State ex rel. Lambert v. County Com'n of Boone County

Decision Date09 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. 22371,22371
Citation192 W.Va. 448,452 S.E.2d 906
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia ex rel. David F. LAMBERT, in his Official Capacity as Director of the West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Agency, Petitioner, v. The COUNTY COMMISSION OF BOONE COUNTY, et al., Respondents, The Cities and Towns of Ravenswood, Lewisburg, et al., Intervenors.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly." Syl. pt. 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975).

2. The West Virginia Public Employees Retirement Act, set forth in W.Va.Code, 5-10-1, et seq., must be read in pari materia with the West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Act, set forth in W.Va.Code, 5-16-1, et seq. (specifically, §§ 2(7), 10, 22 and 24 of chapter 5, article 16 of the W.Va.Code). These statutes relate to providing benefits to retired employees who participate in the Public Employees Retirement System. Therefore, employers who elect to participate in the Public Employees Retirement System must, pursuant to W.Va.Code, 5-16-22 [1992], contribute to the Public Employees Insurance Agency when its retired employee elects to participate in the Public Employees Insurance Agency. After all, it is by virtue of the employer's participation in the Public Employees Retirement System that the retired employee has the option of electing to participate in the Public Employees Insurance Agency.

3. " 'In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches. Every reasonable construction must be resorted to by the courts in order to sustain constitutionality, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment in question. Courts are not concerned with questions relating to legislative policy. The general powers of the legislature, within constitutional limits, are almost plenary. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the negation of legislative power must appear beyond reasonable doubt.' Point 1 Syllabus, State ex rel. Appalachian Power Company v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740 [, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965) ]." Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. W.Va. Housing Development Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W.Va. 636, 171 S.E.2d 545 (1969).

4. "A legislative act which arbitrarily establishes diverse treatment for the members of a natural class results in invidious discrimination and where such treatment or classification bears no reasonable relationship to the purpose of the act, such act violates the equal protection and due process clauses of our federal and state constitutions." Syl. pt. 1, O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).

5. The provision of W.Va.Code, 5-16-22 [1992], which requires employers, whether or not they elect to participate in the Public Employees Insurance Agency, to contribute to the Public Employees Insurance Agency if they participate in the Public Employees Retirement System and their retired employees elect to participate in the Public Employees Insurance Agency, does not violate the equal protection principle found in West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 10, which is West Virginia's due process clause. Such provision relates to a legitimate governmental purpose of providing medical coverage to retired employees who participate in the Public Employees Retirement System.

6. "W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 30, which requires that the object of an act of the Legislature 'shall be expressed in the title,' serves two salutary purposes. First, it is designed to give notice by way of the title of the contents of the act so that legislators and other interested parties may be informed of its purpose. Second, it is designed to prevent any attempt to surreptitiously insert in the body of the act matters foreign to its purpose which, if known, might fail to gain the consent of the majority." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Walton v. Casey, 179 W.Va. 485, 370 S.E.2d 141 (1988).

7. "The requirement of expressiveness contemplated by W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 30 necessarily implies explicitness. A title must, at a minimum, furnish a 'pointer' to the challenged provision in the act. The test to be applied is whether the title imparts enough information to one interested in the subject matter to provoke a reading of the act." Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Walton v. Casey, 179 W.Va. 485, 370 S.E.2d 141 (1988).

8. "In considering whether an act of the Legislature is violative of the constitutional requirement concerning its title, the language and title of the act will be construed in the most comprehensive sense favorable to its validity." Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Graney & Ford v. Sims, 144 W.Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958).

9. "In determining whether a Contract Clause violation has occurred, a three-step test is utilized. The initial inquiry is whether the statute has substantially impaired the contractual rights of the parties. If a substantial impairment is shown, the second step of the test is to determine whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the legislation. Finally, if a legitimate public purpose is demonstrated, the court must determine whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation's adoption." Syl. pt. 4, Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 181 W.Va. 16, 380 S.E.2d 183 (1989).

10. "A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist--(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy." Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969).

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Atty. Gen., Donald L. Darling, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., Charleston, for David P. Lambert.

Dennis R. Vaughan, Jr., Vaughan & Withrow, Charleston, for The County Com'n of Boone County, The County Com'n of Braxton County, The County Com'n of Kanawha County, The County Com'n of McDowell County, The County Com'n of Raleigh County The Hurricane Water Bd., The Hurricane Sewer Bd., The City of Buckhannon, The City of Beckley, The Buckhannon Waste Collection Bd., The City of Summersville; and Intervenors, The Cities and Towns of Ravenswood, Lewisburg, Wellsburg, Grafton and Bridgeport.

J.W. Feuchtenberger, Stone, McGhee, Feuchtenberger & Barringer, Bluefield, for The City of Bluefield.

John F. McCuskey, Campbell, Woods, Bagley, Emerson, McNeer & Herndon, Charleston, for Prestera Center for Mental Health Services and Valley Comprehensive Health Center.

Edward M. Kowal, Jr., Campbell, Woods, Bagley, Emerson, McNeer & Herndon, Huntington, for Green Acres Regional Center, Inc.

McHUGH, Justice:

The petitioner, David Lambert, who is the Director of the Public Employees Insurance Agency (hereinafter "PEIA"), is seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents, who are various city or county government authorities or non-profit corporations, who have elected to not participate in PEIA, 1 to contribute to the cost of coverage for their retired employees who have elected PEIA coverage. For reasons stated below, we grant a writ of mandamus.

I

The question arises as to whether the respondents, who have employees who received PEIA benefits, should contribute to PEIA. In order to resolve this issue it is necessary to understand the relationship of the respondents to the Public Employees Retirement System (hereinafter "PERS") and PEIA.

All of the respondents have elected not to participate in PEIA pursuant to W.Va.Code, 5-16-22 [1992] which states, in relevant part:

The provisions of this article shall not be mandatory upon any employee or employer who is not an employee of or is not the state of West Virginia, its boards, agencies, commissions, departments, institutions or spending units or a county board of education, and nothing contained in this article shall be construed so as to compel any employee or employer to enroll in or subscribe to any insurance plan authorized by the provisions of this article.

However, all of the respondents, regardless of whether they are city or county government authorities or non-profit corporations, have elected to participate in PERS, which is set forth in the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement Act found in W.Va.Code, 5-10-1, et seq. As the petitioner points out, the respondents' participation in PERS is a voluntary act. See W.Va.Code, 5-10-2(4) [1988] and 5-10-16 [1961].

One of the benefits accorded to the respondents, because of their participation in PERS, is that the respondents' employees are eligible to elect PEIA coverage upon their retirement. The authorization for this benefit is in The West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Act found in W.Va.Code, 5-16-1, et seq. Specifically, W.Va.Code, 5-16-10 [1992], in relevant part, authorizes PEIA to provide coverage for retired employees and their spouses and dependents:

Any contract or contracts entered into hereunder may provide for group hospital and surgical, group major medical, group prescription drug and group life and accidental death insurance for retired employees and their spouses and dependents as defined by...

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