State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella, 146

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 146,146
• Citation: 331 Md. 270,627 A.2d 1055
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey ex rel. Sandra LENNON v. Glenn STRAZZELLA. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 270

331 Md. 270

627 A.2d 1055

STATE of New Jersey ex rel. Sandra LENNON v. Glenn STRAZZELLA.

No. 146, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 22, 1993.

Areta L. Kupchyk, Asst. Atty. Gen., (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Charles J. Muskin, Glen Burnie, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge.

In 1983, upon receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Sandra Lennon assigned her right to receive child support from Glenn Strazzella, the appellee, to the State of Delaware, which then filed a paternity and child support action against the appellee. ¹ The appellee requested a blood test and Ms. Lennon refused to cooperate. As a result, the State of Delaware terminated Ms. Lennon's assistance and the court dismissed the action without prejudice.

In 1990, Ms. Lennon, then living in New Jersey, applied for AFDC benefits, assigning her rights to receive child support to the State of New Jersey, the appellant. The appellant filed on behalf of Ms. Lennon, see Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.) § 10-301 et seq. of the Family Law Article, the Maryland Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), a paternity and child support action against the appellee, a resident of Maryland, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The appellee again requested a blood test, again Ms. Lennon refused to cooperate, and again the case was dismissed without prejudice. The court ordered the case dismissed in response to a motion to dismiss filed by the appellant.

The appellant filed another paternity and child support action against the appellee in 1991. ² The appellee moved to dismiss, arguing that Ms. Lennon had voluntarily dismissed two prior paternity and support actions. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted the motion. We issued a writ of certiorari prior to consideration, by the Court of Special Appeals, or the appellant's appeal of that judgment. 329 Md. 338, 619 A.2d 547. We address the proper construction of Rule 2-506, specifically, whether the two dismissal rule embodied in Rule 2-506(c) applies to a dismissal by the court, even one prompted by a motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff.

I.

The appellant posits that it, not Ms. Lennon, is the "real party in interest" in this case. It points out that Ms. Lennon, an AFDC recipient, is required by law, see N.J.Stat.Ann. § 44:10-2 (1940 & 1992 Cum.Supp.), to assign her right to receive child support to the State of New Jersey; thus, it asserts, it, rather than Ms. Lennon, has the right to enforce the appellee's support obligation. Additionally, the appellant, contending that the lower court incorrectly concluded that Ms. Lennon voluntarily dismissed two prior paternity actions, notes that neither Ms. Lennon, nor the State of New Jersey has ever filed a notice of dismissal in either of the prior actions; consequently, it argues Rule 2-506(c) does not apply. Lastly, the appellant insists that a dismissal pursuant to Rule 2-506(c) is inconsistent with the Paternity Statute, see Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.) § 5-1001 et seq. of the Family Law Article and, thus, is barred as a matter of law.

As the appellee sees it, on the other hand, the appellant is not the real party in interest, either in the current action or in the previous one it filed. Although he concedes that both federal and state law require a recipient of AFDC to assign to the state his or her rights to receive child support payments, the appellee posits that, because Ms. Lennon lost her right to proceed against him when appellant's action was dismissed as a result of her refusal to take a blood test, the second time that had occurred, the appellant, her assignee, lost its right as well. In addition, the appellee contends that the law has been clear for over a century that an order dismissing an action bars another action for the same cause. The real issue, he opines, is the effect of an order of dismissal which does not state whether it is with or without prejudice. He suggests, notwithstanding Rule 2-506(c), that when the order of dismissal is silent, the only logical effect which should flow from the order is that consistent with the basic "notice of dismissal."

II.

We begin our analysis, as we must, with Rule 2-506(c). It provides:

(c) Effect.--Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously dismissed in a court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim.

To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same canons and principles of construction used to interpret statutes. Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 563, 611 A.2d 581, 583 (1992); State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 533, 555 A.2d 494, 496 (1989); O'Donnell v. McGann, 310 Md. 342, 350, 529 A.2d 372, 376 (1987); In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477, 481, 505 A.2d 504, 507 (1986); Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. When the words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further. Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 755, 521 A.2d 1225, 1230 (1987); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 685, 516 A.2d 976, 982 (1986); Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985). Only when the language of the rule is ambiguous is it necessary that we look elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent. State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 280 Md. 35, 41, 371 A.2d 645, 648 (1977). We are also to give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Bd. of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982); Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 389, 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982); Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). Finally, we seek to give the rule a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense. D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985); Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 315, 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985).

Rule 2-506(c) is clear; a dismissal is deemed to be without prejudice unless a contrary intention is shown in the instrument effecting the dismissal. The issue we must decide is the meaning of the proviso, "except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim." (emphasis supplied) The other portions of the rule provide some guidance:

(a) By Notice of Dismissal or Stipulation.--Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute, a plaintiff may dismiss an action without leave of court (1) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the adverse party files an answer or a motion for summary judgment or (2) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.

(b) By Order of Court.--Except as provided in section (a) of this Rule, a plaintiff may dismiss an action only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded prior to the filing of the plaintiff's motion for the voluntary dismissal, the action shall not be dismissed over the objection of the party who pleaded the counterclaim unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.

An action may be voluntarily dismissed in three ways: by notice of dismissal; by stipulation of dismissal; see 2-506(a); or by order of court. Rule 2-506(b). Only in the case of a notice of dismissal, if done "before the adverse party files an answer or a motion for summary judgment," may a plaintiff act completely unilaterally. The issue then is whether, when there has been a prior voluntary dismissal, ³ however effected--by notice of dismissal, stipulation of dismissal, or order of court--a subsequent voluntary dismissal by means other than notice of dismissal, "operates as adjudication upon the merits."

By using the term "notice of dismissal", Rule 2-506(c) makes clear that it is that form of voluntary dismissal that, following "a previous dismissal," operates as an adjudication of the merits. In this case, therefore, assuming the Delaware action was voluntarily dismissed, ⁴ the initial Anne Arundel County action, because effected by court order, albeit on motion of the appellant, and not by notice of dismissal, did not operate as an adjudication of the merits. To be an adjudication of the merits, a dismissal by court order, even one granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, or based on stipulation must state that the dismissal is with prejudice.

Our reading of the rule is confirmed by its history. In the interest of completeness, we may look at the purpose of the rule and compare the result obtained when we consider its plain language in light of that purpose. Sabatier v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 323 Md. 232, 250, 592 A.2d 1098, 1107 (1991); Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485; Baltimore County Coalition v. Unfair Taxes v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 203, 582 A.2d 510, 519 (1990); Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989); Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).

Rule...