State ex rel. Kunkel v. Circuit Court of La Porte County
| Decision Date | 24 March 1936 |
| Docket Number | 26647 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. KUNKEL et al. v. CIRCUIT COURT OF LA PORTE COUNTY et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. COURTS---Procedure in General---State Courts---Federal Procedure Not Controlling.---The statutory federal rule of procedure does not control the courts of the states. p. 685.
Philip Lutz, Jr., Atty. Gen., J. Edward Barce, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Thomas F. O'Mara, of Terre Haute, for appellants.
C. V Shields, Earl Rowley, and K. D. Osborn, all of La Porte, for appellees.
This is an original action in which an order is sought prohibiting the respondents from proceeding with a habeas corpus proceeding where it appears that the petitioner is held upon a commitment executing the judgment of a court of general criminal jurisdiction.
Whether the La Porte circuit court may, upon the petition of any or all of the prisoners committed to the Inidana State Prison, review the proceedings of any or all of the other courts of like jurisdiction within the state, and discharge any prisoner if it is determined that he did not have a fair and lawful trial, is the only question presented for decision.
It has been repeatedly announced by decisions of this court from the earliest date that persons convicted and sentenced by courts having jurisdiction of the crime involved cannot be discharged in habeas corpus proceedings. Stephenson v. State (1933) 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E 633, 186 N.E. 293, and cases cited. This is the common-law rule, and was the rule in federal courts until the practice was modified by act of Congress.
The statutory federal rule of procedure does not control the courts of the states. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States only requires that the state provide some procedure by which a conviction obtained by unfair or unlawful methods may be reviewed. Mooney v. Holohan, Warden (1935) 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406. In this state a motion for a new trial or petition for writ of error coram nobis are available as a remedy in such cases, with the right of review by this court for error.
Section 3-1918, Burns' Ann.St.1933, section 1033, Baldwin's 1934, provides that: This statute is but declaratory of the common law. Gillie, Sheriff, v. Fleming (1922) 191 Ind. 444, 133 N.E. 737.
Respondents' counsel, in oral argument, concedes the above to be the rule, but contends that the rule should be changed, and that the La Porte circuit court should be held to have jurisdiction to investigate and pass upon the conduct of the trial in the Hamilton circuit court (or any other court in which a prisoner is convicted), and, in the event it determines a fair trial was not had, power to declare that the Hamilton circuit court thereupon lost jurisdiction of the case, in which event the prisoner would be discharged.
The question cannot be regarded as an open one, but, if it were, reason and authority, to say nothing of the statute, would require us to adopt the rule as it now exists. It appears from the petition for habeas corpus that the petitioner was charged with murder, entered a plea of not guilty, was tried, convicted, and committed upon the judgment of the Hamilton circuit court; that there was an appeal from the judgment of conviction, and that it was affirmed in this court. It is alleged that he is entitled to his liberty, first, because the change of venue from Marion county to Hamilton county was not properly perfected; and, second, that by a corrupt conspiracy, involving court officers, jurors, witnesses, and his own counsel, he was prevented from having a fair trial, and due process of law was denied him. But if these facts were established by proof, they would only entitled him to a new trial, and not to be discharged from custody. Jurisdiction to grant the new trial, if such facts can be established, lies in the Hamilton circuit court, and the Hamilton circuit court has the right and power to hold the prisoner until he has had another trial, and the respondent court has no jurisdiction to grant a new trial of a case that was tried in the Hamilton circuit court. Any other rule would lead to intolerable conflicts of jurisdiction and the destruction of the orderly processes by which justice is administered. The allegations in the petition show that the petitioner appealed from the decision of the Hamilton circuit court to this court, and that the judgment was affirmed, and the opinion of this court shows that the question involving the change of venue from Marion county was presented to the Hamilton circuit court, and to this court on appeal, and that the Hamilton circuit court was held to have had jurisdiction. When a person is tried for a felony and convicted, and there is a judgment of guilty which is executed by commitment to the state prison, that judgment is a bar to a further prosecution for the offense. In the case of many prisoners there is a motion for a new trial, and an appeal to this court in which the judgment is affirmed. It is unthinkable that in such cases the La Porte circuit court may sit in judgment and examine into the conditions under which the case was tried, and the conduct and rulings of the trial court, and determine whether in its judgment a fair trial was had, and discharge the prisoner in case it determines a fair trial was not had, when, at most, under the unquestioned rules of law, he was entitled only to a new trial. Such a procedure would deprive the state of the right to try the defendant again. Even in cases where the defendant had moved for a new trial in the court where he was tried, and a new trial had been denied, and the ruling affirmed upon appeal, such a procedure would vest the La Porte circuit court with jurisdiction to pass upon the same questions which had been presented by the motion for a new trial and passed upon by the trial court and by this court, and to discharge the prisoner if it disagreed with the court in which he was tried and with this court upon the question of whether or not a fair trial had been had. Facts entitling a defendant to a new trial may not be available within the time in which a motion for a new trial may be filed, but such facts may be presented only by petition for a writ of error coram nobis, exclusive jurisdiction to entertain which is in the court rendering judgment, with the right to appeal to this court for review, and there can be no jurisdiction in the La Porte circuit court to review and overrule the decision of the trial court and of this court upon any question which is thus presented. Nor has the defendant the option to present matter which would entitle him to a new trial upon petition for writ of error coram nobis to the La Porte circuit court in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
It is expressly alleged in the petition for habeas corpus that there have been five previous applications for habeas corpus. Two were in the federal court, and the writ was denied. The first in the state courts was filed in the La Porte superior court, where relief was denied, and on appeal to this court the judgment was affirmed. Stephenson v. Daly (1927) 200 Ind. 196, 158 N.E. 289. Every question here presented was decided in this latter case, except the question of whether a writ of prohibition will lie to prevent further action in a habeas corpus proceeding after it appears that the prisoner has been tried and convicted and committed by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Temporary writs of prohibition were issued by this court prohibiting the trial courts from proceeding with the other two petitions for writs of habeas corpus. But the petitions were dismissed, and there was no final decision of this court as to whether the writ of prohibition will lie.
If the respondent court was without jurisdiction to proceed, the writ will lie; otherwise not.
In Wright v. State (1855) 7 Ind. 324, 326, this court had under consideration a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed as an original action. It was held that the prisoner, having been tried in the Johnson circuit court, and a verdict returned which was the equivalent of an acquittal was entitled to be discharged, but that, since there was no release of the prisoner by any judgment of that court, he must still be regarded as in custody under the indictment; that, when such a state of facts is made to appear upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even this court, a court of superior jurisdiction, has no power to discharge the prisoner. It is said: In the case of Wright v. State (1854) 5 Ind. 290, 294, 296, 61 Am.Dec. 90 (), it was held that, notwithstanding the discharge of a jury by the Elkhart circuit court entitled the petitioner to be discharged from custody, since it was the equivalent of an acquittal, the court of common pleas properly remanded the prisoner to the circuit court after having issued a writ, upon having been advised of the facts. It is said in the opinion: ...
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