at an early date in Howe v. State, 53 Miss. 57, that in auditing the reports of the county treasurer the board of supervisors acts in a ministerial and nonjudicial capacity. In this case it was held that they had no power to determine what commissions the treasurer should have.

In the leading case of State v. Board of Commissioners of Edmunds County (S. D.), 156 N.W. 96, the case of Jones v. Board of Supervisors (Miss.), 12 So. 341, was cited in support of this view. In the Jones case it was held that a* claim for furniture purchased for a courtroom should have been audited by the court and "certified to the board of supervisors, not for revision or correction or allowance, but that a warrant may be issued to the county treasurer."

The legislature having the power to enforce a duty upon the board of supervisors not involving judicial discretion, the board's refusal to contribute as alleged in the petition, warranted the action of mandamus.

II. The act creating the uniform auditing system is not unconstitutional as making an appropriation without fixing the maximum amount. Chapter 325, Laws of 1924, is not an appropriation bill. The amounts to be collected by the chief inspector from the counties, institutions and officers, for the maintenance of the auditing bureau, are required to be delivered by the chief inspector "to be placed to the credit of the state auditing department fund." The act requires that the chief inspector keep books showing the amounts credited to the institutions, boards of supervisors and officers.

It will be noted that the statute created a state auditing department fund. Similar to the above are the methods employed for checking funds out of the state treasury by the State Highway department, and by the superintendent of banks.

The fund received by the state treasury under this act is in the nature of a trust fund for a specific purpose and is not one that comes to it as the result of direct taxation, such as follows the levy of an ad valorem or excise tax.

III. The act under review is not unconstitutional as depriving such officers of powers and prerogatives, nor of taking away personal liberty? and property rights of the citizens of the State without due process of law. In several grounds of the demurrer, appellees raised the question of the deprivation of local self-government. They urge that the act under which this proceeding was brought, is drastic and harsh in that it takes away personal liberty and property rights of the citizens of the state; that it deprives boards of supervisors of the right to cause an audit to be made of the books of the county officers unless done with the consent of, and by the direction of the chief inspector.

The great burden of appellee's song is that the act is unwise, inexpedient and is a reflection of a tendency that does not comport with good policy.

Our supreme court has, by a long line of cases, consistently held that the wisdom or policy of a statute is not within its jurisdiction, nor can the courts determine such things as belong particularly to the legislative branch of the government. Bobo v. Levee Commissioners, 92 Miss. 792, 46 So. 819; Hamner v. Yazoo Delta Lumber Co., 100 Miss. 349, 56 So. 466; State v. Newman, Lumber Company, 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923; State v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 So. 152; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Darnell v. Johnston, 109 Miss. 570, 68 So. 780.

It was held in Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 39 So. 523, that no statute would be condemned by the courts as unconstitutional unless in palpable conflict with some Constitutional provision, and such a conflict will not be implied.

Where there is a reasonable doubt of the Constitutionality of a statute, the court must uphold it. Natchez, etc., R. Co. v....