State ex rel. Leftwich v. Dist. Court

• Decision Date: 10 June 1889
• Citation: 42 N.W. 598,41 Minn. 42
• Parties: STATE EX REL. LEFTWICH v DISTRICT COURT.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

41 Minn. 42

42 N.W. 598

STATE EX REL. LEFTWICHvDISTRICT COURT.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 10, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. This court may review an order punishing a person for contempt of court.

2. Where the penalty imposed is for the benefit of a party, the order may be brought here by appeal; if it is only in punishment of the offense, in other words, is for a criminal contempt, there can be no appeal and certiorari will lie.

3. An order adjudging a person guilty of a criminal contempt, and imposing a penalty, will not be reversed unless it is so apparent that no contempt has been committed as to indicate that the court used its authority capriciously, oppressively, and arbitrarily.

4. Counsel trying a cause, while he may except to the rulings and orders of the court, is bound to respect and obey them. If, after the court has ruled against a particular course of examination of a witness, he still persists in the same course of examination, he may be guilty of a contempt.

Certiorari to district court, Hennepin county.

Thomas J. Leftwich, attorney pro se.

Brooks & Hendrix, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

This is a certiorari to bring here for review the proceedings of the district court in Hennepin county in imposing on the relator Leftwich a fine for contempt of court. The record certified here shows that there was on trial in the district court an action in which the relator was attorney for the plaintiff, and at the time he was examining a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. He had asked the witness several questions, all of the same general character, each being in substance but a repetition of those preceding it. The court, on the questions being objected to, as each was asked, decided them improper, and sustained the objections. The relator, however, persisted in making offers substantially similar to those made by the questions which had been overruled, and which the court probably construed to be made with intent to evade its rulings, or with some other than a bona fide purpose to fairly present the cause of his client. The court warned him that if he continued in that course it would consider it a contempt of court. He did continue it, and the court thereupon called on him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, and, as he showed none, the court adjudged him guilty of contempt, and directed to be entered against him a fine of $10.

There can be little, if any, question that an order adjudging a person guilty of contempt, and imposing a penalty upon him, may be brought here for review. The authorities which hold that at the common law the authority of every court to punish for contempts committed in its presence is final and uncontrollable, cannot apply here where, by the constitution, the appellate jurisdiction of this court extends to all cases at law and in equity. In State v. Webber, 37 N. W. Rep. 949, we held this constitutional provision to mean that in all judicial proceedings the judgment which finally determines the rights of parties is subject to review by this court. But objection is made that appeal, and not certiorari, is the proper mode of bringing such a matter here for review. This, we think, depends on the nature and purpose of the adjudication for contempt. In re Fanning, 41 N. W. Rep. 1076, we held that an order committing for contempt may have a double aspect-First, in the nature of a remedy to a party to enforce his rights; second, punitive, merely in punishment of the offense of contempt,-in the first for the private benefit of the party, in the...